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Executive Summary
My alma mater defines the conferral of a doctorate in economics as further edu-
cation in a specific science with state-of-the-art methods beyond the postgraduate
level. According to Encyclopædia Britannica, science can be defined as, “[...] any
system of knowledge that is concerned with the physical world and its phenomena
and that entails unbiased observations and systematic experimentation. In general,
a science involves a pursuit of knowledge covering general truths or the operations of
fundamental laws.”1 Accordingly, science can be divided into two major categories,
the natural sciences, which is the systematic study of natural phenomena, and the
social sciences, which is the systematic study of human behavior and societies.
Critics argue that economists often try to sound like natural scientists by using
mathematic tools and by conveying the impression they are providing incontrovert-
ible conclusions. By contending that natural scientists can draw on a set of irrevo-
cable principles, critics neglect the fact that the current ’incontrovertible’ state of
knowledge in the natural sciences is the result of a long line of errors of judgment
and continues to remain error-prone. Furthermore, they fail, perhaps due to the
narrowness of the human mind and its inability to fully conceive the phenomena
or perhaps because the phenomena are expanding like the universe itself, to take
into consideration that this process of knowledge creation is most likely infinite. It
is also necessary to bear in mind that utilizing the structural science of mathemat-
ics in the natural sciences is not a matter of course. In ancient times, Aristotle’s
Metaphysics made the following point, “The minute accuracy of mathematics is not
to be demanded in all cases, but only in the case of things which have no matter.
Hence method is not that of natural science; for presumably the whole of nature
has matter.”2 Mathematics did not prove to be the most accurate method of de-
scribing natural phenomena until the 17th century. For example, Immanuel Kant
1See e.g. Encyclopædia Britannica (2009).
2For an English version of Aristotle’s ’Metaphysics’, 995a 14-17 see e.g. Aristotle and Ross
(1953)
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emphasized mathematics as the fundamental structure and content of the natural
sciences, stating, “In any special doctrine of Nature, there is only as much genuine
science as there is mathematics.”3
In economics, mathematics was not considered a powerful tool and framework for
generating new knowledge until the 19th century. In his 1926 seminal article, “Sur
un proble`me d’e`conomie pure”, Ragnar Frisch proclaimed the notion of unifying
economic theory, statistics and mathematics, referring to it as ’econometrics’.4 The
empirical experimentation and observation of economic phenomena based on the
economic theory associated with applying econometric methods to the collected data
provide the basis for revealing economic relationships. The objective of applied
econometrics, which involves assessing economic theories and developments with
respect to probability, is to gain a deeper understanding of economic relationships.
However, as Albert Einstein concludes,5
“[...] as far as the propositions of mathematics refer to reality, they are
not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality”
As a result, with the evolution of the use of mathematics in economics as my point of
departure, the goal of this doctoral thesis is to bridge the gap between scientific re-
search and ’phenomena’ in practice by using state-of-the-art econometric techniques.
In order to remain tethered to reality and to promote the application-oriented rel-
evance of my research, three different economic fields will be examined: mutual
fund fee structures, real estate swap pricing and the capital structure of real estate
companies.
3For an English version of Kant’s ’Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science’, A VIII see
e.g. Kant and Friedman (2004)
4Frisch (1936) states that the meaning of the earlier reference by Ciompa (1910) lies more on
the descriptive side of what is now called econometrics and that, consequently, the term was first
employed by Frisch (1926).
5For an English version of Einstein’s ’Geometry and Experience’ Lecture before the Prussian
Academy of Sciences on January 27, 1921 see Einstein (1922).
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Research Objectives, Methods and Scientific Con-
tributions
Are Mutual Fund Fees Too High?
The mutual fund industry has grown into a 25 trillion dollar business worldwide,
representing 39% of the world’s GDP by the end of 2010. Investors can choose be-
tween incredible 70,000 different funds.6 Proponents of this trend emphasize that
mutual funds provide investors with management services and the desirable option
of gaining access to a well-diversified portfolio, even when they can only invest a
small amount. Additionally, these investment vehicles can adjust their portfolio
at substantially lower transaction costs than private investors. However, for their
services, mutual funds charge management and administration fees. Pundits argue,
among them academics and even the Deutsche Bundesbank7, that the costs of ac-
tively managed mutual funds bear no proportion with their benefit, which raises the
issue of whether direct equity investments are perhaps more appealing to a wide
range of individual investors than mutual funds.
Research on this tradeoff extends as far back as Smith and Schreiner (1970),
Fielitz (1974), and Jacob (1974). More recently, Sankaran and Patil (1999), Kellerer,
Mansini, and Speranza (2000), and Baule (2010) pursue this matter. However, none
of these studies take into account the fact that the tradeoff between direct and indi-
rect equity investments depends substantially on investor preferences. In our paper
’Are Mutual Fund Fees Too High?’, my coauthor, Marcel Marekwica, and I demon-
strate that the fee and cost level that makes private investors indifferent between
direct and indirect stock investments varies substantially according to risk aversion,
the amount of money invested, transaction costs, correlations between asset returns,
and the length of investment horizon.
Mutual fund performance and diversification are broadly discussed in the financial
literature. Examples include Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993), Jegadeesh
and Titman (1993), Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994), Brown and Goetzmann (1995),
6Source: European Fund and Asset Management Association, International Statistical Release
2010, Supplementary Tables and the World Bank’s DataBank.
7Although, these findings are already discussed in academic journals for several times, it is
remarkable and new that a central bank gives in such a direct manner financial advice for retail
customers. See Deutsche Bundesbank (2011).
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Carhart (1997), Busse, Goyal, and Wahlal (2010), Fama and French (2010), and
Blitz, Huij, and Swinkels (2010). The results they obtain are all fairly similar. None
of this research indicates the existence of differential manager information or superior
stock-picking skills on the part of fund managers. Consequently, investors should
generally prefer funds with lower fees, in order to avoid the negative impact of fees
on performance. In addition, a number of studies pioneered by Jorion (1985) show
that the out-of sample performance of ex-ante optimally determined portfolios may
underperform ex-post, in comparison to na¨ıve strategies such as an equally weighted
portfolio. DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2009) confirm this outcome impressively,
using 14 different models. The implications of the cost of investing are addressed
empirically, for example by Carhart (1997), Bogle (2005), Fama and French (2010)
or Blitz, Huij, and Swinkels (2010). They conclude that the cost effect of the fee
– higher fees reduce fund performance – generally outweigh the benefit effect – in-
creased investment company profitability and thus their ability to attract skilled
managers. Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2010) argue, from a theoretical perspective, that
a growing mutual fund industry inevitably and without exception, reduces actively
managed funds’ ability to outperform a passive benchmark. Khorana, Servaes, and
Tufano (2009) study the fee structure and obtain average total shareholder costs of
1.53% for the USA. Recently, Cremers, Ferreira, Matos, and Starks (2011) report
average costs of 1.38% for actively managed mutual funds, 0.3% for exchange traded
funds, and 0.26% for passively managed mutual funds.
Throughout our research, we consider an investor who can either invest directly
with up to N different equities or indirectly with an equity mutual fund. Indirect
investments through equity mutual funds provide two key advantages – low-wealth
investors gain access to diversified portfolios, and the portfolio rebalancing costs are
lower for institutional investors than for individual investors. In our model, we con-
sider a wealth- maximizing investor with constant relative risk aversion. We further
assume that the mutual fund invests in such a way that the investor’s utility is max-
imized and the returns are multivariate lognormally distributed. Since there is no
closed-form expression known for sums of lognormals and due to the non-linearity
of the utility function, we have to rely on numerical methods. We draw on a Monte
Carlo simulation to approximate the distribution of total final wealth. The results
are based on 50,000 simulated paths each. For our base-case parameter setting, the
fee that makes the investor indifferent between investing in a mutual fund and a
direct stock investment is about 0.63%. Hence, an investor prefers a mutual fund
4
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if its fee is below 0.63%. By implication, he prefers a direct stock investment if
mutual funds charge fees exceeding 0.63%. However, this result must be seen in
a broader context. The fee to which the investor is indifferent varies substantially
according to the investor’s wealth level and risk aversion, the correlations between
stocks, transaction costs, and the length of investment horizon. The lower the in-
vestor’s wealth level, the higher the transaction costs, the greater his risk aversion,
and the shorter the length of his investment horizon, the higher the ’indifferent fee’.
Our results imply that the fees of many actively managed equity mutual funds are
at levels that make direct stock investments more appealing to a wide range of in-
dividual investors. The relatively low fee levels of passively managed equity mutual
funds and exchange traded funds on the other hand, make these investment vehicles
appealing to a wide range of investors. In further research, our results could be in-
vestigated empirically. However, the current data are inadequate for this approach
at the individual investor level.
An Empirical Evaluation of Normative Commercial Real Es-
tate Swap Pricing
The real estate derivative market is still in its infancy. Despite the fact that
institutional-grade commercial real estate constitutes one third of the overall in-
vestable asset market8, a functioning derivatives market has existed only since the
mid-2000s, when swap contracts, based on private market indices, began to be traded
in the UK in significant amounts. The standard commercial real estate derivative
type of contract – total return swaps – are over-the-counter deals and their market
liquidity remains far behind that of other established derivative markets. Market
participants primarily name three concerns regarding the low acceptance. These are
the lack of a secondary market and dealers, a shortage of liquidity, and concerns as
to how real estate derivatives should be priced. Fabozzi, Shiller, and Tunaru (2009,
2010) argue that the imperfection of real estate markets – serial correlation and
inertia in the returns – is the main obstacle to establishing liquidity in the market.
Shiller (2008) shows that as long as investors do not understand the pricing process,
their confidence in the market will remain low. They will thus remain unwilling to
trade, preventing the critical mass that is necessary to launch a new market. In con-
8Estimate as of end 2009, based on data from the World Bank for stocks, from the Quarterly
Review of the Bank for International Settlements for bonds and from Prudential Real Estate
Investors for real estate.
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trast to the close-to-zero spreads over the risk-free rate for financial market swaps,
the spreads for commercial real estate total return swaps have been large and have
also fluctuated considerably over the last few years. The literature on real estate
pricing can be clustered into two groups: no-arbitrage models and equilibrium pric-
ing models. Based on arbitrage analysis, Buttimer, Kau, and Slawson (1997), Bjo¨rk
and Clapham (2002) and Patel and Pereira (2008) theoretically examine the pricing
of real estate swap contracts. Otaka and Kawaguchi (2002) model the pricing of
real estate derivatives under incomplete market conditions. Baran, Buttimer, and
Clark (2008) calibrate a two-factor commodity pricing model, accounting for chal-
lenges due to lags and the low frequency of index updates. By contrast, Geltner and
Fisher (2007) argue against the arbitrage pricing approach with regard to the anal-
ysis of swaps based on appraisal-based indices, because the index cannot be traded
and may not be valued on an ongoing basis, so as to correspond with the equilibrium
expected return in the real estate market tracked by the index. The appraisal-based
indices lag and smooth actual market developments and eliminate the use of no-
arbitrage models. Based on equilibrium pricing considerations, Geltner and Fisher
demonstrate theoretically how to price swaps fairly. Lizieri, Marcato, Ogden, and
Baum (2010) simulate some of the deviations from fair swap prices by specific real
estate characteristics of the direct real estate market, such as high transaction costs
and long execution times.
In the paper ’An Empirical Evaluation of Normative Commercial Real Estate
Swap Pricing’ my coauthor, Christian Rehring, and I empirically analyze fair com-
mercial real estate swap pricing, using the equilibrium swap pricing considerations
proposed by Geltner and Fisher. We investigate total return swaps, when the cal-
endar year real estate index return is exchanged for a fixed rate for the US and
UK markets, emphasizing how the different market dynamics affect fair swap prices.
The empirical part of our investigation comprises four steps. Firstly, we develop
a vector autoregressive model of expected index returns and compare these results
with the actual index returns and with competing forecasts. In the second step,
we estimate equilibrium risk premia for appraisal-based real estate index returns.
Thirdly based on the index return forecasts and the equilibrium risk premia, we
compute the normative fair swap prices, i.e., those consistent with the Geltner and
Fisher model. Finally, the development of actual commercial real estate swap prices
in recent years is interpreted in the light of our calculated “fair” swap prices. Qual-
itatively, the estimated swap prices track actual market developments quite well,
6
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indicating that the modeled swap prices enhance our understanding of the pricing
of commercial real estate swaps. The deviations are particularly high for UK at the
beginning of 2009. With hindsight, the large negative actual prices were not justi-
fied, because the IPD total return was positive in 2009 and 2010. In general, the
differences between actual and estimated swap prices are smaller for the US. The
reason could be that appraisal-based returns have a higher degree of predictability.
Counterparty risk might explain part of the difference between actual and estimated
swap prices. However, Lizieri, Marcato, Ogden, and Baum (2010) suggest that this
is of minor importance, since no principal is exchanged, the treatment of swaps in
default is favorable and the intermediary market maker offers a guarantee. In fact,
Lizieri, Marcato, Ogden, and Baum (2010) explore the spreads caused by the specific
characteristics of direct real estate markets. Also, our model could be extended, for
example, by a rolling calibration window for the forecast and, even if we have already
included time-variant smoothing parameters, by time-variant betas for the market
risk premia. This may provide superior results, but would be beyond the scope of
this paper. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to empirically explain
the large spreads for commercial real estate total return swaps with state-of-the-art
methods.
The Rat Race of Capital Structure Research: Two Spots on
Leverage
Since the seminal work of Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller in 1958, despite the
large number of capital structure studies, no one generally accepted capital struc-
ture theory has emerged. Consequently my third paper ’An Empirical Evaluation
of Normative Commercial Real Estate Swap Pricing’ does not aim to validate any
of the capital structure theories. In fact, my coauthor, Ralf Hohenstatt, and I follow
the results of Graham and Harvey (2001), who state that “financial flexibility is the
single most important determinant of capital structure according to CFOs”. DeAn-
gelo and DeAngelo (2007), who aimed at filling the gap in capital structure theory,
conclude that “[f]inancial Flexibility is the critical missing link for an empirically
viable [capital structure] theory.” Gamba and Triantis (2008) directly address this
concept and provide the following definition: “Financial flexibility represents the
ability of a firm to access and restructure its financing at a low cost. Financially
flexible firms are able to avoid financial distress in the face of negative shocks, and
to readily fund investment when profitable opportunities arise.”
7
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In our paper, leverage is investigated by two spots. Spot A is defined as financial
flexibility, in the sense of anticipating liquidity management. The interactions of
leverage (LEV) with cash & cash equivalents (CCE) and lines of credit (LOC) are
at the heart of the matter. Spot B distinguishes between real stochastic and mainly
mechanical relationships of the ratio leverage and is motivated by the arguments
of Chen and Zhao (2007) and Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010), so as to frac-
tionalize leverage in its debt and equity component. We hypothesize that financial
flexibility is a broader, but more consistent concept in explaining the dynamics of
financing activities, compared to traditional capital structure theory.
By observing US REITs and REOCs from 1995 to 2010, this paper presents a
dynamic multi-equation model, based on a balance sheet identity. The basic con-
cept underlying this paper is a combination of the cash flow statement approach of
Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010), in which we implement the cash flow state-
ment by the intertemporal changes of CCE, and the balance-sheet view of Chen
and Zhao (2007), in which we deal separately with debt and equity dynamics. More
specifically, the concept that we adopt entails a system of equations, estimated by
weighted least squares, where the weight is reciprocal to the number of observations
per year. As both a cross and a time effect are present in our data, we follow the ad-
vice of Petersen (2009) and address the time effect parametrically, by including time
dummies and then estimating the model clustered on the cross section. In addition
to the balance sheet items defining the identity, we include the three instruments of
liquidity management (LEV, CCE and LOC), traditional capital structure determi-
nants and additional dummies approximating firm characteristics with two dummies
unique to our research (investment opportunities and substantial cash-flow short-
falls). In order to deal with the cross-industry variation, we compare the results
subject to the twelve property segments of the entire real estate market.
The six main findings are as follows. Firstly, leverage drives cash & cash equiva-
lents positively, but lines of credit negatively. While the latter result, as well as the
substitutive relationship of CCE and LOC, are backed by the existing literature,
the positive LEV-CCE relationship is contrary to previous research. However, the
findings from our dynamic framework are consistent with arguments of financial flex-
ibility. Secondly, interactions of LEV, CCE and LOC are consistent with the typical
funding cycle suggested by Riddiough and Wu (2009). An alternative explanation
8
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is obtained by interpreting the marginal value of a liquidity instrument as condi-
tional on the original level of the other sources of financial flexibility. Thirdly, the
discussion of mechanical dynamics is not reduced only to debt and equity for LEV,
but also applies to LEV and LOC. The relationship between growth opportunities
and market/book leverage demonstrate this mechanical issue very clearly. Fourthly,
dummies – unique to our research – yield very robust results with respect to the
observation of firms lowering LEV, i.e. preserving debt capacity after investment
shocks. By contrast, FFO shocks affect balance sheet aggregates very similarly to
investment shocks, but generally result in LEV increases. Fifthly, the more firms
overdo debt acquisition due to cash flow improvements, the more prone they are to
cash-flow-investment sensitivity. Finally, firm size seems to substitute for financial
flexibility, at least to some extent.
This paper builds a bridge between emphasizing the characteristics of leverage
in the function of a simplifying ratio, and classifying leverage in the class of drivers
of liquidity management. However, several issues should be addressed in further
research. Firstly, what are the other sources of financial flexibility? Is there a
hierarchy among the sources in terms of efficiency, and under which circumstances?
Can we draw inferences about managerial risk aversion in terms of preferring one
or the other source? What is the relationship between the sources of liquidity and
investment flexibility? And finally, what is the reason for REOCs underutilizing cash
reserves and accordingly, why do REITs almost totally abandon cash as a hedging
instrument?
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Abstract
We study the tradeoff between direct and indirect stock investments through equity
mutual funds for a utility-maximizing investor. Whereas direct investments impose
higher transaction costs on forming a well-diversified portfolio, mutual funds charge
fees for their services. Our result shows that the fee levels that make private investors
indifferent between direct and indirect stock investments vary heavily according to
risk aversion, the amounts invested, correlations between assets, transaction costs
and the length of investment horizon. In particular, our results suggest that for a
wide range of actively managed mutual funds, the fees charged are too high for these
mutual funds to appeal to a wide range of informed investors.
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1.1 Introduction
The mutual fund industry has recently experienced abundant growth throughout
the developed countries. By the end of 2010, the mutual fund industry had grown
to 24.7 trillion dollars under management worldwide, corresponding to an increase
of 38.98% over the last 5 years. Investors could choose among 69,519 different funds
in 2010, an increase of 31.8% compared to the pool of funds in 1999. Although the
largest markets are still located in the USA and Europe, with global market shares
of 47.9% and 32.0%, respectively, the Asian and Pacific (12.4%) and African (0.6%)
countries are steadily bridging the gap with an average annual growth rate of 9.6%
and 16.6% over the last 5 years.1
Mutual funds provide investors with management services and the desirable op-
tion of gaining access to a well-diversified portfolio, even when they only invest a
smaller amount. Furthermore, these investment vehicles can restructure their port-
folios at substantially lower transaction costs than would be the case for private
investors. However, for their services, mutual funds charge management and ad-
ministration fees, which are usually expressed as a proportion of the funds under
management, which reduces the portfolio return. The fees thus entail a tradeoff
between direct and indirect equity investments, the latter being through mutual
funds. Research on this tradeoff ranges back to Smith and Schreiner (1970), Fielitz
(1974), and Jacob (1974). Other work includes Sankaran and Patil (1999), Kellerer,
Mansini, and Speranza (2000), and Baule (2010). However, none of these studies
take into account the fact that the tradeoff between direct and indirect equity in-
vestments depends substantially on investor preferences.
We contribute to the existing literature by studying this tradeoff for a utility-
maximizing investor. This tradeoff can vary considerably between individual in-
vestors. More specifically, we show that the fee level that makes private investors
indifferent between direct and indirect stock investments, varies heavily according
to risk aversion, the amount invested, transaction costs, correlations between asset
returns, and the length of investment horizon. In particular, our results suggest that
for a wide range of mutual funds, the fees charged are too high to make those funds
appealing.
1Source: European Fund and Asset Management Association, International Statistical Release
2010, Supplementary Tables.
16
Are Mutual Fund Fees too High?
Our research draws on two major groups of previous studies on mutual funds and
the cost of investing. First, mutual fund performance and diversification are dis-
cussed comprehensively in the finance literature. for example, Hendricks, Patel, and
Zeckhauser (1993), Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994), and Brown and Goetzmann
(1995) explain the mutual fund performance by ”hot hands” or general investment
strategies. However, their results seem to be driven partly by the one- to three-years
momentum effect documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Carhart (1997)
shows that general factors in equity returns and fund expenses explain almost all
the persistence in equity mutual fund mean and risk-adjusted returns. His results do
not confirm the existence of differential manager information or stock-picking skills.
These results are confirmed, among others, by Busse, Goyal, and Wahlal (2010) and
Blitz, Huij, and Swinkels (2010). Similarly, Fama and French (2010) find that the
majority of funds do not generate αs that are statistically different from zero. As
a consequence, investors should generally prefer funds with lower fees, as lower fees
ceteris paribus have a direct positive impact on performance.
In addition, a number of studies pioneered by Jorion (1985) show that the out-of-
sample performance of the ex-ante optimal determined portfolios within a sample-
based mean-variance model may underperform, in comparison to na¨ıve strategies
such as an equally weighted portfolio. Recently, DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal
(2009) extended the sample-based mean-variance model by approaches designed to
reduce estimation error, relative to the na¨ıve 1/N portfolio. Of the 14 models which
they analyze on the basis of parameters calibrated to the US equity market, none
consistently outperform the 1/N rule in terms of Sharpe ratio, certainty-equivalent
return or turnover. The analytical results and simulations in DeMiguel, Garlappi,
and Uppal (2009) document that the estimation window needed for the sample-
based mean-variance strategy and its extensions to dominate the 1/N benchmark is
around 3,000 months for a portfolio with 25 assets.
Our research further draws on papers that address the cost of investing and
different fee structures. For investors, fees are the price paid for professional invest-
ment management, distribution, and other services. One the one hand, higher fees
reduce fund performance. Alternatively, they might increase investment company
profitability through their ability to attract skilled managers. However, empirical
results by Carhart (1997), Bogle (2005), Fama and French (2010) or Blitz, Huij, and
Swinkels (2010) among others, suggest that the former effect generally outweighs
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the latter. From a theoretical perspective, Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2010) argue that
a growing mutual fund industry reduces actively managed fund’s ability to outper-
form a passive benchmark. Evans (2008) indeed documents that mutual funds with
managerial investments perform slightly better than other mutual funds.
Khorana, Servaes, and Tufano (2009) study the fee structure charged by 46,580
mutual funds in 18 countries, representing approximately 86% of the world fund in-
dustry in 2002. They analyze the management fees, total expense ratios, and total
shareholder costs including load charges. Fund expenses differ substantially by size,
investment objectives and countries. Larger funds and fund complexes charge lower
fees, whereas fees are higher for funds offered in different countries and those domi-
ciled in certain tax havens. Significant differences among countries persist even after
adjusting for these variables. The most robust explanatory factor for the remaining
differences is that fund fees are higher in countries with weaker investor protection.
The asset-weighted average total shareholder costs for equity funds worldwide were
1.80% in 2002. The cost-range varies from 0.82% in the Netherlands to 3.00% in
Canada. In the United States, legal settlements and lawsuits accusing fund man-
agers of illegal kickback commissions have led to cost reductions to 1.53 percentage
points. In a recent study, Cremers, Ferreira, Matos, and Starks (2011) report av-
erage total shareholder costs of 1.38% for actively managed mutual funds, 0.3% for
exchange traded funds, and 0.26% for passively managed mutual funds.
French (2008) compares the actual cost of investing – the transaction costs, fees
and expenses paid for equity mutual funds in the US stock market with the mod-
eled cost of investing, if everybody invested passively from 1980-2006. He calculates
average total costs per year of 0.82% of the total value of domestic equities in 1980
and 0.75% of that in 2006. With a purely passive investment in the market port-
folio, however, the cost of investing would have been 0.18% of the total value of
domestic equities in 1980 and 0.09% in 2006 only. The difference between the active
and passive strategy can be regarded as the cost of active investing. Consequently,
the average annual cost of active investing is 0.66% in terms of total 2006 domestic
equities. From an investment company perspective, this percentage expresses the
cost of price discovery, based on the value of all stocks. From a private investor
perspective, the interpretation is more challenging. Without net transfer between
a passive market portfolio and other investors, the application of a passive strategy
increases the average annual return by 66 basis points. In addition, mutual funds
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have front-load fees that typically vary between 1 and 8.5% (Livingston and O’Neal
(1998)) and tend to have an even lower performance, following significant mutual
fund outflows (Clarke, Cullen, and Gasbarro (2007)). Therefore, it may seem incom-
prehensible that active traders continue to play a negative sum game. According
to French (2008), there are three main reasons. First, investors fail to understand
the potential to increase returns by applying a passive strategy. Second, investment
company promotion suggest that active trading is effortless and profitable. This
impression a private investor might gain is supported by the financial press, which
reports stories of undervalued stocks and prosperous deals. Third, Odean (1998),
Barber and Odean (2001), and Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) report that
investor overconfidence about their ability to gain superior returns overrides the
knowledge that active trading may be costly.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to show how key parameters like risk
aversion, an investor’s wealth level, transaction costs, correlation, and the length of
the investment horizon affect the tradeoff between direct an indirect stock invest-
ments for a utility-maximizing investor. Our results suggest that fees charged by
many mutual funds are too high for them to be attractive for a wide range of private
investors.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 introduces our model. In section 1.3,
we present our results and section 1.4 concludes.
1.2 The Model
Throughout our manuscript, we consider an investor who can either invest directly
in up to N different stocks or indirectly via an equity mutual fund. Indirect invest-
ments via equity mutual funds provide two key advantages. First, equity mutual
funds give private investors with low wealth levels access to diversified portfolios.
Second, transaction costs for rebalancing portfolio weights are substantially lower
for institutional investors than for individual investors.
On the other hand, mutual funds change an annual fee, which is usually a con-
stant percentage of the fund being managed. Depending on the type of fund, the
annual total shareholder costs including load charges typically vary between 0.26%
for passively managed equity mutual funds and 1.6% for actively managed equity
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mutual funds.2 We refer to these expenses and costs as fees in the following analysis
and assume that the mutual fund’s transaction costs are already included in the
annual fee. We further assume that the mutual fund invests in such a way that the
investor’s utility is maximized. Specifically, we consider an investor with constant
relative risk aversion, whose utility from total final wealth is given by
U (W ) =
W
1−γ
1−γ for γ 6= 1
ln (W ) for γ = 1
(1.1)
where γ ≥ 0 denotes the investor’s degree of risk aversion.
Both investors holding mutual funds and those investing directly are subject to
fees or transaction costs. By τf , we denote a fixed transaction-cost rate that the
investor has to pay each time he buys and sells a fund holding. We assume that
investors are not subject to variable transaction costs.3 Initially, our investor is
endowed with an amount of W0− in cash which he seeks to invest. In our base-case
parameter setting, we consider an investor who invests over a one-year investment
horizon. First, restricting ourselves to a one-period investment horizon avoids un-
necessary complications in notation. Second, the average holding period for both
equity mutual funds and individual stocks listed at NYSE is only about one year
(Bogle (2005) and Montier (2007)).4
1.2.1 Diversification
Since the pioneering work of Markowitz (1952), it is known that diversification is
the key driving force for portfolio formation. For a portfolio with n assets, the port-
folio’s variance σ2n is given by
2Cremers, Ferreira, Matos, and Starks (2011) report average total shareholder costs of 0.26%
for passively managed mutual funds for the time period 2002-2007. Ramos (2009) computes an
average total shareholder costs of 1.6% for actively managed mutual funds in 2005.
3We also computed results for settings with variable transaction costs. However, given that
variable transaction costs affect direct and indirect stock investments in a very similar manner,
our results are not affected much by introducing variable transaction costs.
4We consider the impact of longer investment horizons in section 1.3.5.
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σ2n =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
wiwjσiσjρi,j (1.2)
where σi denotes the standard deviation of asset i, ρi,j the correlation between
the return on asset i and asset j, and wi is the portfolio weight of asset i. In order
to compare the performance of a mutual fund with that of direct investments, we
must take into account that the latter might optimally not invest in all assets, in
an attempt to limit the transaction cost burden. In general, the submenu of assets
chosen will depend on the individual characteristics of the assets considered, as well
as the level of the transaction cost for trading these assets.
One of the key advantages from direct investment in stocks is that the investor
can avoid paying management fees. However, for direct investments, transaction
costs can be substantial. In the presence of transaction costs, investors face a trade-
off between the benefits and costs of diversifying their portfolios. This tradeoff can
lead them to hold portfolios that differ from those they would have chosen in the
absence of transaction costs. In particular, in the presence of fixed transaction costs,
investors might choose to hold a smaller number of different assets (see e.g. Mayshar
(1979), Campanale (2009)). The impact of variable transaction costs is, among oth-
ers, studied in Constantinides (1986), Davis and Norman (1990), or Dumas and
Luciano (1991). Liu (2004) and Lynch and Tan (2010) analyze the joint impact of
both forms of transaction costs and Baule (2010) studies a portfolio choice problem
with variable transaction costs and minimum fees.
The dynamic nature of the portfolio problem caused by introducing transaction
costs into optimal multi-period portfolio problems makes the portfolio optimization
computationally challenging. Research in this field has therefore focused on study-
ing settings with up to two risky assets only. Given that two assets rarely constitute
a well-diversified portfolio and diversification is a key factor driving the tradeoff
between direct and indirect equity investments, we have to allow for more than two
risky assets. As proved by Kellerer, Mansini, and Speranza (2000), finding a port-
folio with the optimal number of stocks is in general an NP-hard problem.5 To keep
5For an investor having access to N risky assets, there are N !K!(N−K)! portfolios with K different
assets. Thus, finding the optimal portfolio with the optimal number of risky assets generally
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the optimization problem numerically tractable, we therefore restrict our analysis
to a menu of N stocks that all yield the same expected return µ, the same stan-
dard deviation σ and the same pairwise correlation ρ. This assumption potentially
overestimates the desirability of mutual fund investments, in that it potentially un-
derestimates the diversification benefits of direct stock investments. In particular,
it rules out the fact that in directly invested portfolios, investors achieve substantial
diversification benefits by holding those assets that correlate least.
Our assumptions imply that mutual funds are not able to generate higher ex-
pected returns by for instance, stock-picking. This corresponds with overwhelming
empirical evidence that mutual funds on average do not outperform their corre-
sponding benchmarks.6 Therefore, investors should ceteris paribus, prefer mutual
funds with lower fees. In particular, investors should generally prefer exchange
traded funds (ETFs) to actively managed equity mutual funds and to the so-called
enhanced ETFs (Chang and Krueger (2010)) that tend to charge higher fees. Ex-
change traded funds are traded on stock markets essentially like individual stocks.
We therefore assume that the same transaction costs apply to trading individual
stocks and to mutual funds.
For the portfolio problem that we study, an investor holding n stocks optimally
holds an equal fraction 1
n
of his wealth in each and every asset. Empirically, such
an investment strategy seems to have desirable out-of-sample properties. For in-
stance, DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2009) report that, due to estimation risk
in other portfolio choice models, they are unable to find a portfolio choice strategy
that systematically outperforms the na¨ıve equally-weighted portfolio strategy. With
an equal fraction of wealth invested in each and every asset, equation (1.2) can be
rewritten as
requires solving
N∑
K=1
N !
K!(N−K)! optimization problems. Already for an N as small as 30, this results
in more than 1,000,000,000 optimization problems.
6See, Jensen (1968), Malkiel (1995), Carhart (1997), Bogle (2005), Busse, Goyal, and Wahlal
(2010), Fama and French (2010), and Blitz, Huij, and Swinkels (2010).
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σ2n =
1
n2
n∑
i=1
σ2 +
1
n2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
σ2ρ
=
1
n
σ2 +
1
n
(n− 1)σ2ρ
=σ2ρ+
1
n
σ2 (1− ρ)
(1.3)
Equation (1.3) indicates that the portfolio’s variance consists of two summands.
The first summand σ2ρ describes the portfolio’s systematic risk that cannot be
diversified. The second summand 1
n
σ2 (1− ρ) is the idiosyncratic risk that can be
eliminated by holding a large number of different assets. If the number n of different
stocks goes to infinity, the second term vanishes completely. Even for a reasonably
large n, the systematic risk becomes negligible.
Figure 1.1: Portfolio Volatility
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Note: This figure depicts the relationship between a portfolio’s volatility and
the number of stocks it contains.
Figure (1.1) depicts the relationship between a portfolio’s volatility σn and the
number n of assets held in the portfolio when σ = 29.02% and ρ = 0.2503, cor-
responding to the average historical standard deviation and correlation for annual
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returns of assets contained in the Dow Jones Industrial Average between 1980 and
2010. This confirms the finding of Statman (1987) that a portfolio consisting of
30 stocks is well-diversified. We therefore restrict ourselves to a market in which
N = 30 stocks are traded throughout. According to the 2007 Survey of Consumer
Finances, 36.4% of all families with direct stock investments held only one stock,
implying a portfolio’s volatility of 0.2902% in our model. 47.6% of all households
hold between 2 and 9 stocks, implying portfolio volatilities between 0.2295% and
0.1676%. Only 16% of the households have more than 10 stocks and consequently, a
volatility not exceeding 0.1676%. The evolution of wealth depends on whether the
investor chooses a direct or an indirect stock investment.
1.2.2 Direct Investment
An investor who invests directly in n stocks has to pay transaction costs for each
unit of the stock he trades. That is, the amount W0+ invested after purchasing
stocks is given by
W0+ = W0− − nτf (1.4)
Equation (1.4) shows how the investor’s wealth before trading W0− is shrunk to
wealth after trading of W0+ due to the associated transaction costs. The investor’s
wealth W1− before trading at time t = 1 is given by
W1− = W0+
n∑
i=1
1
n
Ri (1.5)
where Ri denotes the gross return on asset i. At time t = 1, the investor liqui-
dates his investments. Consequently,
W1+ = W1− − nτf (1.6)
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An investor holding stocks directly thus faces a tradeoff between increasing the
number of stocks to improve the portfolio diversification and not increasing it to save
the transaction costs. That is, the investor has to optimize the number of assets in
his portfolio and solve the optimization problem
U∗ = max
n
U
(
W1+
)
(1.7)
subject to equations (1.4) to (1.6).
1.2.3 Mutual Fund Investment
When investing in a mutual fund, the investor has to pay fees. We assume that the
fund charges a fee f ∈ (0, 1) at the end of each period, which is a constant multiple
of the funds under management at that point in time. When the investor has to
pay transaction costs to purchase the mutual fund at time 0, it holds that
W0+ = W0− − τf (1.8)
Note that in contrast to a direct stock investment, the investor only has to pay
the transaction cost τf once – for purchasing the mutual fund. One of the key advan-
tages of an investment in a mutual fund is the fact that the mutual fund constantly
rebalances portfolio weights to the equally weighted portfolio, thereby keeping the
portfolio’s standard deviation as small as possible. That is, the mutual fund’s an-
nual gross return RM prior to charging fees is given by
RM =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Ri (1.9)
The return on the portfolio after paying of the annual fee of f is given by
RM (1− f). The investor’s wealth W1− before selling the mutual fund at time t = 1
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is then given by
W1− = W0+RM (1− f) =
(
W0− − τf
)
RM (1− f)
After paying the transaction costs, his wealth W1+ is given by
W1+ = W1− − τf =
(
W0− − τf
)
RM (1− f)− τf
Compared to direct investments, mutual fund investments leave the investor with
a lower fixed transaction costs burden, as he only has to pay the transaction cost for
trading the mutual fund, even though the fund itself is a well-diversified portfolio
that invests in all N assets. However, the fund’s return is negatively affected by the
fee.
1.2.4 Calibration
Throughout our numerical analysis, we consider an investor with degree of risk
aversion of γ = 5, which is in the range of values considered reasonable by Mehra
and Prescott (1985).7 The investor is initially endowed with W0 = 35, 000 dollars,
roughly corresponding to the median wealth held in stocks directly or indirectly
by stock owners, according to the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances. Transaction
costs are set to τf = 8 dollars, corresponding to the flat-fee charged by in Fidelity
Accounts, for example.
The risk-return characteristics of the individual assets are estimated from data
from the stocks contained in the Dow Jones Industrial Average between 1980 and
2010. This leaves us with an expected return of µ = 8.39%, a standard deviation of
σ = 29.02% and a pairwise correlation of ρ = 0.2503, an order of magnitude similar
to that reported by Silvapulle and Granger (2001).8 This set of parameter values,
7In section 1.3.1 we demonstrate how other levels of risk aversion affect the tradeoff between
direct and indirect stock investments.
8We also estimated the stocks’ characteristics, using other lengths of estimation window. Since
these changes did not have a significant impact on our results, we have not reported them here in
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which we refer to as our base case parameter choice throughout, is summarized in
table (1.1).
Table 1.1: Parameter Values
Description Parameter Value
Number of assets in mutual fund N 30
Risk aversion γ 5
Expected return on each asset µ 8.39%
Standard deviation of return on each asset σ 29.02%
Pairwise correlation on return from any 2 assets ρ 0.2503
Fixed transaction cost τf 8
Initial wealth W0 35,000
Note: This table reports our choice of base-case parameter values.
To illustrate the quantitative impact of transaction costs and mutual fund fees,
we determine the level of a mutual fund’s fee that makes an investor indifferent
between holding the mutual fund and a direct investment. The investor is indifferent
between a mutual fund investment and a direct stock investment, if the utility UM
from investing in the mutual fund and the utility U∗ = max
n
U
(
W1+
)
from a direct
investment with the optimal number of stocks is the same, i.e. if U∗ − UM = 0. We
further assume the returns to be multivariate lognormally distributed. Since there is
no known closed-form expression for sums of lognormals and due to the non-linearity
of the utility function, we have to rely on numerical methods for finding the optimal
investment strategy. Specifically, we use Monte Carlo simulation to approximate the
distribution of total final wealth. The results reported throughout are each based
on 50,000 simulated paths.9
1.3 Numerical Results
For our base-case parameter setting, the fee fi that makes the investor indifferent
between investing in a mutual fund and a direct stock investment is fi = 0.6254%,
indicating that our base case investor prefers investing in a mutual fund, if the
fund’s annual fee is below 0.6254% and he prefers a direct stock investment if mu-
greater detail.
9Our results are robust to increasing the number of simulations.
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tual funds charge fees exceeding 0.6254%. This fee seems relatively small, compared
those charged by many existing mutual funds. The fact that despite higher fees,
there are still many investors holding these funds, can be attributed to various dif-
ferent reasons. First, private investors might be willing to pay an additional fee
for a professional management of their money. This incentive should be particu-
larly relevant for investors with minimal or no knowledge of the field of finance
and investment. Also, given the financial innovations such as options, investment
certificates or swaps, the fee such investors are willing to pay for professional man-
agement might even have increased over the last couple of decades. Second, the fee
making the investor indifferent between a direct and an indirect stock investment
might be heavily affected by some parameter assumptions we have made so far. In
the following analysis, we seek to understand how key model parameters such as
an investor’s degree of risk aversion, correlations between assets’ returns, the initial
amount invested, the level of transaction costs, and the length of investment horizon
affect the tradeoff between direct and indirect equity investments.
1.3.1 Impact of Risk Aversion
An investor’s risk aversion is a key parameter defining his optimal portfolio decision.
In our setting, the investor faces a tradeoff between paying transaction costs and
diversifying of idiosyncratic portfolio risk. As the investor’s risk aversion increases,
he should assign a higher weight to diversifying his portfolio, compared to saving
transaction costs. We vary the investor’s degree of risk aversion between 0 and 10,
the range of values considered reasonable by Mehra and Prescott (1985).
Figure (1.2) depicts the relationship between the investor’s risk aversion and the
level of mutual fund’s fee fi that makes our investor indifferent between investing in
the equity mutual fund and a direct stock investment. Figure (1.2) indicates that the
fee the investor is willing to pay to the mutual fund for its services increases with an
increasing level of risk aversion. A risk-neutral investor with degree of risk aversion of
γ = 0 is not prepared to pay the mutual fund for its services as he is not concerned
about diversification. As the investor’s risk aversion increases, he place greater
emphasis on diversifying his portfolio. This affects the fee he is willing to pay to the
mutual fund through two channels. First, the improved diversification potential of
the mutual fund, compared to the direct investment, is considered more desirable
for a more risk-averse investor. Second, the number of assets a risk-averse investor
wishes to hold when investing directly in stocks increases with his risk aversion,
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Figure 1.2: Impact of Risk Aversion
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Note: This figure depicts the relationship between the investor’s risk aversion
and the mutual fund management fee fi in percentage points that makes the
investor indifferent between a direct stock investment and holding the mutual
fund.
thereby causing transaction costs to increase. In order to avoid this transaction cost
burden, the investor is willing to pay a higher fee to the mutual fund.
1.3.2 Impact of Correlation
Correlation is one of the most important factors driving portfolio decisions. As is
well-known, the level of correlation determines the relationship between idiosyn-
cratic and systematic risk.
Figure (1.3) depicts the relationship between the pairwise correlation ρ of the
assets and the fee fi that makes the investor indifferent between mutual fund and
direct stock investments. Figure (1.3) reveals a hump-shaped relationship between
correlation and the fee fi. This hump-shaped pattern is caused by the tradeoff be-
tween transaction costs and diversification concerns. Investors who invest in stocks
directly face a tradeoff between the transaction cost and diversification. Whereas
a portfolio consisting of only one asset is clearly most transaction-cost efficient, it
entirely neglects diversification. A portfolio investing in all available assets, on the
other hand, might leave the investor with excessive transaction costs. For levels
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Figure 1.3: Impact of Correlation
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Note: This figure depicts the relationship between the pairwise correlation be-
tween the assets and the mutual fund management fee fi in percentage points
that makes the investor indifferent between a direct stock investment and hold-
ing the mutual fund.
of correlation close to zero, the investor can obtain a well-diversified portfolio with
only a few different assets and therefore avoids further transaction costs from hold-
ing more assets. Given that transaction costs from direct investments are therefore
small and so is the mutual fund’s additional diversification potential, the investor is
only prepared to pay a small fee to the mutual fund, so that fi assumes a low value.
As correlation increases, the number of assets required to diversify the portfolio in-
creases. To achieve a reasonable level of diversification, the investor therefore has to
pay higher transaction costs with the direct investment strategy. The mutual fund’s
greater diversification potential and lower transaction costs imply that the investor
is prepared to accept a higher fee.
Studies of correlations between stock returns are at the heart of portfolio manage-
ment and have recently received considerable attention in a wide variety of literature.
Recent articles, including Bruno and Jacques (2000), Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang
(2009), and Eun and Lee (2010) show that the risk-return characteristics and cor-
relation of major stock market indices of developed and developing countries have
increased significantly over the last few decades. By using a sample of 17 devel-
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oped markets and weekly returns in three subperiods, 1974-1984, 1985-1995, and
1996-2007, Eun and Lee (2010) compute an average correlation of 0.297, 0.387, and
0.538, respectively. Our results in figure (1.3) suggest that this increase in corre-
lation should have increased investor willingness to hold internationally diversified
portfolios.
For higher levels of correlation, the diversification potential diminishes. This
implies a change in the tradeoff between diversification benefits and transaction
costs from holding additional assets. The higher the correlation, the lower the
diversification benefits, whereas transaction costs from trading another stock remain
constant. As a consequence, the investor reduces the number of assets, as the
correlation increases. Therefore, direct investment strategies again become more
transaction cost efficient, which is why the investor is only prepared to pay a lower
fee for a mutual fund. In the extreme case where correlation is perfect (ρ = 1), there
is no diversification benefit from holding different assets. Consequently, the optimal
direct investment strategy is to invest in one asset only. Furthermore, the mutual
fund cannot provide a diversification benefit to the investor, who is therefore not
prepared to pay a fee for the mutual fund.
1.3.3 Impact of Transaction Costs
The level of the fixed transaction cost an investor has to pay for trading an asset
is a key factor driving the tradeoff between direct and indirect stock investments.
An increased transaction cost affects the investor’s total wealth for both direct and
indirect stock investments. However, when purchasing an equity mutual fund, the
investor only has to pay the transaction cost once, whereas to construct his own
diversified portfolio, he has to pay fees for every asset he purchases. Consequently,
direct stock investments are affected more by increased transaction costs than indi-
rect ones.
In figure (1.4), we allow the fixed transaction costs to be paid per trade to vary
between 0 and 20 and depict its impact on the mutual fund’s fee fi that makes the
investor indifferent between a direct and an indirect stock investment. This generally
confirms our above intuition. With zero transaction costs (τf = 0), the investor is
not willing to pay a fee, as he is able to construct a perfectly diversified portfolio
on his own at zero transaction cost. As transaction costs increase, diversifying the
portfolio comes at an increasing cost, implying that the investor is willing to pay
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Figure 1.4: Impact of Transaction Costs
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Note: This figure depicts the relationship between the level of fixed transaction
cost τf the investor has to pay each time he trades an asset and the mutual
fund’s management fee fi in percentage points that makes the investor indif-
ferent between a direct stock investment and holding the mutual fund.
the mutual fund both to avoid these costs and simultaneously gain access to a well-
diversified portfolio.
1.3.4 Impact of Wealth Level
An investor’s wealth level is fundamental to determining the optimal number of
assets in a portfolio. Intuitively, with a low wealth level, the investor should hold
fewer assets in order to avoid transaction costs which reduce his wealth over time.
As the level of fee that makes the investor indifferent between direct and indirect
stock holdings increases as the transaction cost fi does, it increase as the investor’s
wealth level. Consequently, especially for investors with low wealth levels, mutual
fund investments should therefore be a desirable option for getting access to a well-
diversified portfolio at reasonable costs.
Figure (1.5) depicts the relationship between the investor’s wealth level and the
fee fi of a mutual fund that would make him indifferent between an indirect invest-
ment through that mutual fund and a direct stock investment. Figure (1.5) indicates
that fi decreases monotonically as the investor’s wealth level increases. This is driven
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Figure 1.5: Impact of Wealth Level
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Note: This figure depicts the relationship between the investor’s initial wealth
level W0− and the mutual fund’s management fee fi for a mutual fund in
percentage points that makes the investor indifferent between a direct stock
investment and holding the mutual fund.
by the relative impact of transaction costs on direct investments for investors with
low and high wealth levels. For investors with low wealth levels, transaction costs
are high, relative to the amount they invest. However, for wealthier investors, the
relative transaction cost burden is considerably smaller. Consequently, investors
endowed with low initial wealth, optimally hold few assets than wealthier investors.
This implies that direct investments are less well-diversified for investors with low
initial wealth levels than for wealthier investors. The former are therefore prepared
to pay a substantially higher fee to a mutual fund in order to obtain a well-diversified
portfolio. As shown above, whether an investor should prefer a direct or an indirect
stock investment depends crucially on his wealth level and the mutual fund fee.
This finding corresponds with the empirical evidence in the 2007 Survey of Con-
sumer Finances which indicates that direct stock holdings concentrated among high-
wealth families. According to Khorana, Servaes, and Tufano (2009), the average
value-weighted mutual fund fee for US equity mutual funds is f = 1.11%, whereas
the worldwide average is f = 1.29%. This implies that our investor would be indif-
ferent between a mutual fund investment and a direct stock investment at wealth
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levels of 11,500 and 8,400 dollars, respectively.
1.3.5 Impact of Length of Investment Horizon
In this subsection, we study the tradeoff between the length of investment horizon
and investor willingness to pay a mutual fund for its services. Given the multi-period
nature of the investment problem, we distinguish between two types of trading
strategies for the direct portfolio investment: 1) An investor who follows a buy-
and-hold portfolio strategy and does not change portfolio weights over time and 2)
an investor who rebalances his portfolio weights to the optimal equally-weighted
portfolio in each and every period. The mutual fund is assumed to rebalance to the
equally weighted portfolio in each and every period without.
Figure 1.6: Impact of Investment Horizon
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Note: This figure depicts the relationship between the length of the investor’s
investment horizon T and the mutual fund’s management fee fi in percentage
points that makes the investor indifferent between a direct stock investment
and holding the mutual fund. The dashed line shows results for an investor
who follows a buy-and-hold investment strategy for a direct stock investment,
the solid one for an investor pursuing a portfolio strategy of rebalancing the
portfolio annually.
Figure (1.6) depicts the relationship between the length of the investor’s invest-
ment horizon and the fee fi that makes him indifferent between a mutual fund and
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a direct stock investment. The dashed line shows our results for an investor with
a buy-and-hold investment strategy for a direct stock investment and the solid line
for an investor with a portfolio strategy that annually rebalances the portfolio.
Both lines show that with an increasing length of investment horizon, fi declines.
This is because, with a single-period investment horizon, the investor trades his
entire portfolio both at time t = 0 and t = 1. That is, the investor faces the
full transaction costs twice for a one-period investment horizon. For the multi-
period investment horizon, however, the investor only faces the full transaction
costs twice for a longer investment horizon. That is, the relative transaction costs
burden declines as the length of investment horizon increases. Consequently, direct
investment strategies are subject to lower relative transaction costs and the investor
is therefore less willing to pay a high fee to a mutual fund. The solid line shows that
investors who rebalance annually under a direct investment strategy are willing to
pay a substantially higher fee to the mutual fund. This stems from the fact that the
mutual fund allows them to save the annual rebalancing costs. That is, our results
suggest that the costs of rebalancing outweigh the diversification advantage.
1.4 Conclusion
We have studied the tradeoff between direct equity investments and indirect in-
vestments through mutual funds. Mutual funds provide investors with diversified
portfolios and rebalance the portfolio at low transaction costs. However, they charge
a fee for their services. Direct investments, on the other hand, are subject to higher
rebalancing costs. Furthermore, transaction costs usually prevent private investors
from attaining the same level of diversification as a mutual fund. Our results show
that the level of fee an informed investor is prepared to pay for a mutual fund’s
services varies heavily with his wealth level, his risk aversion, the correlations be-
tween assets, transaction costs, and length of investment horizon. The lower the
investor’s wealth level, the greater the transaction costs, the higher his risk aversion
and the shorter his investment horizon, the higher the fee the investor is willing to
pay a mutual fund. Specifically, our results suggest that the fees of many actively
managed equity mutual funds are at levels that make direct stock investments more
appealing to a wide range of individual investors. The relatively low fee levels of
passively managed equity mutual funds and exchange traded funds on the other
hand, makes these investment vehicles appealing to a wide range of investors.
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Abstract
Despite the fact that commercial real estate comprises a large proportion of in-
vestable assets, a functioning derivatives market for private real estate has only
existed since early 2005, when swap contracts began to be traded in the UK in sig-
nificant amounts. Among other concerns about commercial real estate derivatives,
the pricing issue is a major obstacle for the development of the market, due to the
specific characteristics of appraisal-based indices used as the underlying of these
derivatives. This article empirically evaluates a model of normative commercial real
estate swap pricing, based on private real estate market indices, by estimating fu-
ture appraisal-based index returns, and accounting for time-varying equilibrium risk
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premia. Differences between the US and the UK markets are analyzed. Finally, the
development of actual commercial real estate swap prices in recent years is inter-
preted in the light of calculated “fair” swap prices. Qualitatively, the estimated
swap prices track actual market developments quite well, indicating that the mod-
eled swap prices enhance our understanding of the pricing of commercial real estate
swaps.
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2.1 Introduction
Despite the fact that commercial real estate constitutes a large proportion of the to-
tal investment universe – estimated at roughly one third of the invested market size1
– a functioning derivatives market has existed only since the mid 2000s, when swap
contracts, based on private market indices, began to be traded in the UK in notable
amounts. Since then, commercial real estate derivative markets have emerged in a
number of other countries, but they are still in their infancy. The total notional
outstanding of derivatives, based on the Investment Property Databank (IPD) in-
dex, reached ı¨¿1
2
7.3 billion in the UK by the end of 2010. However, the other two
large economies in Europe – France and Germany – have had a total outstanding of
only about ı¨¿1
2
0.3 billion.2 There is no equivalent figure for the USA, but anecdotal
evidence suggests that the trading volume is quite small.
Total return swaps – the standard commercial real estate derivative type of con-
tract – are over-the-counter deals and their market liquidity is still far behind that
of other established derivative markets. Market participants primarily name three
concerns regarding the market: The lack of a secondary market and dealers, a short-
age of liquidity, and concerns about how real estate derivatives should be priced.
Fabozzi, Shiller, and Tunaru (2009, 2010) argue that the imperfection of real estate
markets is the main obstacle to establishing liquidity in the market. The derivative
market requires homogeneity of the underlying and is hampered by the serial correla-
tion and inertia in the underlying’s excess returns. This return predictability causes
a corresponding market sentiment and this potentially exacerbates the difficulty in
finding counterparties. While theoretically predictability is not a problem, since
expectations could adequately be incorporated into prices, market participants may
lack an understanding of the pricing mechanisms and therefore have little confidence
in the market. Shiller (2008) indicates that as long as investors do not regard the
pricing as accurate, they will remain unwilling to participate and thus prevent the
critical mass that is necessary to get a new market underway. In contrast to the
close-to-zero spreads over the risk-free rate for financial market swaps, the spreads
for commercial real estate total return swaps have been large and have also fluctu-
ated considerably over the last few years. An interesting question is whether the
1Estimate as of end 2009, based on data from the World Bank for stocks, from the Quarterly
Review of the Bank for International Settlements for bonds and from Prudential Real Estate
Investors for real estate.
2Source: IPD Research & Market Information.
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fluctuations in prices can be reconciled with a normative pricing approach.
The literature dealing with real estate pricing models can be classified into two
streams: no-arbitrage models and equilibrium pricing models. Buttimer, Kau, and
Slawson (1997), Bjo¨rk and Clapham (2002) and Patel and Pereira (2008) theoreti-
cally examine the pricing of real estate swap contracts based on arbitrage analysis.
Otaka and Kawaguchi (2002) extend the analysis by modeling the pricing of real
estate derivatives under incomplete market conditions. Baran, Buttimer, and Clark
(2008) calibrate a two-factor commodity price model for the pricing of real estate
derivatives, accounting for challenges due to lags and low frequency of index updates.
Geltner and Fisher (2007) – hereinafter GF – argue that the arbitrage pricing ap-
proach is problematic with regard to the analysis of swaps based on appraisal-based
indices, because the index cannot be traded and may not always be valued in such
a manner that it reflects the equilibrium expected return in the real estate market
tracked by the index. The reason is that appraisal-based indices lag and smooth
actual market developments. Based on equilibrium pricing considerations, GF show
theoretically how to obtain fair swap prices based on appraisal-based real estate in-
dices. Lizieri, Marcato, Ogden, and Baum (2010) argue that some of the deviations
from fair swap prices can be explained by institutional characteristics of the direct
real estate market, such as high transaction costs and long execution times. These
characteristics generate a rational trading window with upper and lower bounds,
within which market participants – as long as the market is not fully liquid – might
reasonably trade.
The contribution of this paper is to empirically investigate fair commercial real
estate swap pricing, using the equilibrium swap pricing considerations put forward
by GF. We analyze total return swaps, where the calendar year index return is ex-
changed for a fixed rate. The swap maturities range from one to five years. These
swap contracts are the current market standard both in the UK and the US (Cook,
Batchvarov, Dickstein, Hani, Isgro, Lehman, and Tcherkassova (2008)). We analyze
the US and the UK markets, emphasizing how the different market dynamics affect
fair swap prices. It is important to note that the pricing issue is related to the
specific characteristics of appraisal-based indices for the direct real estate market.
Swaps based on commercial real estate securities, traded on the stock exchange,
would follow conventional swap pricing models.
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The next section provides a review of the methodology for obtaining fair swap
prices. The empirical part of the investigation comprises four steps. We develop
a vector autoregressive (VAR) model of expected index returns and compare these
results with the actual index returns and with competing forecasts. Subsequently,
we estimate equilibrium risk premia for appraisal-based real estate index returns.
Based on the index return forecasts and the equilibrium risk premia, we compute
the normative fair swap prices, i.e., those consistent with the GF model. Finally,
we compare the normative prices with actual swap prices in the UK and US.
2.2 Obtaining Fair Commercial Real Estate Swap
Prices
The structure of the swap analyzed theoretically in GF is as follows. The long side
of the swap receives a payment equal to the total return of an appraisal-based in-
dex, multiplied by the notional amount of the swap. The short side receives a fixed
payment of F multiplied by the notional amount. GF assume that both parties to
the swaps are covered, i.e., the short side holds a real estate portfolio, and the long
side a portfolio of risk-free assets. If the index always provides an expected return
commensurate to its risk, F should be the risk-free interest rate. Consider a swap
of stock returns against the risk-free rate. On average, the stock return is higher
than the risk-free rate, but stock returns are risky. Therefore, when stock prices are
priced efficiently, the swap is fair for both sides. This reasoning can be supported
by arbitrage analysis.
However, as GF emphasize, the risk and return characteristics of the real estate
market differs from that of the appraisal-based index. They argue that, because
the index is appraisal-based, it does not represent the dynamics of the actual real
estate market. In order to obtain the fair price of a total return swap based on an
appraisal-based index, F has to account for the different characteristics of the index
and the actual real estate market, such that
Ft = Et
(
RREI
)−RPREIt (2.1)
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Conditional on information at time t, the fair price of the swap (F ) should be
the expected return on the index, minus the equilibrium risk premium of the index
returns. If the risky asset reflects information efficiently, the right-hand side of equa-
tion (2.1) would reduce to the risk-free rate, since the equilibrium risk premium is
the difference between the expected return and the risk-free rate. However, due to
the lag and smoothing effects in appraisal-based real estate index returns, expected
index returns are usually different from actual market return expectations, and the
equilibrium risk premium of the index differs from the risk premium of the real es-
tate market.
Equation (2.1) is directly applicable to a one-period swap, which is a forward
contract. Swaps are a portfolio of forward rate agreements. Thus, we rewrite equa-
tion (2.1) with subscript k to indicate that these are statistics for a forward contract
with respect to period k:
Ft,k = Et
(
RREIk
)−RPREIt,k (2.2)
Since the payments of the long side are risk-free, we obtain the fair price of the
swap with a maturity of K years, St (K), by solving:
K∑
k=1
Ft,k ·DF (k)t =
K∑
k=1
St (K) ·DF (k)t (2.3)
where DF
(k)
t =
(
1 +R
(k)
f,t
)−k
is the factor for discounting a risk-free cash-flow for
k periods. R
(k)
f,t refers to the term structure of spot rates at time t.
3
3The US spot rates have been calculated from the yield curve of coupon bonds with maturities
of one, two, three and five years, using the bootstrapping method. The source is the website of
the Federal Reserve Board. As there are no data for a four-year coupon bond, we assume that the
yield of four-year coupon bonds is the average of the yields of the three and the five-year bonds.
For the UK, the spot rates were obtained from the website of the Bank of England.
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2.3 Index Return Forecasts
2.3.1 VAR Model
We estimate future index returns using a vector autoregression (VAR) for each coun-
try. Let zt+1 be a vector that includes the appraisal-based real estate total return
and additional state variables that predict these returns. We add three state vari-
ables as predictors of appraisal-based real estate returns. There is evidence that
appraisal-based real estate returns are positively related to lagged returns on prop-
erty shares (Giliberto (1990), Gyourko and Keim (1992), Eichholtz and Hartzell
(1996)). In order to capture the cyclicality of appraisal-based indices, we include
two more variables. The cap rate, i.e. the ratio of income to value, is included in
the VAR model, since there is some presumption that when index values are at the
peak of the cycle and the cap rate is low, future returns will be low as well, and vice
versa.4 Finally, we include the yield spread, the difference between the yield on a
long-term and a short-term treasury security, as a potential asset return predictor
(Campbell (1987) and Fama and French (1989) show that the yield spread does
indeed forecast stock and bond returns).
Assume that a VAR(1) model captures the dynamic relationships between these
variables:
zt+1 = Φ0 + Φ1z1 + vt+1 (2.4)
where Φ0 is a (4x1) vector of constants and Φ1 is a (4x4) coefficient-matrix. The
shocks are stacked in the (4x1) vector vt+1. The k-step (k = 1, ..., 5) conditional
forecast of the vector zt, can be obtained recursively as
Et (zt+k) = Φ0 + Φ1Et (zt+k−1) (2.5)
4Fu and Ng (2001) and Plazzi, Torous, and Valkanov (2010) show that the cap rate predicts
transaction-based direct commercial real estate returns.
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The first element of the vector is the expected total return of the appraisal-based
real estate index return.
2.3.2 Data
The forecast results are based on VAR estimates for the UK and the US market;
using annual data from 1978 to 2010. The appraisal-based indices are those com-
monly used as the basis for commercial real estate swaps: That is, the IPD long-term
annual index in the UK and the NCREIF Property Index (NPI) in the US.5 Total
returns on property companies are calculated using the UK Datastream real estate
index (UK) and the FTSE/NAREIT Equity REITs Index (US). In order to con-
struct the cap rate series, we use annual capital and income real estate returns as
follows. A real estate income series (Inct) is obtained by multiplying the income
return (IRt) by the capital value index (CVt) : Inct = IRt · CVt−1. The cap rate
series is then calculated as CRt = Inct/CVt. For the US, the yield spread is the
ten-year Treasury bond yield minus the three-month Treasury bill yield. For the
UK, the three-month treasury bills average discount rate is used as the short-term
yield. These yields are obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. The yield on
UK long-term bonds is from the Barclays 2011 Equity Gilt Study.
Table (2.1) provides an overview of the sample statistics of the data used in
the VAR models. Annual appraisal-based returns have both a higher mean and a
higher standard deviation in the UK. They are notably positively autocorrelated in
both countries. In contrast, returns on property shares are practically uncorrelated.
The cap rate and the yield spread are both persistent variables, meaning that they
influence forecasts for some periods ahead.
2.3.3 VAR Results
The results of the VARs, estimated by OLS, are shown in table (2.2). In the
appraisal-based real estate return equations, the signs of the regression coefficients
are the same in both countries. The coefficient on the lagged own return is higher
in the UK. The coefficient on the lagged return on securitized real estate is positive
and highly significant in the US, but virtually zero in the UK. The coefficient on the
lagged cap rate is positive in both countries, the relationship being closer in the UK.
Also, the yield spread is a more important predictor of appraisal-based returns in the
5We thank IPD and NCREIF for providing these data.
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Table 2.1: Summary of Sample Statistics
Panel A: UK
Mean St.Dv. Auto-Corr.
Appraisal-based Index Return 10.82% 10.49% 47.60%
Return on Securitized Real Estate 13.15% 26.69% -3.70%
Cap Rate 6.31% 1.30% 75.56%
Yield Spread 0.41% 1.79% 56.89%
Panel B: US
Mean St.Dv. Auto-Corr.
Appraisal-based Index Return 9.22% 8.21% 54.68%
Return on Securitized Real Estate 14.41% 17.89% 4.78%
Cap Rate 7.57% 1.03% 88.95%
Yield Spread 1.65% 1.53% 46.63%
Note: The table shows statistics for the variables included in the VAR models.
The sample period is from 1978 to 2010 (annual data). St.Dv. refers to standard
deviation and Auto-Corr. to the first-order autocorrelation.
UK, suggesting that IPD index returns are closely related to economic activity, since
the yield spread tracks the business cycle (Fama and French (1989)). With an R2
value of 63%, US annual index returns are more predictable than in the UK, where
the R2 value is “only” 48%. For both countries, the p-value of the F-test of joint
significance suggests that appraisal-based returns are indeed highly predictable. R2
values for securitized real estate returns are lower. In both countries, the returns
are positively related to the lagged cap rate and the lagged yield spread, but no
coefficient is significant at the 10%-level. The dynamics of the cap rate are very
well captured by the VAR models. The yield spread has a more modest degree of
predictability, especially in the US.
2.3.4 Forecast Results
In order to evaluate the forecasts of our VAR model, we compare the actual appraisal-
based index return outcomes with the expected one-year returns of the VAR model,
to the forecasts of the best performing univariate interest rate regression model of
Tsolacos (2006), and – for the UK market – to the beginning of year IPF consensus
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Table 2.2: Results of VAR Model
Panel A: UK
Coefficients on Lagged Variables
Variable Constant 1 2 3 4 R2(p)
1 Appraisal-based Index Return -0.147 0.714 0.000 2.647 2.064 48.41%
[-1.403] [3.138] [0.005] [1.801] [2.225] (0.10%)
2 Return on Property Shares -0.401 1.163 -0.294 6.817 4.354 17.99%
[-1.147] [1.536] [-1.165] [1.395] [1.412] (23.57%)
3 Cap Rate 0.025 -0.034 -0.007 0.691 -0.241 78.53%
[2.991] [-1.835] [-1.213] [5.856] [-3.238] (0.00%)
4 Yield Spread 0.016 -0.114 0.011 -0.046 0.445 60.88%
[0.992] [-3.293] [0.981] [-0.204] [3.148] (0.00%)
Panel B: US
Coefficients on Lagged Variables
Variable Constant 1 2 3 4 R2(p)
1 Appraisal-based Index Return -0.104 0.511 0.230 1.462 0.279 63.44%
[-1.414] [3.539] [4.140] [1.540] [0.358] (0.00%)
2 Return on REITs -0.228 -0.267 -0.003 4.833 1.944 14.81%
[-0.920] [-0.550] [-0.016] [1.514] [0.743] (34.47%)
3 Cap Rate 0.011 -0.037 -0.008 0.927 -0.071 88.13%
[2.047] [-3.539] [-2.120] [13.580] [-1.262] (0.00%)
4 Yield Spread 0.034 -0.073 0.000 -0.189 0.237 34.03%
[1.871] [-2.028] [-0.010] [-0.801] [1.227] (2.04%)
Note: The table shows the coefficients for the UK VAR (Panel A) and the US VAR
(Panel B). The results are based on annual data from 1978 to 2010. The t-statistics are
in square brackets; values corresponding to p-values of 10% or below are highlighted.
The rightmost column contains the R2 values, and the p-value of the F-test of joint
significance in parentheses.
forecasts. Figure (2.1) shows the return estimates and the actual index return out-
comes for the period 2000 to 2010.6 In the UK (Panel A), actual index returns, VAR
estimates and estimates from the interest rate regression model are very similar for
the period 2000 to 2003. In 2004 and 2005, the VAR model forecasts the actual
returns most accurately. In 2006 and 2007, all forecast estimates are very close to
one another, but underestimate the return in 2006 and overestimate it in 2007. The
VAR model yields the best forecast for 2008 and 2010, while the interest rate re-
gression model yields the best estimate for 2009. The numerical evaluation supports
these findings. The mean absolute forecast error of the IPF forecasts over the period
2000 to 2010 is 7.9%, compared to 7.2% for the regression model and 5.6% for the
VAR model. The root mean square error of the VAR model is 7.7% as opposed to
9.7% for the IPF consensus forecasts and 10.9% for the regression model. Hence,
6The IPF forecasts have been conducted since November 1998. There was no survey in February
1999, so that we are bound to start our comparison in 2000.
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the VAR forecasts are superior to both IPF forecasts and the Tsolacos model. The
relatively weak forecasting ability of the IPF forecasts conforms to the findings of
Tsolacos (2006) and McAllister, Newell, and Matysiak (2008) who found evidence
of inefficiencies in the IPF forecasts. The US results are shown in Panel B. While
the interest rate regression model of Tsolacos yields better forecasts for 2001, 2002
and 2010, the VAR is superior in every other year and especially tracks the boom
and bust periods quite good. Again, forecasts error statistics reveal that the VAR
is preferable to the univariate regression model of Tsolacos.
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Figure 2.1: Forecast Evaluation
Panel A: UK
Panel A: US
Note: The figure shows the actual annual index returns, the expected
returns obtained from the VAR model and the forecast from the
best performing univariate interest rate regression model of Tsolacos
(2006) from 2000 to 2010. Additionally, the IPF consensus forecasts
are included for the UK (Panel A).
In order to obtain a clear impression of the appraisal-based index return forecasts
over the entire time span, and for both countries, figure (2.2) shows the one-, three-,
and five-year index return forecasts. We omitted the two, and four-year forecasts, so
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as to prevent the exhibits from being too cluttered. Table (2.3) contains an overview
of some key statistics of the forecasts. We see that forecasted returns fluctuate
dramatically within a range of up to almost 35 percentage points. The one-year
index forecasts are more volatile in the UK compared to the US. The volatility of
the forecasts decreases with the forecasting horizon in both countries. The expected
returns move only slowly in both countries. In both countries, the autocorrelation
of one-year-ahead expected returns is slightly below 50%, and for two-year-ahead
expected returns, the autocorrelation is 70%. Especially in the US, three- to five-year
ahead forecasts remain highly autocorrelated. These sluggish expected returns are
reflected in the figure for the US market. We see that the period from 1979 to 1992
is characterized by three to five-year expected index returns that are slightly below
average, while the forecasts for the period from 1993 to 2003 are above average. In
the mid 2000s, expected returns were particularly low, but rose towards the end of
the decade.
Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics of Forecasts
Panel A: UK
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Mean 10.56% 10.37% 10.32% 10.39% 10.49%
Standard Deviation 7.16% 5.86% 5.49% 4.38% 2.99%
Autocorrelation 46.30% 67.68% 65.74% 51.31% 45.44%
Minimum -6.96% -2.69% 0.58% 2.80% 5.39%
Maximum 24.38% 23.12% 22.93% 20.54% 18.14%
Panel A: US
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Mean 9.16% 9.11% 9.02% 8.88% 8.74%
Standard Deviation 6.52% 4.32% 3.82% 3.48% 2.80%
Autocorrelation 48.53% 70.68% 83.44% 77.19% 69.53%
Minimum -13.34% -3.71% -0.77% 0.79% 2.27%
Maximum 19.75% 15.01% 15.01% 14.60% 13.35%
Note: This table shows statistics of expected single-period returns for the pe-
riod 1979 to 2011, based on the VAR estimates.
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Figure 2.2: Forecasts Obtained from VAR Approach
Panel A: UK
Panel A: US
Note: The exhibit shows forecasts for one-, three-, and five-year ahead
returns obtained from the VAR model for the period 1979 to 2011.
2.4 Equilibrium Risk Premium of Appraisal-based
Returns
2.4.1 Methodology
That appraisal-based indices lag and smooth actual market movements is widely
accepted. As a result, appraisal-based returns are less volatile and exhibit less sys-
tematic risk than true real estate market returns (for a review see e.g. (Geltner,
Miller, Clayton, and Eichholtz, 2007, Chapter 25)). Geltner (1991) shows that
the equilibrium risk premium of appraisal-based real estate index returns, RPREI ,
equals the product of ω, which is the weight of the contemporaneous transaction-
price evidence reflected in the appraisal-based index value, with the risk premium
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of the real estate market, RPREM : RPREI = ωRPREM .7 We account for the fact
that ω should depend on the time horizon K, since smoothing is of less importance
in the long-run. While annual returns are still likely to be influenced by smoothing,
this distortion should be weaker for, say, (cumulative) five-year returns, because in
the long-run, changes in valuations should not deviate much from the actual market
development. Assuming rational behavior on the part of appraisers, placing greater
weight on more recent transaction-price evidence, we formally obtain the relationship
ωK =
(
L¯K + 1
)−1
(2.6)
where L¯ is the number of average periods of lag (see Fisher and Geltner (2000)).
For example, Geltner (1993) suggests a value of ω = 0.40 for annual returns (K = 1),
which implies an average lag of 1.5 years. For five-year returns, one obtains ω5 =
(1.5/5 + 1)−1 = 0.77.
Due to the general belief that smoothing has become less of an issue in recent
years, we estimate ω for two different periods, 1978 to 2000 and 2001 to 2010. The
parameter values ω1 are calibrated so that the volatility of unsmoothed appraisal-
based returns and transaction-based returns is equal. The annual appraisal-based
log real capital returns g∗t are unsmoothed using the formula
gt =
g∗t − (1− ω1) · g∗t−1
ω1
(2.7)
where gt is the unsmoothed log real capital return (or growth), and ω1 is the
smoothing parameter corresponding to annual returns. Log real capital returns are
then converted back to simple nominal returns, which are used for the calculation
of the volatility. The transaction-based indices used are the TLI for the UK and the
7See also Geltner and Fisher (2007), Endnote 20. It should be noted that Geltner (1991) obtains
the result under the assumption that true real estate market returns and the exogenous return series
(i.e., the return on the market portfolio in the classical Capital Asset Pricing Model) neither predict
themselves nor each other. Of course, this assumption may not reflect reality. A derivation of the
equilibrium risk premium of appraisal-based real estate returns under less restrictive assumptions
is beyond the scope of this paper.
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TBI for the US (variable-liquidity version to be consistent with the TLI data, since
the TLI is not available in a constant-liquidity version). The TBI (TLI) data from
1985 to 2000 (1989 to 2000) are used to estimate ω1 for the period 1978 to 2000.
For the period 2001 to 2010 the data from this period are used. The values for ωK ,
for K = 2, ..., 5, are based on equation (2.6), using the implicit average lag from the
annual estimate. Table (2.4) gives an overview of the dependence of ω on the time
horizon and different time periods. As expected, the parameter values are higher for
the more recent period. The values for ω1 for the period 1978 to 2000 are slightly
higher than those suggested by Geltner (1993) for the US (0.4) and by Barkham and
Geltner (1994) for the UK (0.625). The higher value in the UK reflects the common
perception that UK appraisal-based returns are less subject to smoothing. We see
clearly that the longer the time horizon, the lower the disturbance due to smoothing.
Table 2.4: Time- and Maturity-Variant Parameter Values ωK
Panel A: UK
Maturity
1 2 3 4 5
1978-2000 0.69 0.81 0.87 0.90 0.92
2001-2010 0.89 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.97
Panel B: US
Maturity
1 2 3 4 5
1978-2000 0.49 0.66 0.74 0.79 0.83
2001-2010 0.65 0.78 0.85 0.88 0.90
Note: The table shows the maturity-variant values of the parameter ωK
for two time periods.
In his Presidential address to the American Finance Association, Cochrane (2011)
emphasizes that asset risk premia vary substantially over time. Therefore, we also
allow the risk premium of appraisal-based index returns to be time-varying, so that
the risk premium depends on the time of the forecast t, as well as on the maturity K:
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RPREIt (K) = ωt,KRP
REM
t (K) (2.8)
We relate the risk premium of the real estate market to the K-period time-varying
risk premium of the market portfolio RPM through beta:
RPREMt (K) = βRP
M
t (K) (2.9)
We use national stock indices as proxies for the market portfolio (UK: FTSE
Actuaries All-Share Index, US: Barclays US Equity Index) and calculate the risk
premia by subtracting the returns of short-term treasury bill investments from the
stock returns. Based on a regression using US data for the period 1947 to 2009,
Cochrane (2011) suggests that the dividend yield multiplied by four, yields a good
estimate of future annual stock market risk premia. To obtain forecasts of stock
market risk premia, we use the same approach, but multiply the end of the year
dividend yield not by four, but by 1.5 (UK) and 2.5 (US) respectively, so that the
average of the forecasts is similar to the sample average of realized risk premia over
the period 1978 to 2010. Cochrane also shows that the coefficient for five-year cu-
mulative returns is roughly five times the coefficient for annual returns. Therefore,
we assume that the cumulative risk premium increases in proportion to the time
horizon.
We derive β by dividing the average annual risk premium of appraisal-based re-
turns by the average stock market risk premium over the sample period.8 (Note
that while appraisal-based returns are conditionally biased, the mean returns of an
appraisal-based index over a long period of time should not contain much bias, see
Geltner (1989).) This yields a β for the real estate market of 0.457 in the UK, and
0.486 in the US.
8We do not estimate beta directly using regression analysis due to the measurement problems
associated with direct real estate return data.
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By combining equation (2.8) and (2.9), we can estimate the time-varying equilib-
rium risk premium of appraisal-based returns, depending on the time horizon, as:
RPREIt (K) = ωt,KβRP
M
t (K) (2.10)
With K-year (cumulative) equilibrium risk premia of real estate index returns,
single-period risk premia RPREIt,k , relevant for the estimates of the forward prices,
can easily be extracted.
2.4.2 Results
Figure (2.3) shows one-year forecasts of stock-return risk premia and the resulting
forecasted risk premia of one and five-year (single-period) appraisal-based returns.
The risk premia are particularly high around 1980, with a downward trend until
the market crash of 2001. In both countries, we see a spike in the forecasts for the
recession years of 1991 and 2009, which is intuitively appealing. Due to ω rising with
the time horizon, the average risk premium of real estate index return increases from
2.02% for the one-year ahead period, to 2.71% for the five-year-ahead period in the
UK. In the US, the average risk premium is 1.86% for one-year forecasts and rises
to 3.45% for five-year forecasts. For comparison, Mitchell and Bond (2009) assume
that the risk premium of annual UK appraisal-based returns is 1.75%.
2.5 Fair Swap Prices
The normative commercial real estate swap prices are a weighted average of for-
ward prices, or in other words, of future expected returns adjusted for equilibrium
index risk premia. The following calculation illustrates how the fair price of a swap
with a maturity of two years, at the end of 2008 / beginning of 2009, is developed
using US data. The VAR model provides an expected NPI return of -13.34% for
the year 2009 and -3.71% for the year 2010. The forecast of the one-year stock
market risk premium for 2009 is 7.38%. Recall that we assume that the cumu-
lative stock market risk premium increases in proportion to the time horizon, so
that the forecast for the two-year risk premium is 14.75%. Hence, the equilib-
rium risk premium of the one-year NPI return is RPREI2009 (1) = ω2009,1βRP
M
2009(1) =
0.646·0.486·7.38% = 2.32%. The two-year cumulative risk premium of index returns
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Figure 2.3: Forecasted Risk Premia
Panel A: UK
Panel A: US
Note: The exhibit shows the one-year ahead forecasted stock market
risk premium (RP) and one- and five-year-ahead real estate index
return risk premia.
is RPREI2009 (2) = ω2009,2βRP
M
2009(2) = 0.785 · 0.486 · 14.75% = 5.63%, so that we get
a single-period risk premium for 2010 of RPREI2009 (2) = 5.63% − 2.32% = 3.31%.
The forward prices are F2009,1 = −13.343% − 2.32% = −15.66% for 2009 and
F2009,2 = −3.71% − 3.31% = −7.02% for 2010. With a discount factor of 0.982
(0.961) for one-year (two-year) cash-flows at the end of 2008, equation (2.3) yields
the fair swap price of -11.38%.
Figure (2.4) gives an impression of the different swap prices for maturities of one,
three and five-years for the entire period. Again, in the interests of clarity, we do not
show the two and four-year prices. Table (2.5) amends the overview, with some key
statistics of the swap prices. As already observed for the index return forecast, the
one-year swap prices are more volatile than the prices of swaps with a longer maturity
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in both the UK and the US. Corresponding to the index return forecast, the mean
and standard deviation of the one-year swaps are lower in the US. The volatility of
swap prices decreases successively with the maturity from 7.27% to 3.17% in the UK
and from 6.52% to 3.41% in the US. Mean swap price decrease with the maturity,
because annual risk premia increase with the maturity. The autocorrelation of the
swap prices is particularly high in the US, with an autocorrelation coefficient of
about 80% for the five-year swap prices. Negative fair swap prices (at the beginning
of the year) were obtained during the crisis years around 1991 and 2009.
Figure 2.4: “Fair” Swap Prices
Panel A: UK
Panel A: US
Note: This exhibit displays beginning-of-year estimated swap prices
with one-, three- and five-year maturity.
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Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics of Modeled Swap Prices
Panel A: UK
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years
Mean 8.54% 8.18% 8.03% 7.96% 7.92%
Standard Deviation 7.27% 5.92% 4.87% 3.96% 3.17%
Autocorrelation 45.87% 56.17% 66.81% 73.55% 77.72%
Minimum -9.52% -4.48% -2.30% 0.16% 2.39%
Maximum 22.80% 20.86% 17.89% 16.61% 15.10%
Panel A: US
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years
Mean 7.30% 6.73% 6.43% 6.23% 6.08%
Standard Deviation 6.52% 5.15% 4.30% 3.77% 3.41%
Autocorrelation 46.07% 53.18% 64.12% 73.81% 79.95%
Minimum -15.65% -11.38% -7.33% -4.16% -1.99%
Maximum 16.45% 14.03% 13.03% 12.08% 11.29%
Note: This exhibit shows statistics of fair swap prices for the period 1979 to
2011.
2.6 Comparing Actual Market Prices with Fair
Swap Prices
Figure (2.5) compares the actual (indicative mid prices) and the modeled prices of
swaps with one year remaining maturity at the beginning of the year.9 The dates
chosen for the actual swap prices are those when the most recent index return is
published and no longer influences the swap price. In the UK, this occurs at the
end of February / beginning of March and in the US, at the end of January. Be-
cause our VAR is based on end-of-the-year data, the estimated data have a slight
disadvantage. Also shown is the actual IPD return outcome minus the equilibrium
risk premium for that year. In the UK (Panel A), the estimated swap prices exceed
the actual prices for all four observations. Especially at the beginning of 2009, the
9All prices are quoted as a fixed rate over calendar years. The mid prices of total return swaps
are obtained from Bloomberg for Merrill Lynch’s data from 2008 to 2009 and from IPF for the
Royal Bank of Scotland’s data from 2010 to 2011 in the UK. The overlapping period reveals no
relevant differences. In the US, the data are obtained from Markit, representing an average mid
price of different dealers.
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actual swap price is about 10 percentage points below our estimated fair swap price.
Judging by the IPD return outcomes, the actual swap prices were a better indicator
at the beginning of 2008, while the estimated fair swap price fared better for 2009
and 2010. In the US, the actual and estimated swap prices are relatively similar at
the beginning of 2008, 2009 and 2010. With hindsight, both actual and estimated
swap prices were too high at the beginning of 2008 and 2009 and too low at the
beginning of 2010. The estimated swap price at the beginning of 2011 is notably
higher than the actual swap price due to the high return estimate obtained from the
VAR. Overall, the picture is mixed, with neither the modeled fair swap prices nor
the actual swap prices being clearly superior, when judged against the actual index
return outcomes. Qualitatively, the estimated fair swap prices track the market de-
velopment quite well in both countries.
Additionally, table (2.6) provides an overview of actual and estimated swap prices
with remaining maturities of up to five years, over the period from 2007 to 2011 for
the UK and from 2008 to 2011 for the US (again, beginning of the year data).
We also report means and standard deviations for prices with different remaining
maturities. There are notable differences between actual and estimated swap prices.
In both countries, the mean estimated swap prices are generally higher than the
mean actual swap prices, especially in the UK. This could indicate that risk premia
implicitly reflected in actual swap prices are higher than those modeled in this paper.
Alternatively, the expected index returns incorporated into actual swap prices are
lower, on average, than those estimated from the VAR models. However, there are
some observations, where the actual swap prices are higher than the estimated swap
prices. The deviations are particularly high for UK prices at the beginning of 2009.
With hindsight, the large negative actual prices were not justified, because the IPD
total return was positive in 2009 and 2010. In general, the differences between actual
and estimated swap prices are smaller for the US. The reasons for this could be that
appraisal-based returns have a higher degree of predictability; recall that in the VAR
models, the R2-statistic was higher for the US market. Standard deviations of both
actual and estimated swap prices tend to decrease with maturity. The standard
deviations of estimated swap prices is larger than the volatilities of actual swap
prices for all maturities, expect for the one-year maturity in the UK.
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Figure 2.5: Actual versus Modeled Prices of Swaps Maturing in One Year
Panel A: UK
Panel A: US
Note: This exhibit compares actual mid prices with estimated prices
of swaps with one year remaining maturity from 2008 to 2011 (begin-
ning of year). Also shown is the outcome of the index return minus
the equilibrium risk premium.
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Table 2.6: Actual Prices versus Modeled Swap Prices
Panel A: UK
Pricing Date
Remaining
Maturity 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average St.Dv.
(years)
Actual na -11.00% -18.50% 10.00% 9.94% -2.39% 14.60%
1 Estimate -7.25% -8.74% 13.82% 17.28% 3.78% 13.68%
Difference -3.75% -9.76% -3.82% -7.34% -6.17%
Actual 6.32% -3.12% -9.75% 8.26% 7.94% 1.93% 8.02%
2 Estimate 4.40% -4.31% -0.15% 15.70% 15.27% 6.18% 9.03%
Difference 1.92% 1.19% -9.60% -7.44% -7.33% -4.25%
Actual 6.32% 0.72% -3.50% 7.69% 7.37% 3.72% 4.92%
3 Estimate 3.25% -0.64% 5.77% 15.31% 12.71% 7.28% 6.62%
Difference 3.07% 1.36% -9.27% -7.62% -5.34% -3.56%
Actual 6.42% 2.83% -0.40% 7.40% 7.03% 4.65% 3.36%
4 Estimate 3.38% 2.40% 8.56% 13.78% 10.54% 7.73% 4.81%
Difference 3.04% 0.43% -8.96% -6.38% -3.51% -3.08%
Actual 6.13% 3.87% 1.45% 7.25% na 4.67% 2.57%
5 Estimate 4.13% 4.31% 9.06% 12.13% 7.41% 3.89%
Difference 2.00% -0.44% -7.61% -4.88% -2.73%
Panel A: US
Pricing Date
Remaining
Maturity 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average St.Dv.
(years)
Actual -2.00% -12.50% -0.35% 4.50% -2.59% 7.16%
1 Estimate 0.21% -15.65% -3.55% 12.71% -1.57% 11.68%
Difference -2.21% 3.15% 3.20% -8.21% -1.02%
Actual -2.00% -9.92% 1.30% 4.30% -1.58% 6.13%
2 Estimate -1.74% -11.38% -0.37% 10.70% -0.70% 9.04%
Difference -0.26% 1.46% 1.67% -6.40% -0.88%
Actual -2.00% -7.00% 0.45% 4.20% -1.09% 4.69%
3 Estimate -2.15% -7.33% 1.84% 8.95% 0.33% 6.87%
Difference 0.15% 0.33% -1.39% -4.75% -1.42%
Actual na -4.42% 0.50% 4.10% 0.06% 4.28%
4 Estimate -4.16% 3.14% 7.67% 2.22% 5.97%
Difference -0.26% -2.64% -3.57% -2.16%
Actual na -2.50% na 4.00% 0.75% 4.60%
5 Estimate -1.99% 6.85% 2.43% 6.25%
Difference -0.51% -2.85% -1.68%
Note: Actual mid prices are compared with estimated prices of swaps with maturities
of one to five years.
Counterparty risk might explain (part of) the difference between actual and esti-
mated swap prices, but Lizieri, Marcato, Ogden, and Baum (2010) suggest that this
is of minor importance, since no principal is exchanged, the treatment of swaps in
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default is favorable and the intermediary market maker offers a guarantee. Lizieri,
Marcato, Ogden, and Baum (2010) explore the participant’s willingness to accept
spreads due to the special characteristics of direct real estate markets. Focusing on
the UK market, they show that the consideration of high transaction costs, execution
time and (of minor importance) cash-flow timing in direct real estate markets gener-
ate a “rational” window around the spreads from the risk-free rate. This window is
particularly large for swaps with short maturities. Their model can explain a spread
from 900 bp to -200 bp over the risk-free rate for a one-year contract, without there
being opportunities for positive net-present-value investments. Transaction costs
have the most important impact on this window. Because transaction costs in the
(UK) direct real estate market are higher for the buyer than for the seller, the spread
window is asymmetrically distributed between buyers, who are prepared to pay a
larger positive margin, than sellers, who are willing to accept a moderate negative
margin to avoid using the underlying real estate market directly. In a liquid market,
the midpoint buyer-seller spread, which decreases from about 350 bp for a one-year
contract to 75 bp for a five-year contract, should be incorporated into prices. As
long as the market is not liquid, however, prices might be set anywhere within the
rational trading window. Actual prices will depend on imbalances between buy-
ers and seller, which could be influenced by market sentiment. These considerations
might explain some of the differences between estimated fair and actual swap prices.
2.7 Conclusion
In comparison to well-developed stock and bond markets, the private commercial
real estate market is affected much more by market frictions, such as low liquidity,
heterogeneity and high transaction costs. A result of the specific microstructure of
direct real estate asset markets is that the return indices tracking commercial real
estate markets are subject to a range of biases. In particular, appraisal-based re-
turns lag behind actual market movements and are less volatile than actual market
returns. This has to be accounted for in the pricing of real estate derivatives based
on appraisal-based indices, making real estate swap pricing more complicated than
the pricing of swaps for liquid financial assets. Despite the fact that commercial real
estate derivative markets have emerged in the US and in Europe in recent years,
uncertainty about fair and rational pricing remains.
We empirically investigate normative swap pricing on private commercial real
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estate market indices using Geltner and Fisher (2007) equilibrium pricing model
for the US and the UK market. Future index return estimates are based on vector
autoregressive models. In deriving the swap prices, we also account for a time-
varying and maturity-dependent equilibrium risk premium for appraisal-based index
returns. Comparing estimated and actual swap prices with index return outcomes,
neither is generally superior. Qualitatively, the estimated swap prices track actual
market developments quite well, indicating that the modeled swap prices enhance
our understanding of the pricing of commercial real estate swaps.
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Chapter 3
The Rat Race of Capital Structure
Research: Two Spotlights on
Leverage
This paper is the result of a joint work with Ralf H. Hohenstatt.
Abstract
This paper presents a dynamic multi-equation model based on a balance sheet iden-
tity, where technical aspects of capital structure are highlighted through separately
observing debt and equity and their relationship to investment. Additionally, lever-
age dynamics are interpreted in their role for liquidity management. Interactions of
leverage with lines of credit (LOC) and cash are considered in the light of financial
flexibility. The major findings obtained by observing US REITs and REOCs from
1995 to 2010 are as follows. In accordance with the existing literature, cash and
LOC reveal a substitute relationship. However, the calculus of financial flexibility
and our findings suggest that leverage positively drives cash, which is consistent with
Gamba and Triantis (2008), and also with the accepted perspective of debt minus
cash being net debt (Spotlight A). Consequently, the very robust results indicate
that leverage eliminates a significant amount of information. Further mechanical
relationships, especially for market leverage, are suggested (Spotlight B).
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3.1 Introduction
The persistently large number of capital structure studies since the seminal work of
Modigliani and Miller (1958) does not yield consistent evidence for one specific cap-
ital structure theory. This study does not aim to validate any of these theories, but
follows Graham and Harvey (2001), who state that “financial flexibility is the single
most important determinant of capital structure according to CFOs”. Investigating
firm cash holdings, Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) argues: “Firms
want to avoid situations where the agency costs of debt are so high that they cannot
raise funds to finance their activities and invest in valuable projects. Obviously,
one way to do so is to choose a low level of leverage.” A more recent example of
this stream of research is the proposal of DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2007), aimed
at filling the gap in capital structure theory and the associated empirical findings.
They state: “Financial Flexibility is the critical missing link for an empirically viable
[capital structure] theory.” Gamba and Triantis (2008) directly address this concept
and provide the following definition: “Financial flexibility represents the ability of a
firm to access and restructure its financing at a low cost. Financially flexible firms
are able to avoid financial distress in the face of negative shocks, and to readily fund
investment when profitable opportunities arise.”
In the present study, approximation leverage (LEV) is investigated by two spot-
lights. Financial flexibility, in the sense of anticipating liquidity management, is
addressed by Spotlight A. Interactions of LEV with cash & cash equivalents (CCE)
and lines of credit (LOC) form the focus. The more technical one (Spotlight B)
is motivated by the arguments of Chen and Zhao (2007) and Gatchev, Pulvino,
and Tarhan (2010). Spotlight B ensures robust results, distinguishing between real
stochastic and mainly mechanical relationships.
The recent late-2000s financial crisis in particular, provides the motivation for
investigating Spotlight A. There is consensus in the existing literature on a substi-
tute relationship between CCE and LOC. This is due to the fact that LOC hedge
against underinvestment, and CCE against cash flow (CF) shortfalls (Lins, Servaes,
and Tufano (2010)). However, what was evident immediately after the peak of the
crisis is that firms draw their available LOC, fearing that they will be canceled due
to covenant breaks (Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010)). Sufi (2009) also sup-
ports the view that CCE and LOC are only conditional substitutes. Therefore, this
study aims to fill the gap in the literature, by including LEV in the interactions
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of sources of liquidity management. Furthermore, another issue of the late-2000s
financial crisis is the perceived increased relevance of the real estate industry. Many
studies argue that there is homogeneity in the REIT industry due to legislation,
e.g. aspects such as the role of taxes or retained cash flows are of lower relevance.
Hence, more consistent findings are expected when concentrating on REITs. An-
other interesting circumstance within this industry is the underutilization of CCE,
as opposed to a similar level of importance of LOC, compared to companies out-
side the real estate industry. This may be due to the fact that the high dividend
payout restriction prevents REITs from accumulating cash. Yet, recent research by
Harrison, Panasian, and Seiler (2011) reports that REITs voluntarily choose to pay
’excess dividends’ – up to 38% of their total assets.
This paper is organized traditionally. Section 2 provides an overview of the related
literature. In section 3, the data are described. Section 4 introduces our model. In
section 5, we present the results and section 6 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
3.2.1 General Motivation
At first, both the general finance literature, as well as real estate studies, seem to
reach no empirically robust consensus on classical capital structure theories. One
could cautiously claim that recent research in this field agrees on a mixture of trade-
off and market-timing theory as valid. This is justified mainly by market timing
allowing equity issuances to be preferable in some states of the economy.1 Further-
more, LEV often reveals a mean-reversion characteristic; hence, target-leverage is
interpreted as a validation of the trade-off theory (Flannery and Rangan (2006)).
Hence, the second argument is motivated by Chen and Zhao (2007), who demon-
strate, using the sample of Flannery and Rangan (2006), how their findings can be
justified by a purely mechanical characteristic. This is due to the fact that leverage
is ’just’ a ratio and has insufficient implications for capital structure dynamics, thus
making it an inadequate tool for distinguishing between different financing policies.
The third argument is based on the relevance of taxes to financing decisions, if one
1For this reason, pecking-order is often rejected, but seems to be valid for large firms with low
market-to-book-ratio but high cash-flows (Leary and Roberts (2010)).
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argues in favor of the trade-off theory. Blouin, Core, and Guay (2010) investigate
the widespread belief in the underutilization of debt. This is supported indirectly by
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2007). They do not exclude a tax-shield, but emphasize
that preserving debt capacity, in order to forego investment distortions in the near
future, outweighs the “few cents on the dollar” benefit of debt. Finally, the present
study observes mainly REITs, which are pass-through entities with respect to the
main business activities. Hence, a tax-shield is assumed to be of no relevance for
this paper.
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2007) recognize the dilemma of capital structure re-
search and formulate a draft aimed at filling the gap between the traditional the-
ories and empirical findings. They argue that it is the ’equity as the last resort’
attribute of the pecking-order theory, and the ’non-occurrence of levering up after
stock price increases’ of market-timing, and the ’high dividend-low leverage’ char-
acteristic of profitable firms of trade-off theory which necessitate innovations in this
field of research. Their alternative approach to explaining capital structure is based
on interpreting management actions in the light of financial flexibility, e.g. preserv-
ing debt capacity for facilitating potential future financial needs.
The above mentioned arguments motivate focusing on leverage with two spot-
lights: from the one perspective, leverage is ’just’ a ratio, which absorbs valuable
information by definition. From the other perspective, as a ratio, leverage is one
source of liquidity management; hence, it competes with other sources of financial
flexibility. The first spotlight can be seen as the more technical one, while the second
may be interpreted rather as an alternative approach to solving the capital structure
puzzle.2 The following section briefly summarizes recent research relevant to these
two spotlights.
2Because much is said about capital structure theories, namely trade-off, pecking-order and
market-timing theory, we forego the reproduction and refer to Feng, Ghosh, and Sirmans (2007),
Hardin and Wu (2010) or Harrison, Panasian, and Seiler (2011) for the real estate market or
Hovakimian, Hovakimian, and Tehranian (2004) or Flannery and Rangan (2006) for the general
finance literature.
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3.2.2 Spotlight A: Leverage, Cash & Cash Equivalents and
Lines of Credit
There is a wide range of literature on CCE versus LOC, generally agreeing that these
sources may be assumed to constitute substitutes.3 Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2010)
accord different purposes to CCE and LOC, with respect to the state of the econ-
omy. They argue that LOC serve to finance value-raising projects when they arise,
while CCE hedge against CF shortfalls. Sufi (2009) investigates the dependence of
firm characteristics on the use of one or the other source. High CF-generating firms
maintain LOC, because of the strong link between financial covenants and credit
facilities. Sufi also argues that the unavailability of LOC is a superior proxy for be-
ing financially constrained (for firms with a high degree of information asymmetry
see also An, Hardin, and Wu (2010)). Accordingly, a positive CF-CCE sensitivity
would only prevail for constrained firms, which do not have a LOC. Interpreting
LOC as the nominal amount of debt capacity (see also Riddiough and Wu (2009)),
Sufi (2009) highlights the relevance of cash flow and debt measures for credit agree-
ments. With cash flow decreases being associated with covenant violations, CCE
is only a conditional substitute for LOC. Hardin, Highfield, Hill, and Kelly (2009)
confirm a substitutive relationship between CCE and LOC. Moreover, the authors
state that REIT managers choose not to accumulate cash, preferring to finance ex-
ternally, gaining from reduced agency conflicts of monitoring and reduced costs of
financing.
While empirical evidence suggests a negative relationship between LEV and CCE
(Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999); Ozkan and Ozkan (2004); Hardin,
Highfield, Hill, and Kelly (2009)), our perspective suggests a positive, but non-linear
relationship. This becomes clear when considering the insurance aspects of both in-
struments: low leverage preserves debt capacity, i.e. the ability to borrow in the
future, high cash reserves hedge against the risk of underinvestment and cash flow
shortfalls, but mainly against the latter. This view is supported by Lins, Servaes,
and Tufano (2010), who find no significant (contemporaneous) relationship, but re-
fer to argument which we have just stated. Denis and Sibilkov (2010) also favor the
hedging argument of CCE for underinvestment, but predict a negative correlation of
LEV and CCE. Gamba and Triantis (2008) investigate a firm’s financial flexibility,
3For interview based studies, see Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2010) in 2005 or Campello, Graham,
and Harvey (2010) in 2008. For empirical studies based on the real estate market see Hardin,
Highfield, Hill, and Kelly (2009) or Sufi (2009) for broad market evidence.
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driven by levels of borrowing and lending. By controlling cash and debt, the re-
sulting positive net debt implicates a higher firm value, although with a decreasing
marginal effect with respect to the mixture of cash and debt.4 Acharya, Almeida,
and Campello (2007) also argue that CCE constitutes negative debt. Their impli-
cations are dependent on varying degrees of hedging needs, namely a lower risk of
underinvestment implicating that firms pay down their outstanding debt.
Moreover, a negative relationship between LEV and LOC seems to be empirically
robust, as well as consistent with the calculus of financial flexibility. Riddiough and
Wu (2009) declare that REITs increased dividend payout in the 1990 to 2003 period,
leaving these specific companies with lower cash reserves than non-REITs, whereas
the use of LOC is comparable. Therefore, interpreting a high LEV as the inability
to borrow in the future (e.g. Gamba and Triantes 2008) – and hence classified as
the reciprocal of debt capacity – LEV and LOC yield reverse dynamics. Second,
LEV accounts for drawing LOC and the change of other external sources of finance.
Third, since the dynamics between LEV and CCE, as well as LOC, have not been
comprehensively empirically investigated, the stochastic properties of the variables
of interest would allow at least the following prediction. Assuming that CCE and
LOC are not independent of each other, namely negative, a reverse relationship of
LEV applies to each of them. Assuming positive CCE-LEV dynamics, the hypoth-
esized sign of LEV and LOC follows technically.
Summarizing the arguments of Spotlight A, the liquidity sources have different
tasks, but are dependent on firm characteristics, as well as the state of the economy.
Moreover, a preference for one or the other may depend on the original level.
3.2.3 Spotlight B: Leverage is ’just’ a Ratio
The second spotlight on leverage takes properties of this ratio into account. If equity
and debt increase by the same percentage, a leverage ratio will simply cancel out
these dynamics, but total (i.e. non-current) assets increase. The relative position of
debt still plays a significant role in terms of anticipative liquidity policy, but in order
to differentiate between financial actions, debt and equity must be treated separately.
4Hill, Kelly, and Hardin (2010) report a $1.34 increase ($0.30 decrease) of firm value due to a $1
increase of CCE (one standard deviation increase of unused LOC) based on empirical investigation
of REITs.
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Today’s decisions are determined jointly, they are dependent on what happened
in the past and also influence the (unknown) future. Therefore, the first impera-
tive, when dealing with financial flexibility is dynamic modeling. Gatchev, Pulvino,
and Tarhan (2010) distinguish between debt and equity, and do so between all the
main aggregates from the cash-flow statement – one example of a more cash-flow-
focused mentality since the late-2000s financial crisis. The authors detect a much
lower sensitivity of investment to shocks to cash flows, concluding that financing
sensitivity with respect to cash flows is much more relevant than investment re-
sponses. Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010) define an identity where one dollar
cash in-flow corresponds exactly to one dollar cash outflow. Chen and Zhao (2007)
also worked with an accounting identity in which assets are defined by last year’s
assets plus the change in debt, equity and retained earnings. The authors suggest
that firms levered below the median increase leverage by increasing debt, but highly
levered firms increase equity while decreasing debt. Almeida and Campello (2007)
also investigate financing-investment sensitivities with respect to the state of the
market and firm characteristics. They agree that cash-flow shocks affect primarily
constrained firms. However, the portion of tangible assets in particular, determines
the procyclical aspect of debt capacity with respect to the business cycle.
In summary, the importance of distinguishing between the numerator and denom-
inator of LEV is the focus of the second spotlight on LEV. In addition to research
surrounding LEV, CCE and LOC, the relevance of real assets (investment) and cash
flow is determined. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2007) suggest “new testable hypothe-
sis [...] for future research [...] [is that] firms’ long-run leverage targets are inversely
related in cross-section and time-series to the (investment distortion-reducing) value
of financial flexibility.”
3.2.4 Research Goal from a Bird’s Eye
In a perfect world, there is no need to hoard cash or hedge in any other way, because
firms have access to the capital market at any time without transactions costs, when
investment opportunities arrive. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999)
define a firm as being short of liquid assets, if it has to sell assets or cut capital
expenditures or dividends. By contrast, this paper considers how, dependent on the
state of the economy and firm characteristics, investment funding is influenced by
the drivers of financial flexibility, namely debt capacity (reciprocal LEV), CCE and
LOC. However, we adjust the concept of assuming an optimum amount of ’finan-
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cial flexibility’. The marginal costs of being short of money in periods when a firm
would actually need funding are a decreasing function with respect to instruments of
financial flexibility. On the other hand, foregoing borrowing power in terms of LEV
(on balance, but not directly measurable in terms of being financially constrained),
the opportunity costs of CCE (on balance and fully measurable) and fees for the
availability of LOC (off balance and partly measurable in terms of efficiency) act in
a contrary manner, so as to antagonize these marginal costs. Therefore, there has
to be an optimum where the marginal costs of underinvestment and financial dis-
tress coincide with the costs associated with being financially flexible. Despite the
fact that CCE plays a minor role for real estate companies, this is an unconditional
source for hedging underinvestment, if outside investors are unwilling to provide
funds. Yet, cash hedges particularly effectively in economic downturns, since a low-
leverage firm would still be dependent on external capital. LOC agreements could
be canceled in the event of covenant breaks. However, of the three sources, CCE
is associated most strongly with costs of asymmetric information, because outsiders
doubt the appropriate use by managers, while debt has the advantage of monitoring
(Hardin, Highfield, Hill, and Kelly (2009)).5
Figure 3.1: Concept of Financial Flexibility
Note: This figure depicts the equilibrium between the costs of financial flexibil-
ity and (in-)direct costs associated with underinvestment and financial distress.
5For the relevance of information asymmetry for a firm’s choice between CCE and LOC, see
also An, Hardin, and Wu (2010).
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From this perspective, the objective function describes the ability to secure suf-
ficient financial resources and to raise sufficient financial resources to implement
profitable investments with respect to uncertainty and the efficiency constraint in
terms of the direct and indirect costs of financial flexibility. We hypothesize that
financial flexibility is a broader, but more consistent concept in explaining the dy-
namics of financing activities, compared to traditional capital structure theory.
3.3 Data
The SEC statements compiled by SNL Financial are the basis of our panel data set.
The initial sample contains 316 operating and acquired or defunct US Equity REITs
and REOCs traded on the NYSE, NYSE Amex Equities and NASDAQ from 1996
to 2010, with 56% non-missing values. Company foundations and liquidations are
responsible for 79% of the missing values, whereas 21% are due to unreported data.
The broad announcements of cash flow statements in SNL from 1996 onwards, as
well as the dynamic modeling, including lagged differences, restrict the sample to
the 1998-2010 period and eliminate 36 firms with less than three consecutive years.6
Table (3.1) provides definitions and computations of the variables and approxi-
mations used in this study. All financial variables are truncated at the 5th and 95th
percentile. LEV (LOC) is cut at the 95th percentile only, because 6% (9%) of the
observations are zero. The truncation is to a lesser extent intended to reduce the
influence of outliers, rather than to focus the study on firms with typical financial
characteristics. Subsequently, the end-of-year financial data are deflated by the US
Producer Price Index of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Therefore, the final
sample includes 140 Equity REITs and REOCs corresponding to 558 firm-year ob-
servations.
Research on cash balances suggests the need to scale variables by non-cash assets,
in order to forego mechanical relationships (see Sufi (2009)), analogous to the argu-
ments associated with Spotlight B. However, since debt scaled by assets (leverage)
would decrease after CCE scaled by non-cash assets has increased for mechanical
reasons, we scale variables with the beginning of the period value of total assets,
rather than divide the variables by non-cash-and-debt assets.
6A further reason for starting in 1996 is the beginning of a consolidation phase, after a boom
of the REIT sector in the 1990s.
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Table 3.1: Variable Description
Variable Description Definition
Balance Sheet Aggregates
STD Short-term debt Debt payable within a business year
LTD Long-term debt Debt payable after a business year
EQU Common equity (shareholder equity) − (preferred equity)
DPROP Depreciable property PPE + accumulated depreciation
NFI Net of financing and investment cash flow ∆CCE − CF Op
Instruments of Liquidity Management
CCE Cash & cash equivalents Cash or assets easily convertible into cash
LEV Market leverage (total debt) / (market value of assets)
LOC Lines of credit Aggregate lines of credit and other
revolving credit agreements available
CF Op Operating CF Net cash provided by operating activities
Control Variables
S&P500 Standard & Poor’s 500 Index ln(S&P500t / S&P500t−1)
MB Growth opportunities (market equity) / (book equity)
ROA Profitability Return on assets
Size Size of a firm ln(total assets)
Dummies
Rating Access to public debt 1 if firm has investment-grade rating ...
Op Risk Operating risk 1 if firm has CF volatility above the median ...
Inv Shock Investment shock 1 if %-change is above the 55th percentile ...
FFO Shock Shock on sustainable CF 1 if %-change is below the 45th percentile ...
... and 0 otherwise
Note: The table describes the variables used in the dynamic model for the two spotlights
on leverage. Mean and standard deviations of the dependent variables in the multi-equation
framework are reported in the respective estimation reports for the full sample, as well as
for each subsample.
3.3.1 (Balance Sheet) Items Defining the Identity
The variables STD for short-term debt, and LTD for long-term debt, describe the lia-
bilities of the company to a third party, whereas EQU for common equity, describes
the claims of the shareholders. DPROP for depreciable property is calculated as
the sum of property, plant and equipment (PPE) and accumulated depreciation.
The differences between DPROP over time characterize the net expenditures of the
company in PPE. In line with Harrison, Panasian, and Seiler (2011), real estate
investment, as the source of collateral and asset tangibility, should increase the debt
capacity of a firm. However, from our point of view, net property (real estate)
investment foregoes the link of internal financing through depreciation.7 Hence,
7Riddiough and Wu (2009) report that the 90% payout restriction transfers to 55%-70% pre-
dividend payout, whereas An et al. (2010) relate this to 85% of FFO. Both figures highlight the
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approximating the change in fixed assets by DPROP does not dilute the actual
stock of real estate. Apart from minor aggregates, the sum of operating, investment
and financing cash flow is the change in CCE and completes the identity, which is
introduced in detail in the next section.
3.3.2 Instruments of Liquidity Management
The following sources are defined as the instruments of liquidity management. Cash
& cash equivalents (CCE) describe the potential of the internal finance source for
future projects and increase the firm’s financial flexibility. By contrast, market
leverage (LEV) is the ratio of total debt to the market value of assets and lowers a
firm’s debt capacity. While market LEV is used throughout the analysis, the results
are also compared to book LEV, which is total debt to year-beginning total assets.
The available lines of credit (LOC) are a revolving debt source extended by a bank.
On the one hand, they offer future financial flexibility for the firm, but on the other
hand, they are subject to fees for the unused lines.
3.3.3 Traditional Capital Structure Determinants
The following determinants are typical control variables used in capital structure
studies. The general (stock) market cycles influence the development of real estate
firms with respect to systematic risks and opportunities. This impact is incurred
through the continuous returns of the S&P500. The market-to-book ratio (MB),
calculated by market equity divided by book equity, characterizes the idiosyncratic
growth opportunity.8 The profitability of a firm – measured by return on assets
(ROA) – may also influence the capital structure, as it is easier to issue debt and
equity for more profitable firms. The size of a firm is captured by the natural
logarithm of its total assets, assuming decreasing marginal economies of scale. With
respect to balance sheet aggregates, a mechanical size effect on DPROP, STD, LTD
and EQU is mitigated, due to scaling by total assets.
relevance of depreciation for internal funding
8Traditionally, MB is approximated by the deviation of market and book value of assets, rather
than equity. In order to reduce the mechanical relationship to market leverage, the latter possibility
is chosen.
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3.3.4 Additional Dummies Approximating Firm Character-
istics
The dummy Rating has a value of one, if the firm has at least an investment grade
long-term issuer rating from S&P, Moody’s or Fitch. It approximates access to the
public debt market, due to relatively lower transaction costs and levels of asym-
metric information. The dummy Op Risk equals one, if the volatility of operating
CF exceeds the conditional median of the twelve different property segments. It
approximates the operational risk confronting a real estate company.
The two remaining dummies are unique to our research. As derived in the liter-
ature section, it is of interest to determine whether a firm faces strong investment
opportunities or substantial CF shortfalls. Therefore, the Inv Shock variable sum-
marizes all observations with a percentage change of the market-to-book ratio above
the 55th percentile, conditional on the property segments. The computation for the
FFO Shock is similar. This determinant indicates observations with low percentage
changes in funds from operations (FFO), if the changes are below the conditional
45th percentile. FFO is typically calculated by adding real estate depreciation to
the GAAP net income, excluding gains or losses from sales of properties or debt
restructuring, and is interpreted as the sustainable cash flow. Observations with
low (more negative) percentage changes in their FFOs are assumed to trigger higher
leverage and lower equity.
3.3.5 Dealing with Cross-Industry Variation
It is common in real estate finance to allow for varying intercepts for different prop-
erty segments. However, Ertugrul and Giambona (2011) show that the relative
standing of a firm within its property focus segment (“micro industry”) is essential
for determining leverage. The rationale behind this approach is simply that it is not
appropriate to compare profitability, leverage, or, as in this study, different forms
of hedging tools of e.g. an office with a residential property company. Table (3.2)
contains the t-statistics of Welch’s t-test for the sources of liquidity across property
segments. The results of the t-test, whether the segment means are equal to the
sample mean, indicate that 10 of 21 conditional means are significantly different to
the overall sample mean.
Therefore, we compare the results of the high and low subsamples. According to
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Table 3.2: Cross-Industry Variance for Financial Liquidity Instruments
LEV CCE LOC
Property Focus N Mean t-stat N Mean t-stat N Mean t-stat
All 558 0.406 558 0.015 558 0.162
Office 103 0.411 -0.5 103 0.012 2.261* 103 0.167 -0.597
Residential 103 0.424 -1.779 103 0.011 3.337** 103 0.167 -0.737
Retail 122 0.446 -3.445*** 122 0.013 1.295 122 0.164 -0.264
Industrial 40 0.407 -0.072 40 0.018 -0.87 40 0.162 -0.052
Hotel 58 0.374 1.931 58 0.022 -2.492* 58 0.146 1.448
Diversified 59 0.415 -0.549 59 0.018 -1.714 59 0.131 3.286**
Others 73 0.327 6.054*** 73 0.019 -1.584 73 0.182 -2.278*
Note: This table shows the t-statistics (t-stat) of Welch’s t-test. LEV refers to the market
leverage. CCE refers to cash & cash equivalents, LOC to lines of credit available, both
scaled by year-beginning total assets. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
the firm characteristics of the respective twelve property segments, a firm enters the
low (high) subsample, if it yields a value below (above) the 45th (55th) percentile for
a given firm characteristic. The characteristics are LEV, CCE, LOC, MB, ROA and
Size. Furthermore, subsamples are constructed for the boom years (1996-1999, 2003-
2007 and 2009-2010), bust years (2000-2002 and 2008) and for the sample before
the late-2000s financial crisis (before 2008). Moreover, the attributes of whether
a firm ’is rated as investment grade’, ’has an above-median cash flow volatility’
or ’experienced positive as opposed to negative cash-flow changes’ are identified
accordingly.
3.4 Model
The concept underlying this paper is basically that of combining the cash flow state-
ment approach of Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010) with the balance-sheet view
of Chen and Zhao (2007).
More specifically, the ideas that we adopt are a system of equations, estimated
by weighted least squares, where the weight is reciprocal to the number of observa-
tions per year. By also following the advice of Petersen (2009), the methodological
difference, is that we decided to include year dummies in order to account for time
effects.9 An even more important difference is that we do not need to define our
9Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010) demeaned their variables by the year means, which is
associated with a manual adjustment of confidence intervals (especially in smaller samples like
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identity, but eliminate 48 firm-year observations which do not satisfy the conditions
in equations (3.1) and (3.2).10
Cash F low from Operationsi,t
+ Cash F low from Financingi,t
+ Cash F low from Investmenti,t
= ∆Cash and Cash Equivalents (CCE)i,t
(3.1)
Through equation (3.1), we relate the operating cash flow (CF Op) to changes in
balance sheet items by modeling
Operating CFi,t
!
=− (Financing CFi,t + Investment CFi,t)− ...
−∆Depreciable Propertyi,t + ∆STDi,t + ∆LTDi,t + ...
+ ∆Common Equityi,t + ∆Resid(All)i,t + errori,t
(3.2)
where:
NFIi,t = Financing CFi,t + Investment CFi,t
∆Resid(All)i,t = ∆Resid(Assets)i,t + ∆Resid(Liab.&Equi.)i,t
∆Resid(Assets)i,t = ∆Total Assetsi,t −∆Depreciable Propertyi,t − ...
−∆(CCE)i,t
∆Resid(Liab.&Equi.)i,t = ∆ (Liabilitiesi,t − Total Debti,t) + ...
+ ∆Total Mezzaninei,t + ∆Preferred Equityi,t
errori,t = −∆Total Assetsi,t + ∆STDi,t + ∆LTDi,t + ...
+ ∆Common Equityi,t + ∆Resid(Liab.&Equi.)i,t
The first two summands of equation (3.2) expresses the change in total assets,
while the second row expresses the change in equity plus liabilities of the variables
ours). Accordingly, after demeaning our sample, the year dummies re-main jointly significant.
10Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010) did not capture the whole cash-flow statement and thus
had to define this identity in combination with a penalty function.
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in our focus. The change in Resid(All) subsumes the remaining aggregates of the
balance sheet.11
Moreover, we allow for a maximum deviation of $100,000 in equation (3.2)
|errori,t|
!
< 100, 000
Therefore, the basic model accounting for Spotlight B can be written as

∆Resid(All)i,t
∆STDi,t
∆LTDi,t
∆EQUi,t
∆DPROPi,t
∆NFIi,t

=Γ ·

∆Resid(All)i,t−1
∆STDi,t−1
∆LTDi,t−1
∆EQUi,t−1
∆DPROPi,t−1
∆NFIi,t−1

+ Λ · CF Opi,t + ...
+ Π ·

S&P500i,t
MBi,t
ROAi,t
SIZEi,t
+ Ψ ·

Ratingi,t
Op Riski,t
Inv Shocki,t
FFO Shocki,t
+ i,t
(3.3)
or in compact form
Y = Γ · L.Y + Λ · CF Op+ Π · C + Ψ ·D + i,t
’Y’ represents all the right hand side variables of equation (3.2), which are also im-
plemented as lagged regressors.12 Operating cash flows ’CF Op’, as well as the firm
11The sum of financing and investment cash flow was originally allocated to the change in
Resid(All), which should only play a minor role for the system dynamics. However, the dynamics
of this variable were too often significant, due to the substantial relevance of these two cash flows.
12Besides Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010), the funding cycle of Brown and Riddiough
(2003) in conjunction with Riddiough and Wu (2009) would also suggest this dynamic framework.
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characteristics ’C’, namely S&P500, MB, ROA and Size are proposed as contempo-
raneous independent variables. The dummies ’D’ (Rating, Op-Risk, Inv Shock and
FFO Shock) complete equation (3.3).13 By construction, it follows that all coeffi-
cients per row add up to zero, but the operating CF’s impact on ’Y’ sum to one.
13We also considered dummies like ’incorporated in Delaware or Maryland’, ’firm is a REIT’,
’firm age’ etc., that are partially implemented in real estate corporate finance research. However,
due to the limited useful and significant insights thus obtained, we disregard these characteristics.
86
The Rat Race of Capital Structure Research: Two Spotlights on Leverage
Table 3.3: Basic Model (according to equation (3.3))
(1)+(2)+(3)+...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) +(4)−(5)−(6)
Resid(All) STD LTD EQU DPROP NFI Balance Sheet
Identity
L.Resid(All) 0.133 -0.299* -0.720* -0.527** -0.965** -0.447*** 0.0000033
(0.62) (-1.84) (-1.90) (-2.50) (-2.08) (-5.53)
L.STD 0.168 -0.660*** -0.231 -0.409* -0.686 -0.446*** 0.0000077
(0.82) (-3.65) (-0.58) (-1.96) (-1.42) (-5.37)
L.LTD 0.181 -0.260 -0.604 -0.447** -0.681 -0.449*** 0.0000061
(0.90) (-1.54) (-1.60) (-2.26) (-1.48) (-5.62)
L.EQU 0.179 -0.234 -0.576 -0.460** -0.646 -0.445*** 0.0000014
(0.91) (-1.39) (-1.57) (-2.40) (-1.50) (-5.60)
L.DPROP -0.166 0.288* 0.784** 0.558*** 1.009** 0.456*** -0.0000057
(-0.80) (1.68) (2.01) (2.74) (2.14) (5.52)
L.NFI -0.217 0.052 0.677** 0.518*** 0.906** 0.124** -0.0000091
(-1.49) (0.38) (2.01) (3.26) (2.42) (2.05)
CF Op 0.169 -0.006 1.192*** 0.453** 1.760*** -0.952*** 0.9999973
(1.03) (-0.05) (3.48) (2.48) (4.08) (-15.62)
S&P500 0.021 -0.005 0.068* 0.055*** 0.123*** 0.016** -0.0000002
(1.30) (-0.26) (1.75) (3.22) (4.32) (1.98)
MB -0.005** -0.002 0.019*** -0.008*** 0.004 0.001 0.0000001
(-2.11) (-0.72) (3.61) (-2.69) (0.52) (0.84)
ROA -0.003* -0.000 -0.007*** 0.006*** -0.005** 0.001** 0.0000000
(-1.98) (-0.54) (-3.86) (4.36) (-2.17) (1.99)
Size -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.008 0.000 0.0000000
(-0.58) (-0.87) (-0.86) (-0.73) (-1.53) (0.89)
Rating -0.003 -0.005 0.014 0.002 0.009 -0.001 0.0000000
(-0.50) (-1.32) (1.60) (0.43) (0.92) (-0.83)
Op Risk -0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.000 0.0000000
(-0.61) (0.37) (-0.12) (-0.27) (-0.33) (-0.51)
Inv Shock 0.011*** -0.004 -0.012 -0.016*** -0.021** -0.001 0.0000002
(2.68) (-1.19) (-1.65) (-4.21) (-2.38) (-0.65)
FFO Shock -0.001 0.003 -0.005 -0.013** -0.016* -0.000 -0.0000001
(-0.13) (0.65) (-0.65) (-2.57) (-1.69) (-0.00)
N 558 558 558 558 558 558
adj. R-sq 0.024 0.160 0.229 0.209 0.225 0.676
N clust 140 140 140 140 140 140
Mean(y) 0.021 0.008 0.049 0.030 0.105 -0.062
St.Dev(y) 0.048 0.048 0.094 0.052 0.108 0.026
Note: This table shows results based on equation (3.3). STD refers to short-term debt, LTD to long-
term debt, EQU to common equity, DPROP to depreciable property, NFI to the net of the financing and
investment cash flow, Resid(All) subsumes all remaining balance sheet items as defined in equation (3.2),
all measured in first differences and scaled by year-beginning total assets. CF Op refers to operating cash
flow scaled by year-beginning total assets. S&P500 refers to the continuous return of the S&P500 index,
MB to the ratio of market value over book value of equity, ROA to return on assets, Size to the ln of total
assets. The dummy Rating is equal to one, if a firm has an investment grade rating, Op Risk is equal to
one, if a firm’s cash flows are above the median in the respective property segment, Inv Shock is equal to
one, if a firm’s percentage change in MB is above the 55th percentile in the respective property segment,
FFO Shock is equal to one, if a firm’s percentage change of FFO is below the 45th percentile in the respective
property segment, and zero otherwise. Year dummies are not reported. N denotes firm-year observations of
each equation, N cluster denotes the number of observed firms, Mean(y) and St.Dev.(y) represent mean and
standard deviation of the dependent variable. The last column illustrates the accounting identity defined in
equation (3.2). T-stats are in parenthesis, ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
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This is basically the modeling aspect of emphasizing leverage. Liquidity man-
agement is essential in modeling financing decisions. Therefore, the other spotlight
highlights the debt ratio from interactions with competing sources of financial flex-
ibility, namely CCE and LOC. Therefore, the full model adds LEV, CCE and LOC
to equation (3.3). The quadratic terms of these three sources are also implemented,
since no previous study has so far explored potential non-linear relationships between
LEV, CCE and LOC. In the manner, interactions between the three instruments of
financial flexibility are dependent on the original level, which is the main reason
for the quadratic terms (i.e. Sufi 2007, for LOC and CCE or Gamba and Triantis
(2008), for cash and debt).
Y = Γ · L.Y + Λ · CF Op+ Π · C + Ψ ·D + Σ · S + Ω · S2 + i,t (3.4)
where
S =

LEVi,t−1
CCEi,t−1
LOCi,t−1

Finally, we challenge equation (3.4) with respect to three different ’sets’ of con-
ditions. The first simply splits our sample in economic up- and downturns, as well
as the subsample before the recent late 2000s financial crisis. Second, rather than
interpreting firm characteristics typically used in capital structure research (MB,
ROA and Size), we compare subsamples with low and high levels for these variables
of interest. The same is done for the sources of financial flexibility, in order to take
a further look at how relationships are dependent on the original level (rankings are
defined according to the respective property focus, see data section). In addition,
subsamples are compared with respect to Rating, Op Risk and the change in CF Op.
Y (X|subsample) = Γ ·L.Y + Λ ·CF Op+ Π ·C + Ψ ·D+ Σ ·S + Ω ·S2 + i,t (3.5)
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3.5 Results
This section is also separated in Spotlight A and Spotlight B and all conditional
subsamples are considered. However, only full sample and conditional estimations
with respect to time and MB, ROA and Size, as well as LEV, CCE and LOC are
reported.14
3.5.1 Spotlight A
In the literature section, it was pointed out that the negative LOC-CCE interactions
seem to be empirically robust. Across the 22 subsamples, we find a robust negative
(non-linear) relationship for CCE on LOC, but only six subsamples reveal reverse
causality.
The literature section did not provide a robust prediction of how LEV fits into the
dynamics of this discussion. Initially, LEV yields contrary interactions with LOC. If
significant, the ’negative’ causality runs from LEV to LOC and only for the squared
terms (14/22 subsamples). Furthermore, we find four negative (four positive) im-
pacts of LOC on LEV, most obviously for the subsamples low (high) CCE and low
(high) LOC firms. This could simply be due to the chronology of the “funding cy-
cle” of Riddiough and Wu (2009). If LEV increases due to the use of LOC, then a
negative relationship follows technically. Alternatively, if debt decreases due to the
repayment of outstanding debt, the next funding cycle is established by blowing up
LOC. On the other hand, if LOC increases, it is not clear when the firm draws these
lines. Moreover, the LOC-LEV interactions are exclusively the case for the squared
terms (except for small firms).
Second, LEV-CCE interactions are much weaker. LEV positively drives CCE in
6/22 subsamples, which is also restricted to the squared terms. In contrast, CCE
negatively impacts on LEV in 3/22 sub-samples. This is the case for the high LOC
and high CCE firms, as well as for firms with high CF volatility. A reason for this
might be that on the one hand, having a reasonable amount of one of these two
sources, the marginal value of lowering debt as the third source increases. On the
other hand, high CCE or LOC subsamples imply that these firms are able to afford
a drop in financial flexibility by lowering CCE, accompanied by an increase in debt.
In the case of firms with highly volatile cash flows, we argue that CCE will be used
14All estimations are, as always, available on request.
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before debt increases, in the event of a CF shortfall. Accordingly, both instruments
will be ’reloaded’ (more CCE, less debt) after positive movements from the CF mean.
In short, in four of the six subsamples, in which LEV is significant with respect
to CCE, LEV is also significant for LOC. Alternatively, the relationship of LEV on
CCE (LOC) is always positive (negative). If significant, CCE on LEV is always neg-
ative and in these subsamples, LOC on LEV is always positively significant. Hence,
the above stochastic argument of a reverse relationship of CCE and LOC on LEV
and vice versa holds for each of the 22 subsamples. This can be observed directly
in the sub-samples high CCE, high LOC and high Op Risk.
Before discussing the remaining variables, four findings are highlighted. First,
the expected strong, empirical, negative relationship of LOC and CCE is reduced
to a causality from CCE to LOC. Second, causality also seems to be stronger for
LEV on LOC and for LEV on CCE, compared to the reverse causalities. Third, the
financial flexibility perspective provides the basis for a complementary relationship
of CCE and LEV and a substitutive one of CCE and LOC. Finally, the dependence
on the original level of one or the other source is strongly suggested by a dominance
of significant squared terms. Also, the change in signs of significant relationships
in the case of LOC on LEV, dependent on low/high CCE or LOC firms, clearly
demonstrate the importance of the original level.
It was expected that CF would positively affect LOC (Sufi (2009)), whereas a
CF-CCE relationship was expected for constraint subsamples. However, CF plays
only a minor role within this framework. The results suggest only one positive es-
timate for LEV (during economic downturns), one negative estimate for CCE (low
MB firms) and two positive estimates for LOC (high Size and low Op Risk firms).
S&P500 affects LEV negatively, while it affects CCE positively; LOC is negatively
affected by the S&P500 continuous returns for high ROA, low LEV and high LOC
firms. Differences in the market and book value of equity (MB) are negatively as-
sociated with LEV. However, MB influences LOC positively (10/22 subsamples),
fully consistent with financial flexibility, where firms with growth opportunities pre-
pare to counter underinvestment due to potential liquidity gaps. As expected, CCE
plays a subordinate role as a hedging tool, but is, as with LOC, positively driven
by MB in five subsamples. In accordance with the argument given for LEV-CCE
interactions, two of the five subsamples are low LEV and high LOC firms, hence,
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the marginal value of accumulating CCE as the third source increases in response
to a MB increase.
Accordingly, ROA and Size affect LEV negatively. However, the latter relation-
ship is much weaker. Moreover, both CCE and LOC are influenced marginally by
(positive) ROA dynamics. In contrast, a negative Size effect applies to both liquid-
ity instruments, implying that firm size substitutes for financial flexibility to some
extent. This is even more the case for LOC (16/22 subsamples). Accordingly, high
LEV, low CCE and low LOC firms yield a negative size effect for LOC, while their
counterparts do not reveal such effects with any significance. Low LEV firms even
yield a positive relationship of Size on CCE.15 This exception is illustrated by the
subsample Size itself, in which large firms yield a negative relationship of Size to
LOC, whereas small firms yield a positively significant relationship.
The impact of the set of dummies is less evident. Rated firms in general have
lower levels of CCE, moreover they have less debt. Firms with higher Op Risk seem
to have higher levels of borrowing and lending in order to smooth out the variance.16
Shocks primarily affect LEV, investment shocks negatively (19/22 subsamples), FFO
shocks positively (8/22 subsamples).17 There is some additional discussion with re-
spect to the shock dummies in the section on the mechanical aspects of leverage.
3.5.2 Spotlight B
The interpretation of Spotlight B is reduced to the discussion of LTD, EQU, DPROP
and LEV.18
15Since growth opportunities approximate for a need for financial flexibility, we observe a positive
estimate of Size on CCE for high MB firms, whereas the counterpart yields a negative one.
16Despite little significant estimates, the size subsample again delivered ambiguous results. Small
firms with an operating risk hold less LOC, but their counterparts just do the reverse. This is
contrary to the negative Size effect for liquidity instrument stated above. A reason for this might
be that small firms with volatile cash flows receive less LOC in general, while big firms additionally
hedge against CF shortfalls contrary to big firms without a high operating risk.
17One exception is that Inv Shock shows a positive sign to LEV before the late-2000s financial
crisis.
18However, worth mentioning is the fact that the sum of financing and investment CF shows the
most considerable significances in our system. Hence, findings of Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan
(2010) that these two ’activities’ would balance each other so that financing-investment sensitivities
are mitigated cannot be stated for the real estate market. Moreover, aspects of debt maturity as
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First of all, the motivating aspects described above are addressed by investigat-
ing how often there is an impact on LTD or EQU, but LEV is unaffected and vice
versa. For this reason, we employ two approaches. On the one hand, we follow
the suggestion of Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010) by interpreting the number
of significant estimators in rows of matrix Γ of equation (3.5) as impulses of the
independent variable, and significances in columns as responses (recall table (3.4)).
Focusing on responses, we find 18 (27) significant off-diagonal estimators for LTD
(EQU), but only 22 for LEV.19 We additionally pose the simple question of how of-
ten LTD and/or EQU are affected by capital structure variables, but LEV remains
unchanged. Across the 22 subsample regressions, it is primarily MB that affects
LTD and/or EQU 19 times, while LEV remains unchanged.
With respect to Size, we rarely find significant effects, since we scaled by the year-
beginning total as-sets. As stated above, a negative relationship of Size is evidently
the case for LEV. MB positively (negatively) impacts LTD (EQU) and hence yields
a significantly negative sign to LEV, moreover, rarely it affects DPROP positively.
In accordance with the arguments relating to the mechanical aspects, a negative
MB-LEV relationship may be attributed to market valuation, which is in the nu-
merator of MB, but in the denominator of LEV. Analogously, this is assumed to be
valid for EQU.
Finally, ROA positively (negatively) drives EQU (LTD and LEV) – which was
expected. However, a negative impact of ’profitability’ on DPROP can again be
attributed either to mechanics (median depreciable property accounts for 96% of
total assets, which is the denominator of ROA) or is a further illustration of cash
flows being a superior measure of a company’s soundness.
CF strictly shows positive impacts on LTD, EQU and DPROP and does not affect
LEV, apart from the ’bust-subsample’. The most impressive instance is the very
suggested by Giambona, Harding, and Sirmans (2008) or Barclay, Marx, and Smith (2003) are
simply modeled, though not reported, by distinguishing between short and long term debt.
19Assuming persistence in accounting variables, we ignore significances of lagged dependent
variables. When we include lagged dependent variable, it is leverage, of course, which shows the
highest persistence, since it is not measured in first differences (LTD 19, EQU 29, and LEV 42).
Dependent variables with more responses are also said to be “shock absorbers” (Gatchev, Pulvino,
and Tarhan (2010)).
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high magnitude of estimates of CF for these three variables. While a $1 increase
in operating cash flow robustly leads EQU to increase within a range of $0.35 to
$0.66, estimators of LTD are between $0.27 (low Size) and a much higher $1.37 (low
Op Risk). DPROP is affected between $1.01 (low LEV) to $2.80 (during Bust) by a
$1.00 increase of CF. These results suggest that firms use the improvement in cash-
flow-based credit-quality ratios due to cash-flow increases and acquire more debt.
Taking the full sample estimation as a benchmark, for each subsample, it can be
stated that the higher the CF-LTD sensitivity the higher the CF-DPROP sensitivity.
Figure 3.2: “Liaison” of Debt and Investment via Cash Flows
Note: This figure plots the marginal impacts of operating cash flows (CF Op)
to changes in long-term debt (LTD) and changes in common equity (EQU)
against the marginal impacts of CF Op to changes in depreciable property
(DPROP).
In order to understand this, recall the identity of equation (3.3). Assume also
that Resid(All) and STD play a minor role, and further assume that a $1 change in
operating CF transfers to a $1 change in the sum of financing and investment CF
whereas EQU is very robustly affected by about $0.52 (whole sample). A strong
connection between LTD and DPROP caused by operating CF then follows logical-
ly.
Accordingly, S&P500 also positively influences all variables considered, but pos-
itive market returns imply a lower LEV. The dummies Rating and Op Risk rarely
yield significant estimates. Across all estimations, INV Shock and FFO Shock
yield a negative sign for LTD, EQU and DPROP very robustly. However, while
INV Shock results in a lower LEV, a FFO Shock is compensated for by a higher
LEV. This confirms the debt capacity argument of future investment opportunities,
by investment shocks robustly resulting in a lower leverage. Therefore, if both vari-
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ables are significant in the same equation, the magnitudes of the estimates are fairly
equal. This also highlights the need to identify drivers of financial decisions, since an
investment shock seems to affect balance sheet changes similarly to an FFO shock,
but the inference for LEV yields reverse dynamics.
3.5.3 Book Leverage
While MB yields a negative relationship to market LEV, it turns into a positively sig-
nificant one for book LEV. Since it was argued that the negative correlation results
from a mechanical relationship, one would rely on book LEV. However, consider two
identically characterized firms with different market valuations. The higher valued
firm would certainly have better access to financing sources. Yet, would a firm that
is not otherwise constrained be interested in this? The calculus of financial flexibil-
ity would refute such behavior. Indeed, we find no significant results for most of the
’good’ subsamples (high LOC, high ROA, high Size, rated firms and low Op Risk).
Most surprisingly, the Inv Shock dummy does not change its sign, even though it is
less often significant (9 for book versus 19 for market LEV). In line with the original
motivation for this approximation, it is significantly negative, especially for finan-
cially inflexible firms. On the one hand, one might see this as a further indication
of the interactions of the three sources suggested in this paper being valid. On the
other hand, it is evident that especially firms that are financially constrained and/or
are confronted with potential underinvestment preserve debt capacity.
A further important difference is that book leverage is very sensitive to CF.
Specifically, a $1.00 increase in CF translates into about the same increase in debt.
ROA remains robustly negative and Size remains understated.20 FFO Shock is only
significant twice, suggesting that the bulk of variance in substantial FFO declines is
priced by the capital market. Moreover, general causalities stated for market LEV do
not change, despite a lesser appearance of linear and squared terms being significant.
With respect to Spotlight B, the approach of Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan
(2010), we find the opposite. That is, we obtain 12 (23) off-diagonal elements
for LTD (EQU) of Γ in equation (3.3) but 54 for LEV. There is even more evi-
dence of LEV eliminating information, since we count 5/2/3 significant estimates of
MB/ROA/Size for LTD and/or EQU, whereas LEV remains unchanged across the
22 subsamples.
20In this sense, results based on book leverage suggest the pecking-order theory to be valid.
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3.6 Conclusion
At the beginning of this paper, the position of leverage as one of the sources of finan-
cial flexibility (Spotlight A), as well as technical attributes of this ratio (Spotlight
B) were outlined.
Our main findings are as follows. First, leverage (LEV) drives cash & cash equiv-
alents (CCE) positively, but drives lines of credit (LOC) negatively. While the latter
result, as well as the substitutive relationship of CCE and LOC are backed by the ex-
isting literature, the positive LEV-CCE relationship is contrary to previous studies.
However, the findings from our dynamic framework are consistent with arguments of
financial flexibility. Second, interactions of LEV, CCE and LOC are consistent with
the typical funding cycle suggested by Riddiough and Wu (2009). An alternative
explanation is obtained by interpreting the marginal value of a liquidity instrument
as conditional on the original level of the other sources of financial flexibility. Third,
the discussion of mechanical dynamics is not reduced only to debt and equity for
LEV, but also applies to LEV and LOC. The relation between growth opportunities
and market and book leverage demonstrate this mechanical issue very clearly. Four,
dummies – unique to our research – yield very robust results with respect to the
observation of firms lowering LEV, i.e. preserving debt capacity after investment
shocks. By contrast, FFO shocks affect balance sheet aggregates very similarly to
investment shocks, but generally result in LEV increases. Five, the more firms
overdo debt acquisition due to cash flow improvements, the more prone they are to
cash-flow-investment sensitivity. Finally, firm size seems to substitute for financial
flexibility at least to some extent.
This paper can be seen as a bridge between emphasizing the characteristics of
leverage in the function of a ratio on the one hand, and classifying leverage in the
class of drivers of liquidity management on the other hand. While this constitutes
the main contribution to the existing literature, the specific and innovative nature of
our broad modeling approach arguably renders the paper far richer than may seem
the paper at face value.
However, there are several issues that should be addressed in further research.
First, what are the other sources of financial flexibility? One might be less debt
at the operating level (mortgage/secured debt) and therefore, rather at a company
level, as Hardin and Wu (2010) outline recently. Based on this observation, is there
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a hierarchy in terms of efficiency, and under which circumstances? Can we draw
inferences about management risk aversion in preferring one or the other source?
Since there is a benefit in selling and acquiring real estate assets in a more flexible
manner, this example leads to the second question. What is the relationship between
these sources and investment flexibility? Finally, what is the reason for non-REITs
(REOCs) underutilizing cash reserves and accordingly, why do REITs almost totally
abandon cash as a hedging instrument?
96
The Rat Race of Capital Structure Research: Two Spotlights on Leverage
T
ab
le
3.
4:
E
st
im
at
io
n
R
es
u
lt
s
fo
r
S
p
ot
li
gh
t
A
(a
cc
or
d
in
g
to
eq
u
at
io
n
(3
.5
))
F
u
ll
M
o
d
e
l
S
ta
te
o
f
E
c
o
n
o
m
y
L
a
te
-2
0
0
0
s
F
in
a
n
c
ia
l
C
ri
si
s
B
o
o
m
B
u
st
B
e
fo
re
th
e
C
ri
si
s
L
E
V
C
C
E
L
O
C
L
E
V
C
C
E
L
O
C
L
E
V
C
C
E
L
O
C
L
E
V
C
C
E
L
O
C
L
.L
E
V
0
.8
5
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
0
1
0
.8
4
6
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
0
3
0
.8
3
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
9
0
.0
2
0
0
.8
2
8
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
9
0
.0
0
9
(3
2
.6
2
)
(-
1
.0
3
)
(-
0
.0
6
)
(2
3
.9
9
)
(-
0
.7
9
)
(-
0
.1
6
)
(1
6
.3
4
)
(-
0
.9
0
)
(0
.6
3
)
(2
3
.1
7
)
(-
0
.9
2
)
(0
.3
5
)
L
.C
C
E
0
.0
2
7
0
.5
7
8
*
*
*
-0
.3
7
6
*
*
*
-0
.1
3
6
0
.5
9
8
*
*
*
-0
.3
4
1
*
*
*
0
.3
7
6
0
.4
8
6
*
*
*
-0
.3
6
1
*
-0
.0
3
8
0
.6
0
2
*
*
*
-0
.4
9
5
*
*
*
(0
.1
7
)
(9
.1
4
)
(-
3
.8
0
)
(-
0
.8
1
)
(8
.8
9
)
(-
3
.0
6
)
(0
.8
2
)
(3
.5
5
)
(-
1
.8
2
)
(-
0
.1
7
)
(8
.0
7
)
(-
3
.0
0
)
L
.L
O
C
-0
.0
1
3
-0
.0
1
2
0
.8
1
5
*
*
*
0
.0
1
1
-0
.0
1
7
0
.8
1
3
*
*
*
-0
.0
7
7
0
.0
0
4
0
.8
0
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
3
-0
.0
1
3
0
.8
0
1
*
*
*
(-
0
.4
5
)
(-
1
.4
1
)
(3
4
.6
5
)
(0
.3
1
)
(-
1
.4
8
)
(3
6
.7
7
)
(-
1
.5
7
)
(0
.3
1
)
(1
3
.9
0
)
(-
0
.4
5
)
(-
1
.3
8
)
(2
5
.5
9
)
L
.L
E
V
2
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
*
*
*
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
7
*
*
0
.0
0
8
0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
8
*
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
1
*
*
-0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
(1
.0
9
)
(3
.0
5
)
(-
2
.6
6
)
(1
.1
9
)
(1
.3
4
)
(-
2
.2
6
)
(1
.2
5
)
(1
.3
6
)
(-
1
.8
5
)
(1
.2
5
)
(2
.5
8
)
(-
2
.6
3
)
L
.C
C
E
2
-0
.0
3
4
-0
.0
0
2
0
.0
2
4
*
*
-0
.0
1
8
-0
.0
0
4
0
.0
2
0
*
-0
.1
7
5
-0
.0
0
1
0
.1
0
3
-0
.0
3
8
-0
.0
0
4
0
.0
3
0
*
*
(-
1
.4
2
)
(-
0
.4
6
)
(2
.4
6
)
(-
0
.9
4
)
(-
0
.6
6
)
(1
.7
0
)
(-
1
.4
8
)
(-
0
.0
5
)
(1
.3
8
)
(-
1
.4
5
)
(-
0
.7
9
)
(2
.4
5
)
L
.L
O
C
2
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
6
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
(-
0
.8
0
)
(-
0
.7
6
)
(0
.2
9
)
(-
0
.9
1
)
(-
0
.9
4
)
(0
.8
6
)
(1
.2
2
)
(0
.1
5
)
(-
0
.5
7
)
(-
0
.7
0
)
(-
0
.7
8
)
(0
.7
1
)
C
F
O
p
0
.0
7
0
0
.0
3
5
0
.1
7
8
-0
.1
1
9
0
.0
6
5
0
.1
4
9
0
.6
1
4
*
-0
.0
1
4
0
.2
2
6
-0
.1
4
6
0
.0
2
5
0
.2
8
8
(0
.3
6
)
(0
.5
9
)
(1
.1
3
)
(-
0
.5
4
)
(0
.7
8
)
(0
.7
9
)
(1
.8
8
)
(-
0
.2
1
)
(0
.7
9
)
(-
0
.7
0
)
(0
.3
3
)
(1
.5
0
)
S
&
P
5
0
0
-0
.0
9
3
*
*
*
0
.0
1
5
*
*
-0
.0
1
3
-0
.1
1
7
*
*
*
0
.0
1
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
5
8
0
.0
1
2
-0
.0
5
7
-0
.0
8
6
0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
0
0
(-
3
.7
2
)
(2
.1
8
)
(-
1
.0
2
)
(-
5
.1
6
)
(2
.2
5
)
(-
0
.1
1
)
(-
1
.0
9
)
(0
.6
7
)
(-
0
.9
4
)
(-
1
.6
3
)
(0
.5
0
)
(-
0
.0
0
)
M
B
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
5
*
*
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
6
*
*
-0
.0
1
2
*
*
0
.0
0
3
*
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
6
*
(-
1
.0
1
)
(1
.2
6
)
(2
.1
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.9
0
)
(2
.1
9
)
(-
2
.5
4
)
(1
.7
6
)
(0
.7
6
)
(0
.3
8
)
(1
.2
2
)
(1
.8
1
)
R
O
A
-0
.0
0
6
*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
4
*
*
*
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
1
0
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
7
*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
(-
4
.6
7
)
(1
.2
1
)
(0
.8
6
)
(-
3
.3
6
)
(1
.6
6
)
(1
.1
7
)
(-
4
.0
2
)
(-
0
.7
7
)
(-
0
.0
6
)
(-
4
.3
8
)
(0
.8
2
)
(0
.2
8
)
S
iz
e
-0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
6
*
*
*
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
9
*
*
-0
.0
0
5
*
*
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
6
*
*
(-
1
.5
2
)
(0
.9
2
)
(-
2
.7
3
)
(-
0
.9
5
)
(0
.5
1
)
(-
2
.6
7
)
(0
.3
7
)
(1
.4
5
)
(-
2
.3
0
)
(-
2
.0
1
)
(0
.1
5
)
(-
2
.5
2
)
R
a
ti
n
g
0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
2
*
*
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
0
3
*
0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
8
(0
.6
0
)
(-
2
.0
4
)
(1
.1
5
)
(0
.9
6
)
(-
1
.8
4
)
(1
.1
8
)
(-
0
.5
9
)
(-
0
.4
8
)
(0
.5
7
)
(1
.0
4
)
(-
1
.1
6
)
(1
.5
5
)
O
p
R
is
k
-0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
0
6
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
8
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
4
(-
0
.0
0
)
(0
.7
2
)
(0
.1
7
)
(-
0
.0
3
)
(0
.2
5
)
(-
0
.9
0
)
(-
0
.7
3
)
(1
.2
4
)
(1
.4
2
)
(-
0
.2
2
)
(1
.3
1
)
(0
.9
5
)
In
v
S
h
o
c
k
-0
.0
3
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
2
7
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
3
3
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
1
3
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
3
(-
6
.3
9
)
(-
0
.6
0
)
(-
0
.9
4
)
(-
4
.9
5
)
(-
0
.7
5
)
(-
1
.3
2
)
(-
3
.9
7
)
(-
0
.2
3
)
(0
.1
2
)
(2
.7
8
)
(-
0
.5
2
)
(-
0
.6
2
)
F
F
O
S
h
o
c
k
0
.0
0
8
*
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
0
0
.0
1
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
5
0
.3
0
0
*
*
*
0
.0
0
8
0
.1
5
2
*
*
*
(1
.7
6
)
(-
1
.1
1
)
(-
0
.1
5
)
(-
0
.1
3
)
(-
0
.6
1
)
(-
0
.1
1
)
(2
.6
9
)
(-
1
.0
3
)
(-
0
.8
1
)
(5
.7
0
)
(0
.4
2
)
(2
.7
6
)
N
5
5
8
5
5
8
5
5
8
3
7
3
3
7
3
3
7
3
1
8
5
1
8
5
1
8
5
3
9
5
3
9
5
3
9
5
a
d
j.
R
-s
q
0
.8
6
8
0
.3
2
5
0
.8
0
8
0
.8
6
6
0
.3
2
1
0
.8
0
4
0
.8
6
6
0
.2
4
0
0
.8
0
7
0
.8
7
5
0
.3
3
1
0
.7
9
1
N
c
lu
st
1
4
0
1
4
0
1
4
0
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
6
1
1
6
1
1
6
M
e
a
n
(y
)
0
.4
0
7
0
.0
1
5
0
.1
6
2
0
.3
8
8
0
.0
1
7
0
.1
6
3
0
.4
4
3
0
.0
1
1
0
.1
5
8
0
.4
0
2
0
.0
1
3
0
.1
6
2
S
t.
D
e
v
(y
)
0
.1
2
7
0
.0
1
7
0
.0
8
3
0
.1
2
4
0
.0
1
9
0
.0
8
3
0
.1
2
3
0
.0
1
2
0
.0
8
4
0
.1
2
0
0
.0
1
6
0
.0
8
6
N
o
te
:
T
h
is
ta
b
le
sh
o
w
s
re
su
lt
s
b
a
se
d
o
n
e
q
u
a
ti
o
n
(3
.5
).
L
E
V
re
fe
rs
to
m
a
rk
e
t
le
v
e
ra
g
e
,
C
C
E
to
c
a
sh
&
c
a
sh
e
q
u
iv
a
le
n
ts
,
L
O
C
to
li
n
e
s
o
f
c
re
d
it
,
C
F
O
p
re
fe
rs
to
o
p
e
ra
ti
n
g
c
a
sh
fl
o
w
,
a
ll
sc
a
le
d
b
y
y
e
a
r-
b
e
g
in
n
in
g
to
ta
l
a
ss
e
ts
.
S
&
P
5
0
0
re
fe
rs
to
th
e
c
o
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s
re
tu
rn
o
f
th
e
S
&
P
5
0
0
in
d
e
x
,
M
B
to
th
e
ra
ti
o
o
f
m
a
rk
e
t
v
a
lu
e
o
v
e
r
b
o
o
k
v
a
lu
e
o
f
e
q
u
it
y
,
R
O
A
to
re
tu
rn
o
n
a
ss
e
ts
,
S
iz
e
to
th
e
ln
o
f
to
ta
l
a
ss
e
ts
.
T
h
e
d
u
m
m
y
R
a
ti
n
g
is
e
q
u
a
l
to
o
n
e
,
if
a
fi
rm
h
a
s
a
n
in
v
e
st
m
e
n
t
g
ra
d
e
ra
ti
n
g
,
O
p
R
is
k
is
e
q
u
a
l
to
o
n
e
,
if
a
fi
rm
’s
c
a
sh
fl
o
w
s
a
re
a
b
o
v
e
th
e
m
e
d
ia
n
in
th
e
re
sp
e
c
ti
v
e
p
ro
p
e
rt
y
se
g
m
e
n
t,
In
v
S
h
o
c
k
is
e
q
u
a
l
to
o
n
e
,
if
a
fi
rm
’s
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
c
h
a
n
g
e
in
M
B
is
a
b
o
v
e
th
e
5
5
t
h
p
e
rc
e
n
ti
le
in
th
e
re
sp
e
c
ti
v
e
p
ro
p
e
rt
y
se
g
m
e
n
t,
F
F
O
S
h
o
c
k
is
e
q
u
a
l
to
o
n
e
,
if
a
fi
rm
’s
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
c
h
a
n
g
e
o
f
F
F
O
is
b
e
lo
w
th
e
4
5
t
h
p
e
rc
e
n
ti
le
in
th
e
re
sp
e
c
ti
v
e
p
ro
p
e
rt
y
se
g
m
e
n
t,
a
n
d
z
e
ro
o
th
e
rw
is
e
.
E
st
im
a
te
s
fo
r
th
e
m
a
tr
ix
Γ
a
n
d
y
e
a
r
d
u
m
m
ie
s
a
re
n
o
t
re
p
o
rt
e
d
.
N
d
e
n
o
te
s
fi
rm
-y
e
a
r
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
o
f
e
a
c
h
e
q
u
a
ti
o
n
,
N
c
lu
st
e
r
d
e
n
o
te
s
th
e
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
o
b
se
rv
e
d
fi
rm
s,
M
e
a
n
(y
)
a
n
d
S
t.
D
e
v
.(
y
)
re
p
re
se
n
t
m
e
a
n
a
n
d
st
a
n
d
a
rd
d
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
.
T
-s
ta
ts
a
re
in
p
a
re
n
th
e
si
s,
*
*
*
,
*
*
,
a
n
d
*
d
e
n
o
te
st
a
ti
st
ic
a
l
si
g
n
ifi
c
a
n
c
e
a
t
th
e
1
%
,
5
%
,
a
n
d
1
0
%
le
v
e
ls
,
re
sp
e
c
ti
v
e
ly
.
97
The Rat Race of Capital Structure Research: Two Spotlights on Leverage
(c
on
ti
n
u
ed
fr
om
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
ag
e)
L
E
V
L
O
C
L
o
w
H
ig
h
L
o
w
H
ig
h
L
E
V
C
C
E
L
O
C
L
E
V
C
C
E
L
O
C
L
E
V
C
C
E
L
O
C
L
E
V
C
C
E
L
O
C
L
.L
E
V
0
.8
3
2
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
2
0
.0
2
1
0
.6
9
7
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
3
2
0
.8
5
2
*
*
*
0
.0
0
8
-0
.0
2
7
0
.8
0
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
8
0
.0
4
8
(2
2
.1
1
)
(-
0
.9
1
)
(0
.8
5
)
(1
3
.8
3
)
(-
0
.3
2
)
(-
1
.0
0
)
(2
2
.3
5
)
(0
.8
5
)
(-
1
.3
8
)
(1
7
.8
1
)
(-
1
.4
2
)
(1
.3
8
)
L
.C
C
E
0
.1
3
6
0
.5
9
9
*
*
*
-0
.2
7
9
*
*
0
.0
0
2
0
.5
1
5
*
*
*
-0
.4
8
1
*
*
-0
.0
1
2
0
.5
6
1
*
*
*
-0
.2
6
1
*
*
-0
.0
1
0
0
.6
0
5
*
*
*
-0
.3
9
3
*
*
(0
.7
6
)
(7
.6
2
)
(-
2
.2
5
)
(0
.0
1
)
(6
.4
3
)
(-
2
.5
2
)
(-
0
.0
6
)
(8
.8
1
)
(-
1
.9
9
)
(-
0
.0
4
)
(4
.5
6
)
(-
2
.2
6
)
L
.L
O
C
-0
.0
5
9
-0
.0
1
0
0
.7
9
2
*
*
*
0
.0
3
4
-0
.0
2
1
*
0
.8
2
0
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
9
-0
.0
4
3
*
*
0
.6
4
2
*
*
*
-0
.0
4
3
0
.0
0
6
0
.7
2
5
*
*
*
(-
1
.6
5
)
(-
0
.8
1
)
(2
1
.0
1
)
(0
.8
5
)
(-
1
.6
9
)
(2
4
.1
7
)
(-
0
.1
8
)
(-
2
.4
6
)
(1
0
.5
7
)
(-
1
.0
0
)
(0
.4
1
)
(2
0
.1
0
)
L
.L
E
V
2
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
1
9
*
*
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
5
*
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
5
*
*
0
.0
1
9
*
*
0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
6
(-
0
.0
5
)
(2
.6
0
)
(-
0
.2
5
)
(1
.5
2
)
(-
0
.0
6
)
(-
1
.9
1
)
(0
.8
6
)
(0
.3
3
)
(-
2
.3
6
)
(2
.3
6
)
(0
.9
9
)
(-
0
.6
8
)
L
.C
C
E
2
0
.0
1
4
-0
.0
0
0
0
.0
1
9
-0
.0
9
8
0
.0
1
5
0
.0
5
5
-0
.0
4
3
0
.0
1
2
0
.0
5
9
*
-0
.0
5
1
*
*
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
1
5
(0
.6
4
)
(-
0
.0
3
)
(1
.4
1
)
(-
1
.2
3
)
(0
.9
0
)
(1
.3
8
)
(-
0
.7
6
)
(0
.7
0
)
(1
.8
1
)
(-
2
.3
3
)
(0
.2
9
)
(0
.8
5
)
L
.L
O
C
2
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
2
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
3
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
3
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
0
(-
0
.3
6
)
(-
2
.0
8
)
(-
0
.3
3
)
(-
0
.8
0
)
(-
0
.5
5
)
(1
.5
5
)
(-
4
.6
1
)
(-
1
.1
1
)
(0
.9
0
)
(2
.2
2
)
(-
0
.8
5
)
(-
0
.2
6
)
C
F
O
p
0
.1
0
8
0
.0
5
5
0
.1
8
3
-0
.1
3
8
0
.0
3
2
0
.2
4
8
-0
.0
4
0
-0
.0
5
3
0
.2
5
1
-0
.0
6
7
0
.1
3
0
-0
.0
1
2
(0
.5
1
)
(0
.6
3
)
(0
.9
0
)
(-
0
.5
1
)
(0
.4
5
)
(1
.0
4
)
(-
0
.1
5
)
(-
0
.6
5
)
(1
.3
8
)
(-
0
.2
6
)
(1
.5
7
)
(-
0
.0
5
)
S
&
P
5
0
0
-0
.1
0
5
*
*
0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
7
0
*
-0
.0
8
9
*
*
*
0
.0
2
2
*
*
0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
9
8
*
*
*
0
.0
1
6
-0
.0
0
7
-0
.1
3
4
*
*
*
0
.0
1
8
*
*
*
-0
.0
5
0
*
*
(-
2
.5
3
)
(0
.5
1
)
(-
1
.7
1
)
(-
3
.5
4
)
(2
.4
2
)
(0
.3
6
)
(-
2
.7
2
)
(1
.4
4
)
(-
0
.6
0
)
(-
4
.8
7
)
(2
.6
9
)
(-
2
.2
8
)
M
B
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
3
*
*
0
.0
0
6
*
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
2
*
0
.0
0
3
(-
0
.9
1
)
(2
.3
8
)
(1
.8
6
)
(-
0
.2
7
)
(-
0
.6
4
)
(1
.0
7
)
(-
0
.1
9
)
(0
.4
0
)
(1
.5
2
)
(-
1
.0
0
)
(1
.7
2
)
(0
.7
9
)
R
O
A
-0
.0
0
4
*
*
*
0
.0
0
1
*
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
7
*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
6
*
*
*
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
*
-0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
(-
3
.2
1
)
(1
.7
1
)
(1
.3
1
)
(-
3
.0
4
)
(0
.3
8
)
(0
.5
5
)
(-
3
.3
9
)
(1
.3
5
)
(1
.7
6
)
(-
3
.2
2
)
(1
.1
1
)
(0
.3
3
)
S
iz
e
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
3
*
*
-0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
6
*
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
3
*
*
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
6
(0
.0
3
)
(2
.5
2
)
(-
1
.5
8
)
(0
.1
3
)
(-
0
.6
9
)
(-
1
.9
6
)
(-
0
.5
2
)
(0
.5
3
)
(-
2
.2
5
)
(-
0
.6
0
)
(0
.6
0
)
(-
1
.2
0
)
R
a
ti
n
g
0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
9
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
4
(1
.1
4
)
(-
2
.7
9
)
(0
.1
7
)
(-
0
.9
9
)
(-
0
.9
6
)
(1
.4
4
)
(-
0
.7
4
)
(-
1
.3
4
)
(1
.0
6
)
(0
.8
5
)
(-
0
.9
4
)
(0
.5
7
)
O
p
R
is
k
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
(0
.7
7
)
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.9
3
)
(-
0
.3
4
)
(1
.5
8
)
(0
.3
3
)
(-
0
.8
0
)
(1
.5
9
)
(0
.6
7
)
(1
.0
2
)
(-
0
.7
1
)
(0
.2
0
)
In
v
S
h
o
c
k
-0
.0
1
8
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
3
3
*
*
*
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
3
4
*
*
*
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
3
0
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
4
(-
3
.6
1
)
(-
1
.2
3
)
(-
0
.0
6
)
(-
4
.5
7
)
(0
.5
2
)
(-
0
.6
7
)
(-
4
.7
6
)
(1
.3
7
)
(0
.3
7
)
(-
4
.9
9
)
(-
1
.0
0
)
(-
0
.8
1
)
F
F
O
S
h
o
c
k
0
.0
1
0
*
-0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
1
4
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
2
(1
.7
0
)
(-
0
.1
6
)
(0
.1
3
)
(0
.2
6
)
(-
0
.7
7
)
(-
0
.5
6
)
(2
.3
0
)
(-
0
.8
3
)
(0
.7
5
)
(0
.0
7
)
(-
0
.1
0
)
(-
0
.3
7
)
N
3
0
3
3
0
3
3
0
3
2
9
2
2
9
2
2
9
2
2
9
6
2
9
6
2
9
6
2
9
9
2
9
9
2
9
9
a
d
j.
R
-s
q
0
.8
3
3
0
.3
4
6
0
.7
8
5
0
.8
0
0
0
.3
2
7
0
.8
0
7
0
.8
8
0
0
.3
8
3
0
.7
5
2
0
.8
4
9
0
.2
8
2
0
.6
9
2
N
c
lu
st
9
0
9
0
9
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
9
5
9
5
9
5
M
e
a
n
(y
)
0
.3
3
3
0
.0
1
5
0
.1
6
8
0
.4
8
0
0
.0
1
4
0
.1
5
3
0
.4
1
8
0
.0
1
7
0
.1
1
1
0
.3
9
2
0
.0
1
3
0
.2
1
0
S
t.
D
e
v
(y
)
0
.0
9
7
0
.0
1
8
0
.0
7
4
0
.1
0
6
0
.0
1
6
0
.0
8
8
0
.1
2
9
0
.0
1
8
0
.0
5
8
0
.1
2
2
0
.0
1
7
0
.0
7
1
98
The Rat Race of Capital Structure Research: Two Spotlights on Leverage
(c
on
ti
n
u
ed
fr
om
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
ag
e)
C
C
E
M
B
L
o
w
H
ig
h
L
o
w
H
ig
h
L
E
V
C
C
E
L
O
C
L
E
V
C
C
E
L
O
C
L
E
V
C
C
E
L
O
C
L
E
V
C
C
E
L
O
C
L
.L
E
V
0
.8
3
3
*
*
*
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
2
2
0
.8
4
8
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
1
-0
.0
0
5
0
.8
4
9
*
*
*
0
.0
0
7
0
.0
0
3
0
.8
4
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
7
*
-0
.0
1
5
(2
0
.0
7
)
(0
.5
3
)
(0
.8
5
)
(2
6
.4
5
)
(-
0
.9
9
)
(-
0
.2
1
)
(1
9
.3
4
)
(0
.9
4
)
(0
.1
4
)
(2
8
.2
8
)
(-
1
.6
7
)
(-
0
.6
8
)
L
.C
C
E
-0
.3
1
1
0
.1
7
0
*
*
-0
.6
7
8
*
*
*
0
.1
4
6
0
.4
3
5
*
*
*
-0
.3
0
9
*
*
-0
.1
5
5
0
.4
1
1
*
*
*
-0
.3
8
7
*
*
0
.0
3
4
0
.6
1
4
*
*
*
-0
.3
9
8
*
*
*
(-
0
.9
5
)
(2
.1
1
)
(-
2
.9
8
)
(0
.7
3
)
(6
.1
1
)
(-
2
.5
4
)
(-
0
.5
3
)
(5
.0
5
)
(-
2
.6
0
)
(0
.1
6
)
(7
.3
9
)
(-
3
.1
3
)
L
.L
O
C
-0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
1
5
*
*
0
.7
8
6
*
*
*
-0
.0
3
9
-0
.0
1
3
0
.8
3
7
*
*
*
-0
.0
5
9
-0
.0
3
5
*
*
*
0
.8
2
2
*
*
*
0
.0
2
3
0
.0
0
0
0
.8
0
1
*
*
*
(-
0
.1
8
)
(-
2
.2
2
)
(2
1
.5
8
)
(-
0
.8
3
)
(-
0
.9
1
)
(2
3
.2
4
)
(-
1
.3
6
)
(-
3
.0
2
)
(2
5
.1
4
)
(0
.7
2
)
(0
.0
2
)
(2
6
.2
9
)
L
.L
E
V
2
0
.0
1
2
*
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
6
0
.0
0
3
*
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
3
*
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
2
*
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
9
*
*
*
(1
.7
0
)
(-
0
.1
7
)
(-
0
.9
8
)
(1
.6
7
)
(1
.6
4
)
(-
1
.8
8
)
(0
.6
7
)
(0
.2
9
)
(-
1
.8
3
)
(1
.1
4
)
(1
.3
7
)
(-
3
.0
9
)
L
.C
C
E
2
0
.1
7
1
0
.1
7
7
*
*
*
0
.2
5
3
*
*
*
-0
.0
5
6
*
*
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
3
0
*
*
-0
.0
3
2
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
2
9
*
*
-0
.0
4
9
0
.0
1
8
0
.0
4
9
*
(1
.6
0
)
(8
.9
9
)
(3
.2
6
)
(-
2
.5
1
)
(0
.5
4
)
(2
.0
7
)
(-
1
.2
5
)
(0
.5
1
)
(2
.1
6
)
(-
1
.2
2
)
(0
.8
1
)
(1
.8
4
)
L
.L
O
C
2
-0
.0
0
3
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
*
*
-0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
4
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
1
(-
2
.5
8
)
(-
1
.9
9
)
(-
0
.1
1
)
(3
.1
4
)
(-
0
.6
0
)
(-
0
.6
0
)
(1
.9
9
)
(-
1
.0
0
)
(-
0
.8
1
)
(-
1
.3
3
)
(-
0
.5
9
)
(1
.3
0
)
C
F
O
p
0
.0
1
6
0
.0
0
2
0
.1
6
0
0
.0
4
8
0
.1
3
4
0
.2
4
9
-0
.0
1
4
-0
.0
9
7
*
0
.2
3
7
0
.2
1
0
0
.1
0
6
0
.0
7
5
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
9
)
(0
.8
3
)
(0
.1
9
)
(1
.1
6
)
(1
.0
4
)
(-
0
.0
5
)
(-
1
.6
8
)
(0
.9
7
)
(0
.8
4
)
(1
.1
1
)
(0
.3
5
)
S
&
P
5
0
0
-0
.1
2
8
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
2
5
-0
.0
8
1
*
*
*
0
.0
2
6
*
*
*
0
.0
0
9
-0
.1
0
5
*
*
0
.0
1
1
-0
.0
2
7
-0
.1
0
7
*
*
*
0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
0
1
(-
3
.8
4
)
(-
0
.4
0
)
(-
1
.1
1
)
(-
2
.7
3
)
(2
.9
2
)
(0
.6
4
)
(-
2
.1
0
)
(1
.5
8
)
(-
1
.0
6
)
(-
4
.7
5
)
(0
.7
7
)
(-
0
.0
8
)
M
B
-0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
6
*
-0
.0
0
6
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
(-
1
.2
8
)
(0
.3
4
)
(0
.7
9
)
(-
0
.1
8
)
(1
.1
0
)
(1
.7
2
)
(-
0
.8
0
)
(0
.5
6
)
(1
.3
6
)
(-
0
.3
4
)
(0
.5
1
)
(0
.4
7
)
R
O
A
-0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
6
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
6
*
*
*
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
0
(-
2
.8
8
)
(1
.5
3
)
(1
.2
9
)
(-
4
.2
3
)
(-
0
.0
4
)
(0
.4
7
)
(-
2
.8
7
)
(1
.3
7
)
(1
.2
6
)
(-
3
.7
8
)
(1
.0
2
)
(-
0
.2
2
)
S
iz
e
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
*
-0
.0
0
6
*
*
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
2
*
-0
.0
0
7
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
2
*
-0
.0
0
6
*
*
(-
0
.3
1
)
(-
1
.7
7
)
(-
2
.2
7
)
(-
1
.0
4
)
(1
.4
2
)
(-
1
.2
3
)
(-
0
.2
9
)
(-
1
.8
6
)
(-
2
.8
8
)
(-
1
.2
7
)
(1
.8
0
)
(-
2
.0
2
)
R
a
ti
n
g
0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
6
*
*
0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
8
(0
.6
7
)
(-
1
.5
6
)
(1
.2
6
)
(-
0
.1
5
)
(-
2
.3
2
)
(0
.7
1
)
(-
0
.3
3
)
(-
1
.5
7
)
(-
0
.0
1
)
(1
.0
5
)
(-
1
.2
6
)
(1
.2
8
)
O
p
R
is
k
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
6
(-
0
.3
3
)
(-
0
.2
0
)
(1
.0
9
)
(0
.8
5
)
(0
.5
7
)
(-
0
.5
7
(-
0
.3
6
)
(0
.7
2
)
(-
1
.0
0
)
(0
.9
2
)
(0
.3
6
)
(1
.3
0
)
In
v
S
h
o
c
k
-0
.0
3
2
*
*
*
0
.0
0
1
*
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
3
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
*
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
3
7
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
2
3
*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
(-
5
.0
2
)
(1
.7
7
)
(-
0
.4
5
)
(-
4
.7
4
)
(-
1
.7
3
)
(-
0
.3
9
)
(-
5
.6
4
)
(-
0
.7
1
)
(-
1
.4
9
)
(-
3
.3
3
)
(0
.1
6
)
(0
.0
9
)
F
F
O
S
h
o
c
k
0
.0
1
1
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
1
3
*
*
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
0
(1
.6
1
)
(-
1
.1
2
)
(0
.7
1
)
(0
.2
9
)
(0
.7
3
)
(-
0
.7
7
)
(-
0
.4
3
)
(-
1
.6
3
)
(-
0
.2
2
)
(2
.1
5
)
(-
0
.0
3
)
(-
0
.0
4
)
N
3
0
8
3
0
8
3
0
8
2
8
8
2
8
8
2
8
8
2
7
9
2
7
9
2
7
9
3
1
8
3
1
8
3
1
8
a
d
j.
R
-s
q
0
.8
4
7
0
.3
7
0
0
.8
2
1
0
.8
8
3
0
.2
9
0
0
.7
8
2
0
.8
6
0
0
.3
8
1
0
.8
1
5
0
.8
6
8
0
.3
0
8
0
.7
8
8
N
c
lu
st
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
0
3
1
0
3
1
0
3
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
2
1
0
2
1
0
2
M
e
a
n
(y
)
0
.4
0
2
0
.0
0
7
0
.1
7
3
0
.4
0
8
0
.0
2
4
0
.1
4
7
0
.4
2
5
0
.0
1
4
0
.1
5
3
0
.3
8
5
0
.0
1
6
0
.1
6
7
S
t.
D
e
v
(y
)
0
.1
1
6
0
.0
0
8
0
.0
7
7
0
.1
3
5
0
.0
2
0
0
.0
8
5
0
.1
3
0
0
.0
1
5
0
.0
8
2
0
.1
2
3
0
.0
1
9
0
.0
8
1
99
The Rat Race of Capital Structure Research: Two Spotlights on Leverage
(c
on
ti
n
u
ed
fr
om
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
ag
e)
R
O
A
S
iz
e
L
o
w
H
ig
h
L
o
w
H
ig
h
L
E
V
C
C
E
L
O
C
L
E
V
C
C
E
L
O
C
L
E
V
C
C
E
L
O
C
L
E
V
C
C
E
L
O
C
L
.L
E
V
0
.8
5
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
1
-0
.0
1
2
0
.8
2
3
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
4
0
.8
2
6
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
5
5
*
*
0
.8
1
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
1
0
.0
0
4
(2
1
.4
0
)
(-
0
.8
7
)
(-
0
.4
4
)
(1
9
.8
6
)
(-
0
.4
6
)
(0
.1
6
)
(2
2
.4
8
)
(-
0
.2
2
)
(-
2
.2
4
)
(2
2
.2
3
)
(-
1
.0
4
)
(0
.1
5
)
L
.C
C
E
-0
.1
5
1
0
.5
3
5
*
*
*
-0
.3
6
5
*
*
0
.0
1
5
0
.6
2
9
*
*
*
-0
.3
7
5
*
*
*
-0
.1
3
1
0
.5
0
0
*
*
*
-0
.4
2
6
*
*
-0
.1
3
1
0
.5
6
8
*
*
*
-0
.2
9
9
*
*
(-
0
.6
4
)
(5
.5
7
)
(-
2
.3
6
)
(0
.0
8
)
(8
.5
1
)
(-
3
.0
6
)
(-
0
.5
8
)
(4
.7
5
)
(-
2
.1
0
)
(-
0
.6
2
)
(7
.6
8
)
(-
2
.3
2
)
L
.L
O
C
-0
.0
2
5
-0
.0
2
1
0
.8
2
9
*
*
*
0
.0
1
2
-0
.0
0
6
0
.7
9
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
1
8
0
.8
3
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
3
2
-0
.0
0
5
0
.7
5
7
*
*
*
(-
0
.6
3
)
(-
1
.6
2
)
(2
6
.9
1
)
(0
.3
2
)
(-
0
.4
7
)
(2
1
.1
1
)
(-
0
.0
8
)
(-
1
.6
4
)
(2
7
.2
8
)
(-
0
.7
6
)
(-
0
.5
0
)
(2
3
.1
6
)
L
.L
E
V
2
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
6
*
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
3
*
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
4
2
*
*
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
1
6
(0
.2
1
)
(0
.1
3
)
(-
1
.9
6
)
(0
.9
8
)
(2
.8
2
)
(-
1
.7
9
)
(0
.4
6
)
(1
.2
4
)
(0
.2
7
)
(2
.5
2
)
(-
0
.0
2
)
(-
1
.6
1
)
L
.C
C
E
2
-0
.0
4
0
0
.0
2
1
0
.0
2
9
-0
.0
1
1
-0
.0
0
8
0
.0
2
1
-0
.0
3
7
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
2
7
*
*
-0
.0
5
4
0
.2
3
4
*
*
*
0
.4
0
6
*
*
*
(-
0
.8
6
)
(0
.8
9
)
(1
.0
1
)
(-
0
.4
2
)
(-
1
.2
0
)
(1
.4
2
)
(-
1
.3
8
)
(0
.2
4
)
(2
.0
2
)
(-
0
.6
1
)
(1
0
.7
4
)
(5
.4
8
)
L
.L
O
C
2
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
1
2
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
4
*
*
*
(-
0
.7
8
)
(0
.2
7
)
(0
.9
6
)
(-
1
.1
1
)
(-
1
.0
3
)
(-
0
.8
0
)
(-
0
.6
5
)
(-
0
.9
9
)
(0
.2
3
)
(0
.7
7
)
(-
7
.4
7
)
(-
5
.5
8
)
C
F
O
p
0
.0
3
3
-0
.0
3
5
0
.0
4
9
-0
.0
5
8
0
.0
9
3
0
.2
3
1
-0
.1
3
5
-0
.0
3
2
-0
.1
8
1
0
.1
1
6
0
.1
0
1
0
.3
8
2
*
(0
.1
1
)
(-
0
.3
9
)
(0
.2
4
)
(-
0
.2
2
)
(1
.2
0
)
(0
.9
5
)
(-
0
.4
7
)
(-
0
.4
6
)
(-
0
.8
7
)
(0
.4
9
)
(1
.0
0
)
(1
.8
5
)
S
&
P
5
0
0
-0
.0
7
3
*
*
*
0
.0
1
3
-0
.0
1
0
-0
.1
1
3
*
*
*
0
.0
1
5
-0
.0
4
3
*
-0
.0
8
9
*
*
*
0
.0
2
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
1
-0
.1
2
3
*
*
*
0
.0
1
4
0
.0
1
5
(-
3
.4
6
)
(1
.1
9
)
(-
0
.8
9
)
(-
4
.3
1
)
(1
.4
4
)
(-
1
.7
5
)
(-
3
.0
5
)
(3
.4
8
)
(-
1
.1
7
)
(-
5
.0
0
)
(1
.4
7
)
(0
.9
9
)
M
B
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
7
*
-0
.0
0
6
*
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
0
2
*
*
0
.0
0
6
*
-0
.0
1
0
*
*
*
0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
0
.0
0
6
*
*
(0
.2
8
)
(0
.8
9
)
(1
.8
4
)
(-
1
.6
7
)
(1
.1
4
)
(1
.1
8
)
(1
.1
9
)
(-
2
.5
4
)
(1
.7
7
)
(-
2
.6
4
)
(3
.4
8
)
(2
.0
2
)
R
O
A
-0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
0
.0
0
1
*
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
7
*
*
*
0
.0
0
1
*
*
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
1
(-
2
.7
4
)
(-
0
.3
2
)
(2
.7
4
)
(-
3
.2
7
)
(1
.9
1
)
(-
0
.5
0
)
(-
4
.1
3
)
(2
.3
0
)
(0
.0
1
)
(-
3
.1
6
)
(-
0
.0
9
)
(1
.0
2
)
S
iz
e
-0
.0
0
7
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
6
*
*
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
6
*
-0
.0
0
6
*
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
5
*
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
1
1
*
*
*
(-
1
.6
3
)
(0
.5
2
)
(-
2
.5
3
)
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
5
)
(-
1
.8
2
)
(-
1
.8
2
)
(-
1
.1
0
)
(1
.9
0
)
(0
.2
7
)
(0
.8
6
)
(-
3
.4
2
)
R
a
ti
n
g
0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
3
-0
.4
3
8
*
-0
.2
1
1
*
*
0
.1
3
1
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
8
*
(0
.4
4
)
(-
1
.0
8
)
(0
.2
2
)
(0
.1
0
)
(-
0
.6
8
)
(0
.5
2
)
(-
1
.6
7
)
(-
1
.9
9
)
(0
.5
8
)
(-
0
.3
1
)
(-
0
.8
0
)
(1
.6
7
)
O
p
R
is
k
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
9
-0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
0
6
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
9
*
*
0
.0
1
1
*
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
8
*
(-
0
.4
9
)
(0
.6
5
)
(-
0
.2
9
)
(1
.6
5
)
(-
0
.3
0
)
(1
.0
9
)
(-
1
.0
4
)
(0
.6
9
)
(-
2
.3
1
)
(1
.8
2
)
(-
0
.5
9
)
(1
.6
8
)
In
v
S
h
o
c
k
-0
.0
3
7
*
*
*
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
2
7
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
4
3
*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
2
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
3
(-
4
.9
2
)
(0
.3
5
)
(-
1
.0
5
)
(-
4
.4
8
)
(-
0
.9
6
)
(0
.1
7
)
(-
5
.7
9
)
(0
.0
5
)
(-
0
.6
8
)
(-
3
.4
5
)
(-
0
.1
9
)
(-
0
.8
3
)
F
F
O
S
h
o
c
k
0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
1
0
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
1
3
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
3
(0
.9
9
)
(-
1
.3
2
)
(0
.2
8
)
(1
.6
3
)
(-
0
.0
4
)
(-
0
.3
5
)
(0
.2
3
)
(-
0
.5
1
)
(-
0
.4
6
)
(2
.0
2
)
(-
1
.0
3
)
(0
.5
4
)
N
2
8
9
2
8
9
2
8
9
3
1
4
3
1
4
3
1
4
3
0
1
3
0
1
3
0
1
2
9
5
2
9
5
2
9
5
a
d
j.
R
-s
q
0
.8
3
0
0
.3
1
6
0
.8
4
7
0
.8
4
6
0
.3
3
5
0
.7
4
5
0
.8
8
2
0
.2
9
8
0
.8
1
8
0
.8
5
2
0
.4
1
4
0
.7
9
0
N
c
lu
st
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
9
8
9
8
9
8
9
8
9
8
9
8
8
6
8
6
8
6
M
e
a
n
(y
)
0
.4
5
4
0
.0
1
5
0
.1
5
2
0
.3
5
7
0
.0
1
5
0
.1
7
4
0
.4
2
3
0
.0
1
5
0
.1
7
1
0
.3
9
6
0
.0
1
5
0
.1
5
0
S
t.
D
e
v
(y
)
0
.1
1
9
0
.0
1
7
0
.0
8
8
0
.1
1
2
0
.0
1
8
0
.0
7
8
0
.1
3
9
0
.0
1
6
0
.0
9
1
0
.1
1
2
0
.0
1
8
0
.0
7
1
100
The Rat Race of Capital Structure Research: Two Spotlights on Leverage
T
ab
le
3.
5:
E
st
im
at
io
n
R
es
u
lt
s
fo
r
S
p
ot
li
gh
t
B
(a
cc
or
d
in
g
to
eq
u
at
io
n
(3
.5
))
F
u
ll
M
o
d
e
l
S
ta
te
o
f
E
c
o
n
o
m
y
B
o
o
m
B
u
st
∆
L
T
D
∆
E
Q
U
D
P
R
O
P
L
E
V
∆
L
T
D
∆
E
Q
U
D
P
R
O
P
L
E
V
∆
L
T
D
∆
E
Q
U
D
P
R
O
P
L
E
V
R
e
sp
o
n
se
1
1
1
1
0
2
0
0
3
0
1
0
C
F
O
p
1
.0
3
4
*
*
*
0
.5
1
7
*
*
*
1
.8
1
1
*
*
*
0
.0
7
0
0
.5
3
7
0
.5
6
0
*
*
1
.2
8
6
*
*
*
-0
.1
1
9
2
.0
9
2
*
*
*
0
.2
7
9
2
.7
9
9
*
*
*
0
.6
1
4
*
(2
.8
0
)
(2
.7
2
)
(3
.8
6
)
(0
.3
6
)
(1
.4
0
)
(2
.1
7
)
(2
.7
5
)
(-
0
.5
4
)
(2
.8
8
)
(1
.1
1
)
(2
.8
1
)
(1
.8
8
)
S
&
P
5
0
0
0
.0
6
1
*
0
.0
5
8
*
*
*
0
.1
2
0
*
*
*
-0
.0
9
3
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
5
8
*
*
*
0
.0
5
3
-0
.1
1
7
*
*
*
0
.3
1
9
*
*
*
0
.1
3
4
*
*
0
.4
5
2
*
*
*
-0
.0
5
8
(1
.7
1
)
(5
.0
8
)
(4
.1
7
)
(-
3
.7
2
)
(-
0
.1
2
)
(2
.8
0
)
(1
.0
4
)
(-
5
.1
6
)
(2
.8
7
)
(2
.2
8
)
(3
.5
1
)
(-
1
.0
9
)
M
B
0
.0
2
0
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
*
0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
2
3
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
9
*
*
*
0
.0
0
6
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
1
3
-0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
1
2
*
*
(3
.6
0
)
(-
2
.7
9
)
(0
.7
0
)
(-
1
.0
1
)
(3
.2
9
)
(-
2
.6
4
)
(0
.7
4
)
(0
.0
1
)
(1
.2
6
)
(-
0
.8
9
)
(0
.0
6
)
(-
2
.5
4
)
R
O
A
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
*
0
.0
0
6
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
5
*
*
-0
.0
0
6
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
*
0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
6
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
0
.0
0
8
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
1
0
*
*
*
(-
3
.9
1
)
(4
.4
9
)
(-
2
.1
1
)
(-
4
.6
7
)
(-
3
.5
3
)
(3
.1
8
)
(-
2
.1
0
)
(-
3
.3
6
)
(-
1
.6
1
)
(4
.7
0
)
(-
0
.8
6
)
(-
4
.0
2
)
S
iz
e
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
9
-0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
1
4
*
*
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
1
2
0
.0
0
1
(-
0
.5
6
)
(0
.5
4
)
(-
1
.4
2
)
(-
1
.5
2
)
(-
0
.9
8
)
(-
0
.5
1
)
(-
2
.1
9
)
(-
0
.9
5
)
(0
.2
1
)
(0
.4
7
)
(-
1
.1
3
)
(0
.3
7
)
R
a
ti
n
g
0
.0
0
9
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
9
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
1
8
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
1
6
0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
1
6
-0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
0
5
(0
.8
9
)
(0
.0
8
)
(0
.8
0
)
(0
.6
0
)
(1
.5
3
)
(0
.4
9
)
(1
.2
3
)
(0
.9
6
)
(-
1
.0
5
)
(-
0
.7
9
)
(-
0
.4
3
)
(-
0
.5
9
)
O
p
R
is
k
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
1
0
0
.0
1
2
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
6
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.3
4
)
(-
0
.0
0
)
(-
0
.0
0
)
(0
.1
5
)
(-
0
.5
2
)
(-
0
.4
0
)
(-
0
.0
3
)
(-
0
.7
3
)
(2
.0
8
)
(-
0
.0
6
)
(-
0
.7
3
)
In
v
S
h
o
c
k
-0
.0
1
1
-0
.0
1
6
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
2
*
*
-0
.0
3
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
8
*
-0
.0
2
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
3
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
7
*
*
*
0
.0
1
2
-0
.0
0
8
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
3
3
*
*
*
(-
1
.5
2
)
(-
4
.3
9
)
(-
2
.5
3
)
(-
6
.3
9
)
(-
1
.8
0
)
(-
3
.8
9
)
(-
2
.9
7
)
(-
4
.9
5
)
(0
.8
3
)
(-
1
.1
7
)
(0
.0
1
)
(-
3
.9
7
)
F
F
O
S
h
o
c
k
-0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
1
7
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
0
*
*
0
.0
0
8
*
-0
.0
1
8
*
-0
.0
1
8
*
*
-0
.0
3
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
1
5
-0
.0
1
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
1
9
*
*
*
(-
0
.8
8
)
(-
3
.2
0
)
(-
2
.1
4
)
(1
.7
6
)
(-
1
.8
1
)
(-
2
.4
1
)
(-
2
.7
0
)
(-
0
.1
3
)
(1
.2
0
)
(-
4
.0
0
)
(-
0
.0
9
)
(2
.6
9
)
N
5
5
8
5
5
8
5
5
8
5
5
8
3
7
3
3
7
3
3
7
3
3
7
3
1
8
5
1
8
5
1
8
5
1
8
5
5
a
d
j.
R
-s
q
0
.2
4
3
0
.2
3
5
0
.2
2
9
0
.8
6
8
0
.2
7
5
0
.1
8
6
0
.2
4
8
0
.8
6
6
0
.1
4
6
0
.2
7
3
0
.1
4
9
0
.8
6
6
N
c
lu
st
1
4
0
1
4
0
1
4
0
1
4
0
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
M
e
a
n
(y
)
0
.0
4
9
0
.0
3
0
0
.1
0
5
0
.4
0
7
0
.0
5
2
0
.0
3
7
0
.1
1
1
0
.3
8
8
0
.0
3
9
0
.0
1
5
0
.0
8
9
0
.4
4
3
S
t.
D
e
v
(y
)
0
.0
9
4
0
.0
5
2
0
.1
0
8
0
.1
2
7
0
.0
9
7
0
.0
5
5
0
.1
1
0
0
.1
2
4
0
.0
8
7
0
.0
4
1
0
.1
0
0
0
.1
2
3
N
o
te
:
T
h
is
ta
b
le
sh
o
w
s
re
su
lt
s
b
a
se
d
o
n
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
(3
.5
).
L
T
D
to
lo
n
g
-t
er
m
d
eb
t,
E
Q
U
to
co
m
m
o
n
eq
u
it
y,
D
P
R
O
P
to
d
ep
re
ci
a
b
le
p
ro
p
er
ty
,
a
ll
m
ea
su
re
d
in
fi
rs
t
d
iff
er
en
ce
s
a
n
d
sc
a
le
d
b
y
y
ea
r-
b
eg
in
n
in
g
to
ta
l
a
ss
et
s.
L
E
V
re
fe
rs
to
m
a
rk
et
le
v
er
a
g
e,
C
F
O
p
re
fe
rs
to
o
p
er
a
ti
n
g
ca
sh
fl
o
w
,
a
ll
sc
a
le
d
b
y
y
ea
r-
b
eg
in
n
in
g
to
ta
l
a
ss
et
s.
S
&
P
5
0
0
re
fe
rs
to
th
e
co
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s
re
tu
rn
o
f
th
e
S
&
P
5
0
0
in
d
ex
,
M
B
to
th
e
ra
ti
o
o
f
m
a
rk
et
v
a
lu
e
o
v
er
b
o
o
k
v
a
lu
e
o
f
eq
u
it
y,
R
O
A
to
re
tu
rn
o
n
a
ss
et
s,
S
iz
e
to
th
e
ln
o
f
to
ta
l
a
ss
et
s.
T
h
e
d
u
m
m
y
R
a
ti
n
g
is
eq
u
a
l
to
o
n
e,
if
a
fi
rm
h
a
s
a
n
in
v
es
tm
en
t
g
ra
d
e
ra
ti
n
g
,
O
p
R
is
k
is
eq
u
a
l
to
o
n
e,
if
a
fi
rm
’s
ca
sh
fl
o
w
s
a
re
a
b
o
v
e
th
e
m
ed
ia
n
in
th
e
re
sp
ec
ti
v
e
p
ro
p
er
ty
se
g
m
en
t,
In
v
S
h
o
ck
is
eq
u
a
l
to
o
n
e,
if
a
fi
rm
’s
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
ch
a
n
g
e
in
M
B
is
a
b
o
v
e
th
e
5
5
th
p
er
ce
n
ti
le
in
th
e
re
sp
ec
ti
v
e
p
ro
p
er
ty
se
g
m
en
t,
F
F
O
S
h
o
ck
is
eq
u
a
l
to
o
n
e,
if
a
fi
rm
’s
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
ch
a
n
g
e
o
f
F
F
O
is
b
el
o
w
th
e
4
5
th
p
er
ce
n
ti
le
in
th
e
re
sp
ec
ti
v
e
p
ro
p
er
ty
se
g
m
en
t,
a
n
d
ze
ro
o
th
er
w
is
e.
E
st
im
a
te
s
fo
r
th
e
m
a
tr
ix
Γ
a
n
d
y
ea
r
d
u
m
m
ie
s
a
re
n
o
t
re
p
o
rt
ed
.
N
d
en
o
te
s
fi
rm
-y
ea
r
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
o
f
ea
ch
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
,
N
cl
u
st
er
d
en
o
te
s
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
o
b
se
rv
ed
fi
rm
s,
M
ea
n
(y
)
a
n
d
S
t.
D
ev
.(
y
)
re
p
re
se
n
t
m
ea
n
a
n
d
st
a
n
d
a
rd
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
.
T
-s
ta
ts
a
re
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
is
,
*
*
*
,
*
*
,
a
n
d
*
d
en
o
te
st
a
ti
st
ic
a
l
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
%
,
5
%
,
a
n
d
1
0
%
le
v
el
s,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
101
The Rat Race of Capital Structure Research: Two Spotlights on Leverage
(c
on
ti
n
u
ed
fr
om
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
ag
e)
L
a
te
-2
0
0
0
s
F
in
a
n
c
ia
l
C
ri
si
s
L
E
V
B
e
fo
re
th
e
C
ri
si
s
L
o
w
H
ig
h
∆
L
T
D
∆
E
Q
U
D
P
R
O
P
L
E
V
∆
L
T
D
∆
E
Q
U
D
P
R
O
P
L
E
V
∆
L
T
D
∆
E
Q
U
D
P
R
O
P
L
E
V
R
e
sp
o
n
se
1
2
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
C
F
O
p
1
.3
5
5
*
*
*
0
.6
1
1
*
*
2
.1
1
3
*
*
*
-0
.1
4
6
0
.4
5
1
0
.3
8
1
*
1
.0
1
0
*
*
0
.1
0
8
1
.5
3
0
*
*
0
.6
3
5
*
*
2
.4
8
7
*
*
*
-0
.1
3
8
(2
.6
3
)
(2
.5
7
)
(3
.2
1
)
(-
0
.7
0
)
(1
.4
0
)
(1
.7
2
)
(2
.5
0
)
(0
.5
1
)
(2
.4
8
)
(2
.1
8
)
(3
.0
1
)
(-
0
.5
1
)
S
&
P
5
0
0
0
.0
9
1
0
.0
3
3
0
.1
9
0
*
-0
.0
8
6
0
.0
2
4
0
.0
2
8
0
.0
6
6
-0
.1
0
5
*
*
0
.0
9
2
*
*
*
0
.0
6
7
*
*
*
0
.1
5
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
8
9
*
*
*
(1
.6
4
)
(0
.9
1
)
(1
.9
5
)
(-
1
.6
3
)
(0
.2
7
)
(0
.6
9
)
(1
.2
0
)
(-
2
.5
3
)
(2
.7
3
)
(3
.9
8
)
(4
.1
0
)
(-
3
.5
4
)
M
B
0
.0
2
3
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
7
*
*
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
2
0
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
7
*
0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
2
2
*
*
-0
.0
1
0
*
*
0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
0
1
(2
.9
6
)
(-
1
.9
8
)
(0
.5
9
)
(0
.3
8
)
(3
.3
7
)
(-
1
.8
3
)
(0
.5
4
)
(-
0
.9
1
)
(2
.3
7
)
(-
2
.5
1
)
(0
.4
7
)
(-
0
.2
7
)
R
O
A
-0
.0
1
0
*
*
*
0
.0
0
6
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
0
7
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
0
*
*
*
0
.0
0
4
*
*
-0
.0
0
6
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
8
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
7
*
*
*
(-
4
.5
3
)
(3
.7
7
)
(-
1
.5
2
)
(-
4
.3
8
)
(-
5
.0
6
)
(2
.3
8
)
(-
2
.3
5
)
(-
3
.2
1
)
(-
0
.9
7
)
(4
.2
8
)
(-
0
.5
2
)
(-
3
.0
4
)
S
iz
e
-0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
1
0
-0
.0
0
5
*
*
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
8
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
0
(-
0
.8
1
)
(-
0
.3
5
)
(-
1
.3
8
)
(-
2
.0
1
)
(0
.1
8
)
(0
.5
6
)
(-
1
.0
8
)
(0
.0
3
)
(-
0
.0
9
)
(-
0
.0
2
)
(-
0
.5
1
)
(0
.1
3
)
R
a
ti
n
g
0
.0
1
2
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
1
3
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
2
4
*
*
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
1
9
0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
7
(1
.0
2
)
(0
.4
2
)
(0
.9
7
)
(1
.0
4
)
(2
.3
3
)
(0
.1
7
)
(1
.5
3
)
(1
.1
4
)
(-
0
.2
1
)
(0
.1
1
)
(0
.1
2
)
(-
0
.9
9
)
O
p
R
is
k
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
0
2
(0
.2
3
)
(0
.3
1
)
(-
0
.0
3
)
(-
0
.2
2
)
(0
.1
8
)
(0
.1
9
)
(-
0
.0
1
)
(0
.7
7
)
(-
0
.2
9
)
(0
.7
0
)
(-
0
.4
7
)
(-
0
.3
4
)
In
v
S
h
o
c
k
-0
.0
1
8
*
-0
.0
2
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
7
*
*
-0
.0
2
5
*
*
*
0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
1
6
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
1
8
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
9
-0
.0
0
8
*
-0
.0
1
7
-0
.0
3
3
*
*
*
(-
1
.7
5
)
(-
4
.3
7
)
(-
2
.1
3
)
(-
4
.6
5
)
(0
.5
6
)
(-
2
.7
4
)
(-
0
.3
9
)
(-
3
.6
1
)
(-
0
.7
7
)
(-
1
.6
6
)
(-
1
.1
9
)
(-
4
.5
7
)
F
F
O
S
h
o
c
k
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
2
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
4
*
*
0
.0
1
3
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
1
4
*
*
-0
.0
0
5
0
.0
1
0
*
-0
.0
1
6
-0
.0
1
7
*
-0
.0
4
2
*
*
0
.0
0
2
(-
0
.3
7
)
(-
3
.4
9
)
(-
2
.0
9
)
(2
.7
8
)
(-
0
.0
2
)
(-
2
.1
3
)
(-
0
.4
5
)
(1
.7
0
)
(-
1
.2
9
)
(-
1
.9
3
)
(-
2
.5
9
)
(0
.2
6
)
N
3
9
5
3
9
5
3
9
5
3
9
5
3
0
3
3
0
3
3
0
3
3
0
3
2
9
2
2
9
2
2
9
2
2
9
2
a
d
j.
R
-s
q
0
.2
2
5
0
.2
4
9
0
.2
1
2
0
.8
7
5
0
.2
4
4
0
.1
4
8
0
.1
6
9
0
.8
3
3
0
.2
8
5
0
.2
6
7
0
.2
7
8
0
.8
0
0
N
c
lu
st
1
1
6
1
1
6
1
1
6
1
1
6
9
0
9
0
9
0
9
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
M
e
a
n
(y
)
0
.0
5
6
0
.0
2
8
0
.1
0
9
0
.4
0
2
0
.0
3
7
0
.0
3
4
0
.0
9
4
0
.3
3
3
0
.0
6
1
0
.0
2
8
0
.1
1
9
0
.4
8
0
S
t.
D
e
v
(y
)
0
.0
9
7
0
.0
5
3
0
.1
1
4
0
.1
2
0
0
.0
8
3
0
.0
5
0
0
.0
9
3
0
.0
9
7
0
.1
0
2
0
.0
5
6
0
.1
2
1
0
.1
0
6
102
The Rat Race of Capital Structure Research: Two Spotlights on Leverage
(c
on
ti
n
u
ed
fr
om
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
ag
e)
L
O
C
L
o
w
H
ig
h
∆
L
T
D
∆
E
Q
U
D
P
R
O
P
L
E
V
∆
L
T
D
∆
E
Q
U
D
P
R
O
P
L
E
V
R
e
sp
o
n
se
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
C
F
O
p
0
.7
1
3
0
.3
4
5
1
.2
6
2
*
*
-0
.0
4
0
1
.0
8
1
*
0
.5
7
4
*
*
1
.8
7
2
*
*
*
-0
.0
6
7
(1
.4
7
)
(1
.4
8
)
(2
.3
8
)
(-
0
.1
5
)
(1
.8
7
)
(2
.1
5
)
(2
.7
1
)
(-
0
.2
6
)
S
&
P
5
0
0
0
.0
6
9
0
.0
4
8
*
*
*
0
.1
1
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
9
8
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
2
0
.0
5
0
*
*
0
.0
4
6
-0
.1
3
4
*
*
*
(1
.6
4
)
(4
.0
3
)
(3
.3
7
)
(-
2
.7
2
)
(-
0
.4
1
)
(2
.4
6
)
(1
.5
6
)
(-
4
.8
7
)
M
B
0
.0
2
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
0
.0
1
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
1
4
-0
.0
1
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
0
-0
.0
0
4
(2
.9
1
)
(-
1
.3
7
)
(2
.0
5
)
(-
0
.1
9
)
(1
.6
0
)
(-
3
.0
4
)
(-
0
.9
6
)
(-
1
.0
0
)
R
O
A
-0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
8
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
6
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
0
*
*
*
0
.0
0
4
*
*
-0
.0
0
9
*
*
-0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
(-
1
.6
0
)
(5
.4
4
)
(-
0
.0
6
)
(-
3
.3
9
)
(-
3
.8
9
)
(2
.1
5
)
(-
2
.6
1
)
(-
3
.2
2
)
S
iz
e
-0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
1
3
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
3
(-
1
.3
1
)
(-
0
.3
0
)
(-
1
.6
2
)
(-
0
.5
2
)
(0
.2
3
)
(1
.3
0
)
(-
0
.1
7
)
(-
0
.6
0
)
R
a
ti
n
g
0
.0
1
2
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
1
1
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
1
8
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
1
7
0
.0
0
6
(0
.9
6
)
(-
0
.1
4
)
(0
.8
2
)
(-
0
.7
4
)
(1
.1
8
)
(0
.7
1
)
(1
.0
4
)
(0
.8
5
)
O
p
R
is
k
-0
.0
0
9
0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
1
7
-0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
9
0
.0
0
5
(-
0
.8
7
)
(0
.6
3
)
(-
1
.2
5
)
(-
0
.8
0
)
(0
.6
7
)
(-
0
.2
1
)
(0
.6
2
)
(1
.0
2
)
In
v
S
h
o
c
k
-0
.0
1
2
-0
.0
1
3
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
8
-0
.0
3
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
1
4
*
*
-0
.0
1
6
-0
.0
3
0
*
*
*
(-
1
.1
9
)
(-
2
.9
8
)
(-
1
.6
1
)
(-
4
.7
6
)
(-
0
.3
4
)
(-
2
.1
5
)
(-
1
.2
1
)
(-
4
.9
9
)
F
F
O
S
h
o
c
k
0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
1
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
6
0
.0
1
4
*
*
-0
.0
0
9
-0
.0
1
2
-0
.0
2
6
*
0
.0
0
0
(0
.2
6
)
(-
3
.7
8
)
(-
0
.5
3
)
(2
.3
0
)
(-
0
.8
5
)
(-
1
.3
2
)
(-
1
.8
8
)
(0
.0
7
)
N
2
9
6
2
9
6
2
9
6
2
9
6
2
9
9
2
9
9
2
9
9
2
9
9
a
d
j.
R
-s
q
0
.2
2
9
0
.2
6
6
0
.1
9
0
0
.8
8
0
0
.2
0
1
0
.2
0
5
0
.2
2
2
0
.8
4
9
N
c
lu
st
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
9
5
9
5
9
5
9
5
M
e
a
n
(y
)
0
.0
4
7
0
.0
2
4
0
.0
9
6
0
.4
1
8
0
.0
4
9
0
.0
3
5
0
.1
1
3
0
.3
9
2
S
t.
D
e
v
(y
)
0
.0
8
9
0
.0
4
6
0
.1
0
3
0
.1
2
9
0
.0
9
8
0
.0
5
7
0
.1
1
1
0
.1
2
2
103
The Rat Race of Capital Structure Research: Two Spotlights on Leverage
(c
on
ti
n
u
ed
fr
om
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
ag
e)
C
C
E
L
o
w
H
ig
h
∆
L
T
D
∆
E
Q
U
D
P
R
O
P
L
E
V
∆
L
T
D
∆
E
Q
U
D
P
R
O
P
L
E
V
R
e
sp
o
n
se
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
C
F
O
p
1
.1
4
3
*
*
0
.5
6
4
*
*
*
1
.9
7
5
*
*
*
0
.0
1
6
0
.8
7
0
*
0
.6
0
9
*
*
1
.5
4
6
*
*
*
0
.0
4
8
(2
.1
1
)
(2
.9
2
)
(3
.0
5
)
(0
.0
6
)
(1
.9
0
)
(2
.0
7
)
(2
.6
9
)
(0
.1
9
)
S
&
P
5
0
0
-0
.0
1
5
0
.0
4
3
0
.0
4
4
-0
.1
2
8
*
*
*
0
.0
7
1
*
0
.0
6
4
*
*
*
0
.1
2
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
8
1
*
*
*
(-
0
.3
3
)
(0
.9
3
)
(0
.9
0
)
(-
3
.8
4
)
(1
.9
6
)
(3
.6
5
)
(2
.9
1
)
(-
2
.7
3
)
M
B
0
.0
2
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
6
*
0
.0
0
8
-0
.0
0
5
0
.0
1
9
*
*
-0
.0
1
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
1
(3
.1
4
)
(-
1
.6
7
)
(1
.1
7
)
(-
1
.2
8
)
(2
.6
0
)
(-
3
.7
0
)
(-
0
.3
8
)
(-
0
.1
8
)
R
O
A
-0
.0
0
7
*
*
0
.0
0
7
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
9
*
*
*
0
.0
0
5
*
*
-0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
0
6
*
*
*
(-
2
.1
3
)
(3
.5
8
)
(-
0
.6
4
)
(-
2
.8
8
)
(-
3
.4
2
)
(2
.5
1
)
(-
1
.4
6
)
(-
4
.2
3
)
)
S
iz
e
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
9
-0
.0
0
3
(0
.3
6
)
(0
.7
1
)
(-
0
.0
3
)
(-
0
.3
1
)
(-
0
.4
8
)
(0
.4
5
)
(-
1
.1
2
)
(-
1
.0
4
)
R
a
ti
n
g
0
.0
2
3
*
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
2
1
0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
0
1
(1
.9
2
)
(0
.7
1
)
(1
.5
9
)
(0
.6
7
)
(-
0
.3
8
)
(-
0
.6
6
)
(-
0
.2
4
)
(-
0
.1
5
)
O
p
R
is
k
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
1
2
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
2
0
0
.0
0
5
(0
.0
7
)
(0
.4
1
)
(1
.0
3
)
(-
0
.3
3
)
(-
0
.4
1
)
(-
0
.6
3
)
(-
1
.4
9
)
(0
.8
5
)
In
v
S
h
o
c
k
-0
.0
0
9
-0
.0
1
7
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
4
*
*
-0
.0
3
2
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
1
1
*
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
3
1
*
*
*
(-
0
.8
3
)
(-
3
.2
7
)
(-
2
.0
3
)
(-
5
.0
2
)
(-
0
.5
0
)
(-
1
.9
5
)
(-
0
.2
1
)
(-
4
.7
4
)
F
F
O
S
h
o
c
k
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
1
5
*
*
-0
.0
1
7
0
.0
1
1
-0
.0
1
1
-0
.0
1
2
-0
.0
1
8
0
.0
0
2
(-
0
.1
9
)
(-
2
.1
2
)
(-
1
.4
1
)
(1
.6
1
)
(-
1
.1
5
)
(-
1
.5
8
)
(-
1
.3
2
)
(0
.2
9
)
N
3
0
8
3
0
8
3
0
8
3
0
8
2
8
8
2
8
8
2
8
8
2
8
8
a
d
j.
R
-s
q
0
.2
2
2
0
.3
0
7
0
.2
8
6
0
.8
4
7
0
.2
4
6
0
.2
3
5
0
.1
8
4
0
.8
8
3
N
c
lu
st
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
0
3
1
0
3
1
0
3
1
0
3
M
e
a
n
(y
)
0
.0
4
6
0
.0
2
7
0
.1
0
6
0
.4
0
2
0
.0
4
9
0
.0
3
7
0
.1
0
6
0
.4
0
8
S
t.
D
e
v
(y
)
0
.0
9
3
0
.0
5
0
0
.1
0
4
0
.1
1
6
0
.0
9
4
0
.0
5
7
0
.1
1
2
0
.1
3
5
104
The Rat Race of Capital Structure Research: Two Spotlights on Leverage
(c
on
ti
n
u
ed
fr
om
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
ag
e)
M
B
L
o
w
H
ig
h
∆
L
T
D
∆
E
Q
U
D
P
R
O
P
L
E
V
∆
L
T
D
∆
E
Q
U
D
P
R
O
P
L
E
V
R
e
sp
o
n
se
1
5
5
4
0
0
0
1
C
F
O
p
1
.0
3
2
*
0
.4
5
1
*
1
.7
8
9
*
*
-0
.0
1
4
0
.9
0
7
*
*
0
.4
4
0
*
1
.5
8
5
*
*
*
0
.2
1
0
(1
.9
3
)
(1
.7
1
)
(2
.5
3
)
(-
0
.0
5
)
(1
.9
9
)
(1
.8
0
)
(2
.8
9
)
(0
.8
4
)
S
&
P
5
0
0
0
.0
3
5
0
.0
3
4
0
.1
2
3
*
-0
.1
0
5
*
*
0
.0
5
2
0
.0
7
4
*
*
*
0
.0
9
3
*
*
-0
.1
0
7
*
*
*
(0
.6
0
)
(0
.8
9
)
(1
.9
2
)
(-
2
.1
0
)
(1
.5
3
)
(3
.8
1
)
(2
.4
4
)
(-
4
.7
5
)
M
B
0
.0
4
3
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
0
.0
4
2
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
6
0
.0
1
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
0
1
(3
.0
1
)
(-
0
.4
9
)
(2
.6
7
)
(-
0
.8
0
)
(3
.0
0
)
(-
3
.4
5
)
(-
0
.4
5
)
(-
0
.3
4
)
R
O
A
-0
.0
0
7
*
*
0
.0
0
6
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
6
*
-0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
0
*
*
*
0
.0
0
6
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
7
*
*
-0
.0
0
6
*
*
*
(-
2
.2
6
)
(3
.2
4
)
(-
1
.8
2
)
(-
2
.8
7
)
(-
4
.0
6
)
(3
.2
6
)
(-
2
.5
4
)
(-
3
.7
8
)
S
iz
e
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
0
9
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
0
4
(-
0
.2
5
)
(-
1
.2
1
)
(-
1
.1
4
)
(-
0
.2
9
)
(-
0
.2
1
)
(1
.0
1
)
(-
0
.9
8
)
(-
1
.2
7
)
R
a
ti
n
g
0
.0
1
1
0
.0
0
8
0
.0
1
1
0
.0
1
1
0
.0
0
8
-0
.0
0
6
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
6
(0
.6
9
)
(1
.0
6
)
(0
.6
2
)
(0
.6
9
)
(0
.6
2
)
(-
0
.9
3
)
(0
.0
4
)
(1
.0
5
)
O
p
R
is
k
-0
.0
1
2
-0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
1
3
-0
.0
1
2
0
.0
1
2
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
4
(-
0
.9
8
)
(-
0
.9
5
)
(-
0
.9
8
)
(-
0
.9
8
)
(1
.3
7
)
(0
.5
6
)
(0
.4
6
)
(0
.9
2
)
In
v
S
h
o
c
k
-0
.0
1
9
-0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
1
7
-0
.0
3
7
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
2
6
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
3
*
*
*
(-
1
.5
7
)
(-
1
.4
5
)
(-
1
.2
3
)
(-
5
.6
4
)
(-
0
.6
0
)
(-
4
.7
5
)
(-
2
.7
7
)
(-
3
.3
3
)
F
F
O
S
h
o
c
k
-0
.0
1
4
-0
.0
1
2
-0
.0
3
4
*
*
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
8
-0
.0
1
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
6
0
.0
1
3
*
*
(-
1
.0
5
)
(-
1
.6
4
)
(-
2
.1
9
)
(-
0
.4
3
)
(-
0
.7
7
)
(-
2
.8
0
)
(-
1
.2
6
)
(2
.1
5
)
N
2
7
9
2
7
9
2
7
9
2
7
9
3
1
8
3
1
8
3
1
8
3
1
8
a
d
j.
R
-s
q
0
.2
0
2
0
.2
0
8
0
.2
1
9
0
.8
6
0
0
.2
2
7
0
.2
4
0
0
.2
3
2
0
.8
6
8
N
c
lu
st
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
2
1
0
2
1
0
2
1
0
2
M
e
a
n
(y
)
0
.0
4
1
0
.0
2
9
0
.1
0
1
0
.4
2
5
0
.0
5
4
0
.0
3
2
0
.1
0
9
0
.3
8
5
S
t.
D
e
v
(y
)
0
.0
9
3
0
.0
5
1
0
.1
0
9
0
.1
3
0
0
.0
9
3
0
.0
5
4
0
.1
0
5
0
.1
2
3
105
The Rat Race of Capital Structure Research: Two Spotlights on Leverage
(c
on
ti
n
u
ed
fr
om
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
ag
e)
R
O
A
L
o
w
H
ig
h
∆
L
T
D
∆
E
Q
U
D
P
R
O
P
L
E
V
∆
L
T
D
∆
E
Q
U
D
P
R
O
P
L
E
V
R
e
sp
o
n
se
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
C
F
O
p
0
.7
9
2
0
.2
5
3
1
.2
9
3
*
*
0
.0
3
3
0
.8
2
4
0
.6
4
9
*
*
1
.7
0
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
5
8
(1
.6
1
)
(1
.0
3
)
(2
.2
0
)
(0
.1
1
)
(1
.5
9
)
(2
.5
0
)
(2
.7
8
)
(-
0
.2
2
)
S
&
P
5
0
0
0
.0
8
2
*
*
0
.0
5
4
*
*
*
0
.1
2
7
*
*
*
-0
.0
7
3
*
*
*
0
.0
6
9
0
.0
4
6
0
.1
4
9
*
*
-0
.1
1
3
*
*
*
(2
.0
4
)
(3
.0
1
)
(3
.2
7
)
(-
3
.4
6
)
(1
.1
7
)
(1
.6
5
)
(2
.0
2
)
(-
4
.3
1
)
M
B
0
.0
3
8
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
6
0
.0
2
3
*
*
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
1
2
-0
.0
0
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
-0
.0
0
6
*
(4
.3
2
)
(-
1
.2
9
)
(2
.1
2
)
(0
.2
8
)
(1
.6
0
)
(-
2
.7
9
)
(-
1
.1
3
)
(-
1
.6
7
)
R
O
A
-0
.0
0
4
0
.0
1
0
*
*
*
0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
3
*
*
*
0
.0
0
4
*
*
-0
.0
1
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
(-
1
.2
2
)
(5
.7
2
)
(0
.3
8
)
(-
2
.7
4
)
(-
4
.8
4
)
(2
.0
9
)
(-
3
.7
7
)
(-
3
.2
7
)
S
iz
e
-0
.0
1
0
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
2
0
*
*
-0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
7
0
.0
0
0
(-
1
.4
0
)
(-
0
.0
7
)
(-
2
.0
9
)
(-
1
.6
3
)
(-
0
.4
9
)
(-
0
.9
3
)
(-
1
.0
4
)
(0
.0
6
)
R
a
ti
n
g
0
.0
1
7
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
1
7
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
1
2
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
9
0
.0
0
1
(1
.2
9
)
(0
.3
3
)
(1
.1
5
)
(0
.4
4
)
(0
.8
3
)
(0
.2
2
)
(0
.6
0
)
(0
.1
0
)
O
p
R
is
k
-0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
9
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
7
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
9
(-
0
.1
5
)
(1
.4
7
)
(-
0
.1
2
)
(-
0
.4
9
)
(0
.3
0
)
(-
1
.1
2
)
(0
.1
2
)
(1
.6
5
)
In
v
S
h
o
c
k
-0
.0
2
8
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
3
7
*
*
*
-0
.0
3
7
*
*
*
0
.0
1
1
-0
.0
0
9
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
2
7
*
*
*
(-
2
.6
8
)
(-
3
.4
9
)
(-
2
.8
6
)
(-
4
.9
2
)
(1
.1
0
)
(-
1
.6
3
)
(-
0
.0
1
)
(-
4
.4
8
)
F
F
O
S
h
o
c
k
-0
.0
1
7
-0
.0
1
9
*
*
-0
.0
3
2
*
*
0
.0
0
7
0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
1
4
*
*
-0
.0
1
0
0
.0
1
0
(-
1
.4
4
)
(-
2
.2
4
)
(-
2
.2
2
)
(0
.9
9
)
(0
.4
4
)
(-
2
.1
6
)
(-
0
.7
8
)
(1
.6
3
)
N
2
8
9
2
8
9
2
8
9
2
8
9
3
1
4
3
1
4
3
1
4
3
1
4
a
d
j.
R
-s
q
0
.2
8
4
0
.2
0
7
0
.2
4
2
0
.6
8
2
0
.2
0
2
0
.2
0
3
0
.2
2
2
0
.8
4
6
N
c
lu
st
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
9
8
9
8
9
8
9
8
M
e
a
n
(y
)
0
.0
5
3
0
.0
2
3
0
.1
0
6
-0
.0
5
6
0
.0
4
6
0
.0
3
8
0
.1
0
4
0
.3
5
7
S
t.
D
e
v
(y
)
0
.0
9
6
0
.0
5
3
0
.1
1
0
0
.0
2
5
0
.0
9
2
0
.0
5
0
0
.1
0
3
0
.1
1
2
106
The Rat Race of Capital Structure Research: Two Spotlights on Leverage
(c
on
ti
n
u
ed
fr
om
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
ag
e)
S
iz
e
L
o
w
H
ig
h
∆
L
T
D
∆
E
Q
U
D
P
R
O
P
L
E
V
∆
L
T
D
∆
E
Q
U
D
P
R
O
P
L
E
V
R
e
sp
o
n
se
1
1
1
2
0
1
0
0
C
F
O
p
0
.2
7
0
0
.3
7
4
0
.9
6
6
*
*
-0
.1
3
5
1
.3
7
7
*
*
0
.5
6
4
*
2
.1
5
1
*
*
0
.1
1
6
(0
.6
0
)
(1
.5
6
)
(2
.1
3
)
(-
0
.4
7
)
(2
.0
9
)
(1
.9
4
)
(2
.5
4
)
(0
.4
9
)
S
&
P
5
0
0
0
.0
7
3
0
.0
6
2
*
*
*
0
.1
0
9
*
*
-0
.0
8
9
*
*
*
0
.0
2
4
0
.0
7
3
*
*
*
0
.0
4
2
-0
.1
2
3
*
*
*
(1
.3
3
)
(3
.9
6
)
(2
.1
6
)
(-
3
.0
5
)
(0
.7
7
)
(4
.3
8
)
(0
.8
9
)
(-
5
.0
0
)
M
B
0
.0
3
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
1
*
*
*
0
.0
1
3
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
9
-0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
0
9
-0
.0
1
0
*
*
*
(4
.4
0
)
(-
2
.9
9
)
(1
.4
9
)
(1
.1
9
)
(1
.2
3
)
(-
1
.3
6
)
(-
0
.9
6
)
(-
2
.6
4
)
R
O
A
-0
.0
0
5
*
0
.0
0
8
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
7
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
0
*
*
*
0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
7
*
*
-0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
(-
1
.7
9
)
(3
.9
8
)
(-
1
.0
0
)
(-
4
.1
3
)
(-
3
.9
5
)
(2
.7
4
)
(-
2
.0
5
)
(-
3
.1
6
)
S
iz
e
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
7
*
*
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
5
*
-0
.0
0
8
-0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
1
6
0
.0
0
1
(0
.4
1
)
(2
.0
1
)
(0
.1
1
)
(1
.9
0
)
(-
0
.8
7
)
(-
0
.8
1
)
(-
1
.3
5
)
(0
.2
7
)
R
a
ti
n
g
-0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
1
1
0
.0
1
5
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
0
2
(-
0
.4
2
)
(-
0
.1
0
)
(0
.0
5
)
(-
0
.6
9
)
(1
.2
5
)
(0
.5
9
)
(0
.3
3
)
(-
0
.3
1
)
O
p
R
is
k
-0
.0
1
3
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
2
3
*
-0
.0
3
2
*
0
.0
1
2
-0
.0
0
0
0
.0
1
3
0
.0
1
1
*
(-
1
.2
8
)
(-
0
.4
4
)
(-
1
.8
5
)
(-
1
.6
9
)
(1
.0
6
)
(-
0
.0
6
)
(0
.9
3
)
(1
.8
2
)
In
v
S
h
o
c
k
-0
.0
1
8
-0
.0
1
0
-0
.0
1
0
-0
.0
4
3
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
1
7
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
2
*
-0
.0
2
1
*
*
*
(-
1
.6
1
)
(-
1
.5
4
)
(-
0
.7
1
)
(-
5
.7
9
)
(-
0
.3
2
)
(-
3
.5
8
)
(-
1
.8
0
)
(-
3
.4
5
)
F
F
O
S
h
o
c
k
-0
.0
0
9
-0
.0
1
0
-0
.0
1
7
0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
9
-0
.0
2
3
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
7
*
0
.0
1
3
*
*
(-
0
.7
8
)
(-
1
.3
5
)
(-
1
.3
7
)
(0
.2
3
)
(-
0
.8
2
)
(-
3
.3
0
)
(-
1
.8
3
)
(2
.0
2
)
N
3
0
1
3
0
1
3
0
1
3
0
1
2
9
5
2
9
5
2
9
5
2
9
5
a
d
j.
R
-s
q
0
.2
2
2
0
.2
2
3
0
.1
8
8
0
.8
8
2
0
.2
2
9
0
.2
0
7
0
.2
4
0
0
.8
5
2
N
c
lu
st
9
8
9
8
9
8
9
8
8
6
8
6
8
6
8
6
M
e
a
n
(y
)
0
.0
4
6
0
.0
3
0
0
.1
0
5
0
.4
2
3
0
.0
5
1
0
.0
2
9
0
.1
0
5
0
.3
9
6
S
t.
D
e
v
(y
)
0
.0
9
8
0
.0
5
2
0
.1
0
1
0
.1
3
9
0
.0
9
1
0
.0
5
1
0
.1
1
2
0
.1
1
2
107
The Rat Race of Capital Structure Research: Two Spotlights on Leverage
References
Acharya, V.V., H. Almeida, and M. Campello, 2007, Is cash negative debt? a
hedging perspective on corporate financial policies, Journal of Financial Interme-
diation 16, 515–554.
Almeida, H., and M. Campello, 2007, Financial constraints, asset tangibility, and
corporate investment, Review of Financial Studies 20, 1429–1460.
An, H., W.G. Hardin, and Z. Wu, 2010, Information asymmetry and corporate
liquidity management: Evidence from real estate investment trusts, Journal of
Real Estate Finance and Economics, forthcoming.
Barclay, M.J., L.M. Marx, and Jr. C.W. Smith, 2003, The joint determination of
leverage and maturity, Journal of Corporate Finance 9, 149–167.
Blouin, J., J.E. Core, and W. Guay, 2010, Have the tax benefits of debt been
overestimated?, Journal of Financial Economics 98, 195–213.
Brown, D.T., and T.J. Riddiough, 2003, Financing choice and liability structure of
real estate investment trusts, Real Estate Economics 31, 313–346.
Campello, M., J.R. Graham, and C.R. Harvey, 2010, The real effects of financial
constraints: Evidence from a financial crisis, Journal of Financial Economics 97,
470–487.
Chen, L., and X. Zhao, 2007, Mechanical mean reversion of leverage ratios, Eco-
nomics Letters 95, 223–229.
DeAngelo, H., and L. DeAngelo, 2007, Capital structure, payout policy, and financial
flexibility, Working paper, Marshall School of Business.
Denis, D.J., and V. Sibilkov, 2010, Financial constraints, investment, and the value
of cash holdings, Review of Financial Studies 23, 247–269.
Ertugrul, M., and E. Giambona, 2011, Property segment and REIT capital struc-
ture, Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, forthcoming.
Feng, Z., C. Ghosh, and C.F. Sirmans, 2007, On the capital structure of real estate
investment trusts (REITs), Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 34,
81–105.
108
The Rat Race of Capital Structure Research: Two Spotlights on Leverage
Flannery, M.J., and K.P. Rangan, 2006, Partial adjustment toward target capital
structures, Journal of Financial Economics 79, 469–506.
Gamba, A., and A. Triantis, 2008, The value of financial flexibility, Journal of
Finance 63, 2263–2296.
Gatchev, V.A., T. Pulvino, and V. Tarhan, 2010, The interdependent and intertem-
poral nature of financial decisions: An application to cash flow sensitivities, Jour-
nal of Finance 65, 725–763.
Giambona, E., J.P. Harding, and C. Sirmans, 2008, Explaining the variation in REIT
capital structure: The role of asset liquidation value, Real Estate Economics 36,
111–137.
Graham, J.R., and C.R. Harvey, 2001, The theory and practice of corporate finance:
evidence from the field, Journal of Financial Economics 60, 187–243.
Hardin, W.G., M.J. Highfield, M.D. Hill, and G.W. Kelly, 2009, The determinants
of REIT cash holdings, Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 39, 39–57.
Hardin, W.G., and Z. Wu, 2010, Banking relationships and REIT capital structure,
Real Estate Economics 38, 257–284.
Harrison, D.M., C.A. Panasian, and M.J. Seiler, 2011, Further evidence on the
capital structure of REITs, Real Estate Economics, forthcoming.
Hill, M.D., G.W. Kelly, and W.G. Hardin, 2010, Market value of REIT liquidity,
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, forthcoming.
Hovakimian, A., G. Hovakimian, and H. Tehranian, 2004, Determinants of target
capital structure: The case of dual debt and equity issues, Journal of Financial
Economics 71, 517–540.
Leary, M.T., and M.R. Roberts, 2010, The pecking order, debt capacity, and infor-
mation asymmetry, Journal of Financial Economic 95, 332–355.
Lins, K.V., H. Servaes, and P. Tufano, 2010, What drives corporate liquidity? an
international survey of cash holdings and lines of credit, Journal of Financial
Economics 98, 160–176.
Modigliani, F., and M.H. Miller, 1958, The cost of capital, corporation finance and
the theory of investment, American Economic Review 48, 261–297.
109
The Rat Race of Capital Structure Research: Two Spotlights on Leverage
Opler, T., L. Pinkowitz, R. Stulz, and R. Williamson, 1999, The determinants and
implications of corporate cash holdings, Journal of Financial Economics 52, 3–46.
Ozkan, A., and N. Ozkan, 2004, Corporate cash holdings: An empirical investigation
of UK companies, Journal of Banking & Finance 28, 2103–2134.
Petersen, M.A., 2009, Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Com-
paring approaches, Review of Financial Studies 22, 435–480.
Riddiough, T.J., and Z. Wu, 2009, Financial constraints, liquidity management and
investment, Real Estate Economics 37, 447–481.
Sufi, A., 2009, Bank lines of credit in corporate finance: An empirical analysis,
Review of Financial Studies 22, 1057–1088.
110
Schriften zu Immobilienökonomie und Immobilienrecht 
IREBS International Real Estate Business School (Hrsg.) 
 
Die Reihe „Schriften zu Immobilienökonomie“ wurde 1994 von Karl-Werner Schulte begründet. Ab Band 29 war Stephan Bone-Winkel, 
ab Band 57 Wolfgang Schäfers Mitherausgeber. 2014 (ab Band 67) wurde die Reihe mit den seit 2008 von Jürgen Kühling herausgege-
ben „Schriften zum Öffentlichem Immobilienrecht und Infrastrukturrecht“ fusioniert und wird seitdem gemeinsam von den Professoren 
der IREBS International Real Estate Business School als „Schriften zu Immobilienökonomie und Immobilienrecht“ herausgegeben. 
Anlässlich der Zusammenlegung der Schriftenreihen wurden auch frühere Arbeiten an der IREBS, die bisher in den Schriftenreihen noch 
nicht veröffentlicht wurden, neu herausgegeben. 
Schriften zu Immobilienökonomie und Immobilienrecht 
Glossner, Stefan: Unternehmensmobilität im Kontext der Immobilienökonomie – Eine theoretische und 
empirische Analyse des Mobilitätsverhaltens gewerblicher Mieter in Deutschland / IREBS International Real 
Estate Business School (Hrsg.). Regensburg: Universitätsbibliothek Regensburg, 2014 (Schriften zu Immobi-
lienökonomie und Immobilienrecht 74) 
Blüml, Andreas: Immobilienwirtschaftliche Investmentstile – Eine theoretische und empirische Untersuchung 
am Beispiel der Präferenzstrukturen institutioneller Immobilieninvestoren / IREBS International Real Estate 
Business School (Hrsg.). Regensburg: Universitätsbibliothek Regensburg, 2014 (Schriften zu Immobilienöko-
nomie und Immobilienrecht 73) 
Segerer, Matthias: Investitionen in Handelsimmobilien – Allgemeine theoretische Grundlagen sowie deren 
Übertragung auf das Beispiel des deutschen LM-Discounters unter Berücksichtigung der jeweils wesentli-
chen Akteure / IREBS International Real Estate Business School (Hrsg.). Regensburg: Universitätsbibliothek 
Regensburg, 2014 (Schriften zu Immobilienökonomie und Immobilienrecht 72) 
Fleischmann, Benedikt: Asset Allocation under the Influence of Long-Run Relations / IREBS International Real 
Estate Business School (Hrsg.). Regensburg: Universitätsbibliothek Regensburg, 2014 (Schriften zu Immobi-
lienökonomie und Immobilienrecht 71) 
Gohs, Andreas: Wertentwicklungen von Immobilienanlagen und ihre Risiken: Ein Vorschlag zur Evaluierung 
von Korrekturverfahren für bewertungsbasierte Immobilienindices / IREBS International Real Estate Business 
School (Hrsg.). Regensburg: Universitätsbibliothek Regensburg, 2014 (Schriften zu Immobilienökonomie und 
Immobilienrecht 70) 
Steininger, Bertram: Implications of Securitization / IREBS International Real Estate Business School (Hrsg.). 
Regensburg: Universitätsbibliothek Regensburg, 2014 (Schriften zu Immobilienökonomie und Immobilien-
recht 69) 
Rehring, Christian: Commercial Real Estate Investments and the Term Structure of Risk and Return / IREBS 
International Real Estate Business School (Hrsg.). Regensburg: Universitätsbibliothek Regensburg, 2014 
(Schriften zu Immobilienökonomie und Immobilienrecht 68) 
Schätz, Alexander: Dynamics on Real Estate and Emerging Markets / IREBS International Real Estate Business 
School (Hrsg.). Regensburg: Universitätsbibliothek Regensburg, 2014 (Schriften zu Immobilienökonomie und 
Immobilienrecht 67) 
Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 
Schulte, Kai-Magnus: Asset Pricing in European Real Estate Capital Markets / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.); 
Bone-Winkel, Stephan (Hrsg.); Schäfers, Wolfgang (Hrsg.). Köln: Immobilienmanager-Verlag, 2014 (Schriften 
zur Immobilienökonomie 66) 
Kongela, Sophia M.: Framework and Value Drivers for Real Estate Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Assessment of the Tanzanian Real Estate Sector in the Context of the Competitiveness Model / Schulte, Karl-
Werner (Hrsg.); Bone-Winkel, Stephan (Hrsg.); Schäfers, Wolfgang (Hrsg.). Köln: Immobilienmanager-Verlag, 
2013 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 65) 
Schubert, Jan A.: Büroimmobilien in Deutschland: Die Bedeutung der Beschäftigungsstruktur für die 
Marktauswahl institutioneller Investoren / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.); Bone-Winkel, Stephan (Hrsg.); 
Schäfers, Wolfgang (Hrsg.). Köln: Immobilienmanager-Verlag, 2013 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 64) 
Kusiluka, Moses M.: Agency conflicts in real estate investment in Sub-Saharan Africa: exploration of selected 
investors in Tanzania and the effectiveness of institutional remedies / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.); Bone-
Winkel, Stephan (Hrsg.); Schäfers, Wolfgang (Hrsg.). Köln: Immobilienmanager-Verlag, 2012 (Schriften zur 
Immobilienökonomie 63) 
Nebauer, Claudia: Immobilien-Controlling für institutionelle Investoren: Eine theoretische und empirische 
Untersuchung / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.); Bone-Winkel, Stephan (Hrsg.); Schäfers, Wolfgang (Hrsg.). 
Köln: Immobilienmanager-Verlag, 2012 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 62) 
Schleich, Helmut: Sustainable property portfolio management – with special consideration of energy 
efficiency improvements in the property portfolio stock / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.); Bone-Winkel, Stephan 
(Hrsg.); Schäfers, Wolfgang (Hrsg.). Köln: Immobilienmanager-Verlag, 2012 (Schriften zur Immobilien-
ökonomie 61) 
Forster-Kraus, Stefanie: Der Einfluss der Demographie auf die Erschwinglichkeit von Wohnraum in Deutsch-
land: Eine theoretische und empirische Analyse / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.); Bone-Winkel, Stephan (Hrsg.); 
Schäfers, Wolfgang (Hrsg.). Köln: Immobilienmanager-Verlag, 2011 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 60) 
Trübestein, Michael: Real Estate Asset Management für institutionelle Investoren: eine theoretische 
Konzeption und empirische Untersuchung aus Sicht institutioneller Investoren in Deutschland / Schulte, Karl-
Werner (Hrsg.); Bone-Winkel, Stephan (Hrsg.); Schäfers, Wolfgang (Hrsg.). Köln: Immobilienmanager-Verlag, 
2011 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 59) 
Rothenberger, Steen: Foreign Real Estate Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Behavioural Approach in 
Countervailing the Investment Stigma by Image Analysis and Exploration of the Tanzanian Real Estate 
Market / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.); Bone-Winkel, Stephan (Hrsg.); Schäfers, Wolfgang (Hrsg.). Köln: 
Immobilienmanager-Verlag, 2010 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 58) 
Högner, Johannes: Private Investitionen in die Verkehrsinfrastruktur – eine theoretische Analyse und 
empirische Untersuchung anhand von Fallstudien / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.); Bone-Winkel, Stephan 
(Hrsg.); Schäfers, Wolfgang (Hrsg.). Köln: Immobilienmanager-Verlag, 2010 (Schriften zur Immobilien-
ökonomie 57) 
Spies, F. Ferdinand: Ökonometrische Modelle zur Prognose von Büromieten / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.); 
Bone-Winkel, Stephan (Hrsg.). Köln: Immobilienmanager-Verlag, 2009 (Schriften zur Immobilien-
ökonomie 56) 
Teichmann, Sven A.: Integriertes Facilities Management in Europa: Theoretische Konzeption, empirische 
Untersuchung und Marktanalyse zur Gestaltung und Steuerung von Wertschöpfungspartnerschaften im 
internationalen Kontext / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.); Bone-Winkel, Stephan (Hrsg.). Köln: Immobilienma-
nager-Verlag, 2009 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 55) 
Stock, Alexandra: Risikomanagement im Rahmen des Immobilien-Portfoliomanagements institutioneller 
Investoren / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.); Bone-Winkel, Stephan (Hrsg.). Köln: Immobilienmanager-Verlag, 
2009 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 54) 
Feldmann, Philipp: Die strategische Entwicklung neuer Stadtquartiere – unter besonderer Berücksichtigung 
innenstadtnaher oder innerstädtischer, brachgefallener Industrieareale / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.); Bone-
Winkel, Stephan (Hrsg.). Köln: Immobilienmanager-Verlag, 2009 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 53) 
Arens, Jenny: Strategisches Reputationsmanagement in Unternehmen der Immobilienbranche / Schulte, Karl-
Werner (Hrsg.); Bone-Winkel, Stephan (Hrsg.). Köln: Immobilienmanager-Verlag, 2009 (Schriften zur 
Immobilienökonomie 52) 
Bischoff, Thorsten: Public Private Partnership (PPP) im öffentlichen Hochbau: Entwicklung eines ganzheitli-
chen, anreizorientierten Vergütungssystems / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.); Bone-Winkel, Stephan (Hrsg.). 
Köln: Immobilienmanager-Verlag, 2009 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 51) 
Kohl, Nicolas: Corporate Governance and Market Valuation of Publicly Traded Real Estate Companies: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.); Bone-Winkel, Stephan (Hrsg.). Köln: 
Immobilienmanager-Verlag, 2009 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 50) 
Pfeffer, Tobias: Performance of REITs: A Sector- and Company-based Analysis of Links and Time Lags 
between Real Estate Market Cycles, Earnings, and Pricing of REITs / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.); Bone-
Winkel, Stephan (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 2009 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 49) 
Staiber, Markus: Immobilienbewertung in der Kreditwirtschaft: Vorschläge zur Prozessoptimierung / Schulte, 
Karl-Werner (Hrsg.); Bone-Winkel, Stephan (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 2009 (Schriften zur Immobilienökono-
mie 48) 
Naubereit, Philipp: Harmonisierung internationaler Immobilienbewertungsansätze / Schulte, Karl-Werner 
(Hrsg.); Bone-Winkel, Stephan (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 2009 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 47) 
Gerstner, Nicolai: Entscheidungsprozesse in Unternehmen bei der Anmietung von Büroimmobilien / Schulte, 
Karl-Werner (Hrsg.); Bone-Winkel, Stephan (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 2008 (Schriften zur Immobilienökono-
mie 46) 
Mahler, Kilian: Logistikimmobilien: Optimierung des Investment- und Logistikerfolges / Schulte, Karl-Werner 
(Hrsg.); Bone-Winkel, Stephan (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 2008 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 45) 
Hofmann, Philip: Immobilien-Projektentwicklung als Dienstleistung für institutionelle Auftraggeber / Schulte, 
Karl-Werner (Hrsg.); Bone-Winkel, Stephan (Hrsg.). Köln: Immobilien Manager Verlag, 2007 (Schriften zur 
Immobilienökonomie 44) 
Boll, Philip: Investitionen in Public Private Partnership-Projekte im öffentlichen Hochbau unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der Risikoverteilung: eine theoretische und empirische Untersuchung der Anforderung 
privater Investoren / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.); Bone-Winkel, Stephan (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 2007 
(Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 43) 
Flüshöh, Christian; Strottrop, Daria: Büroflächenbestand: Grundlagen, Daten und Methoden, eine Büroflä-
chenvollerhebung am Beispiel der Stadt Düsseldorf / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.); Bone-Winkel, Stephan 
(Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 2007 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 42) 
Kolb, Christian: Corporate Governance bei deutschen Immobilienkapitalgesellschaften / Schulte, Karl-Werner 
(Hrsg.); Bone-Winkel, Stephan (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 2007 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 41) 
Holzmann, Christoph: Entwicklung eines Real Estate Confidence Indicator zur kurzfristigen Konjunkturprog-
nose auf Immobilienmärkten / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.); Bone-Winkel, Stephan (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 
2007 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 40) 
Zimmermann, Matthias: Projektentwicklung im Immobilienbestand institutioneller Investoren: Konzeption, 
Make-or-Buy-Entscheidung und empirische Analyse zur Revitalisierung von Büroimmobilien / Schulte, Karl-
Werner (Hrsg.); Bone-Winkel, Stephan (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 2006 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 39) 
Sturm, Verena: Erfolgsfaktoren der Revitalisierung von Shopping-Centern: ein Turnaround-Management-
Ansatz / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.); Bone-Winkel, Stephan (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 2006 (Schriften zur 
Immobilienökonomie 38) 
Beidatsch, Kaja: Geographic Selection - Auswahl von Zielmärkten im Portfoliomanagement: Eine empirische 
Analyse am Beispiel ausgewählter deutscher Büromärkte / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.); Bone-Winkel, 
Stephan (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 2006 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 37) 
Pelzeter, Andrea: Lebenszykluskosten von Immobilien: Einfluss von Lage, Gestaltung und Umwelt / Schulte, 
Karl-Werner (Hrsg.); Bone-Winkel, Stephan (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 2006 (Schriften zur Immobilienökono-
mie 36) 
Gier, Sonja: Bereitstellung und Desinvestition von Unternehmensimmobilien / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.); 
Bone-Winkel, Stephan (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 2006 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 35) 
Breidenbach, Marc: Real Estate Securitisation – Asset-backed security financing for the property industry, an 
international comparison applied to the case of Germany / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.); Bone-Winkel, 
Stephan (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 2005 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 34) 
Focke, Christian: Gewerbeimmobilien-Investments in Polen – Eine Analyse der Marktentwicklung, Eignung 
und Akzeptanz aus der Perspektive deutscher institutioneller Investoren / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.); Bone-
Winkel, Stephan (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 2005 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 33) 
Matzen, Frank J.: Unternehmensbewertung von Wohnungsbauunternehmen unter besonderer Berücksichti-
gung der Besteuerung und Finanzierung / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.); Bone-Winkel, Stephan (Hrsg.). Köln: 
Müller, 2005 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 32) 
Wernecke, Martin: Büroimmobilienzyklen - Eine Analyse der Ursachen, der Ausprägungen in Deutschland 
und der Bedeutung für Investitionsentscheidungen / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.); Bone-Winkel, Stephan 
(Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 2004 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 31) 
Pitschke, Christoph: Die Finanzierung gewerblicher Immobilien-Projektentwicklungen unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der Neuen Baseler Eigenkapitalvereinbarung / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.); Bone-Winkel, 
Stephan (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 2004 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 30). - Umschlagtitel: Die Finanzie-
rung gewerblicher Immobilien-Projektentwicklungen unter Basel II 
Rottke, Nico: Investitionen mit Real Estate Private Equity – Herleitung eines anreizkompatiblen Beteiligungs-
modells unter Berücksichtigung der Transaktionskosten- und Agency-Theorie / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.); 
Bone-Winkel, Stephan (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 2004 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 29)  
Blumenthal, Ira: Anforderungen an ein Marketingkonzept für Facilities-Management-Dienstleistungs-
unternehmen – Ein Vergleich zwischen Theorie und Empirie / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 
2004 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 28) 
Ecke, Christian: Strategisches Immobilienmanagement der öffentlichen Hand – empirische Untersuchungen 
und Handlungsempfehlungen / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 2004 (Schriften zur Immobilien-
ökonomie 27) 
Fischer, Carsten: Projektentwicklung: Leistungsbild und Honorarstruktur / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.). Köln: 
Müller, 2004 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 26) 
Busz, Pamela: Seniorenimmobilien als Investitionsobjekte - Entwicklung und empirische Analyse eines 
Beurteilungsmodells / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 2003 (Schriften zur Immobilienökono-
mie 25) 
Gerhard, Jan: Immobilienportfoliomanagement mit Immobilienindex-Derivaten: Eine kritische Analyse und 
Bewertung der Einsatzmöglichkeiten immobilienindexbasierter Finanzinstrumente auf dem deutschen Markt 
/ Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 2003 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 24) 
Iblher, Felix: Internetbasierte Immobilienfinanzierung: Auswirkungen des Electronic Business auf die 
Finanzierung privater Wohnimmobilien / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 2003 (Schriften zur 
Immobilienökonomie 23) 
Vogel, Ludwig: Projektentwicklung von Factory Outlet Centern - eine akzeptanztheoretische Untersuchung / 
Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 2003 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 22) 
Hagemeier, Irene M.: Der Einsatz staatlicher Instrumente in der Wohnungs- und Bodenpolitik des 20. 
Jahrhunderts: Deutschland, Spanien, Schweden und die USA im Vergleich / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.). 
Köln: Müller, 2003 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 21) 
Werner, Jeannette: Die Besteuerung von Gewerbeimmobilien in Europa: effektive Steuerbelastung und 
Steuerbeständigkeit in einem Fünf-Länder-Vergleich / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 2002 
(Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 20) 
Schulz-Eickhorst, Antje: Die Bauherren-Architekten-Beziehung: eine institutionenökonomische Problemana-
lyse mit Lösungsansätzen / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 2002 (Schriften zur Immobilienöko-
nomie 19) 
Cieleback, Marcus: Optionsaspekte der Zinssicherung durch Bauspardarlehen und ihre Implikationen für die 
Wohneigentumsfinanzierung / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 2001 (Schriften zur Immobilien-
ökonomie 18). - Umschlagtitel: Bausparen und Optionstheorie 
Crommen, Marcel: Finanzierung von Unternehmensimmobilien: Eine Shareholder Value-orientierte Analyse / 
Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 2001 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 17) 
Sotelo, Ramon: Ökonomische Grundlagen der Wohnungspolitik / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 
2001 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 16) 
Walbröhl, Victoria: Die Immobilienanlageentscheidung im Rahmen des Kapitalanlagemanagements 
institutioneller Anleger – eine Untersuchung am Beispiel deutscher Lebensversicherungsunternehmen und 
Pensionskassen / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 2001 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 15) 
Pierschke, Barbara: Die organisatorische Gestaltung des betrieblichen Immobilienmanagements / Schulte, 
Karl-Werner (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 2001 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 14) 
Hens, Markus: Marktwertorientiertes Management von Unternehmensimmobilien / Schulte, Karl-Werner 
(Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 1999 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 13) 
Straßheimer, Petra: Internationales Corporate Real Estate Management: Implikationen der Internationalisie-
rung von Unternehmen auf das betriebliche Immobilienmanagement / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.). Köln: 
Müller, 1999 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 12) 
Väth, Arno: Die Grundstücks-Investmentaktiengesellschaft als Pendant zum REIT: Entwicklung einer 
Konzeption auf Basis der KAGG-Novelle ’98 / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 1999 (Schriften zur 
Immobilienökonomie 11) 
Vaaßen, Nicole: Gewerbliches Immobilienleasing: eine quantitative und qualitative Analyse aus Sicht des 
Leasingnehmers / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 1999 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 10) 
Buse, Christoph: Strategisches Management von industrieverbundenen Wohnungsunternehmen / Schulte, 
Karl-Werner (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 1999 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 9) 
Isenhöfer, Björn: Strategisches Management von Projektentwicklungsunternehmen / Schulte, Karl-Werner 
(Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 1999 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 8) 
Brade, Kerstin H.: Strategischer Marketingplanungsprozeß für Büroimmobilien: Anwendung der Kausalana-
lyse zur Erforschung des Mieterverhaltens / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 1998 (Schriften zur 
Immobilienökonomie 7) 
Leopoldsberger, Gerrit: Kontinuierliche Wertermittlung von Immobilien / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.). Köln: 
Müller, 1998 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 6) 
Ropeter, Sven-Eric: Investitionsanalyse für Gewerbeimmobilien / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 
1998 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 5) 
Kirsch, Daniela: Public Private Partnership: Eine empirische Untersuchung der kooperativen Handlungs-
strategien in Projekten der Flächenerschließung und Immobilienentwicklung / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.). 
Köln: Müller, 1997 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 4) 
Schäfers, Wolfgang: Strategisches Management von Unternehmensimmobilien: Bausteine einer theoreti-
schen Konzeption und Ergebnisse einer empirischen Untersuchung / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.). Köln: 
Müller, 1997 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 3) 
Thomas, Matthias: Die Entwicklung eines Performanceindexes für den deutschen Immobilienmarkt / Schulte, 
Karl-Werner (Hrsg.). Köln: Müller, 1997 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 2) 
Bone-Winkel, Stephan: Das strategische Management von offenen Immobilienfonds unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der Projektentwicklung von Gewerbeimmobilien / Schulte, Karl-Werner (Hrsg.). Köln: 
Müller, 1994 (Schriften zur Immobilienökonomie 1) 
Schriften zum Öffentlichen Immobilienrecht und Infrastrukturrecht 
Kühling, Jürgen (Hrsg.): Grünes Baurecht und Energiewende (Tagungsband des 6. Regensburger Immobilien-
rechtstags am 12. Juli 2013), Köln, München: Heymann, 2014 (Schriften zum Öffentlichen Immobilienrecht 
und Infrastrukturrecht 10) 
Kühling, Jürgen (Hrsg.): Die Einzelhandelsimmobilie - Wirtschaftliche Rationalität und rechtliche Steuerung 
(Tagungsband des 5. Regensburger Immobilienrechtstags am 13. Juli 2012), Köln, München: Heymann, 
2012 (Schriften zum Öffentlichen Immobilienrecht und Infrastrukturrecht 9) 
Müller, Kathrin: Das bauordnungsrechtliche Verunstaltungsverbot (Verfahrensoptimierung zur Bewältigung 
bauästhetischer Konflikte im öffentlichen Raum), Köln, München: Heymann, 2012 (Schriften zum Öffentli-
chen Immobilienrecht und Infrastrukturrecht 8) 
Kühling, Jürgen (Hrsg.): Die Einzelhandelsimmobilie - Bau(recht)liche Todsünden und vernünftige Problem-
lösungen (Tagungsband des 4. Regensburger Immobilienrechtstags am 15. Juli 2011), Köln, München: 
Heymann, 2012 (Schriften zum Öffentlichen Immobilienrecht und Infrastrukturrecht 7) 
Kühling, Jürgen (Hrsg.): Kooperation im Öffentlichen Immobilien- und Infrastrukturrecht (Tagungsband des 
3. Regensburger Immobilienrechtstags am 16. Juli 2010), Köln, München: Heymann, 2011 (Schriften zum 
Öffentlichen Immobilienrecht und Infrastrukturrecht 6) 
Kühling, Jürgen (Hrsg.): Mehrebenenkonflikte im Öffentlichen Immobilien-und Infrastrukturrecht (Tagungs-
band des 2. Regensburger Immobilienrechtstags am 2. Juli 2009), Köln, München: Heymann, 2010 
(Schriften zum Öffentlichen Immobilienrecht und Infrastrukturrecht 5) 
Pfeifle, Florian: UNESCO-Weltkulturerbe - Vom globalen Völkerrecht zur lokalen Infrastrukturplanung, Köln, 
München: Heymann, 2010 (Schriften zum Öffentlichen Immobilienrecht und Infrastrukturrecht 4) 
Tigges, Damian: Die Regulierung des Zugangs zum Markt für Hafendienste - Ein Vergleich der horizontalen 
und vertikalen Regulierungsansätze, Köln, München: Heymann, 2009 (Schriften zum Öffentlichen Immobi-
lienrecht und Infrastrukturrecht 3) 
Müller, Friederike: Kommunalrechtliche Grenzen beim Sale-and-lease-back - Ein Beitrag zum Privatisierungs-
folgerecht am Beispiel der Privatisierung und öffentlich genutzter Immobilien, Köln, München: Heymann, 
2009 (Schriften zum Öffentlichen Immobilienrecht und Infrastrukturrecht 2) 
Kühling, Jürgen (Hrsg.): Öffentliches Recht und Investitionssicherheit in der Immobilienwirtschaft (Tagungs-
band des 1. Regensburger Immobilienrechtstags am 20. Juni 2008), Köln, München: Heymann, 2009 
(Schriften zum Öffentlichen Immobilienrecht und Infrastrukturrecht 1) 
